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I. An Accompanying Letter
We are of one mind in recommending for consideration the thoughtful report developed
by the Presidential Succession Clinic of Fordham University Law School. We were
pleased to participate in the Fordham Law Review program, a unique academic but highly
practical undertaking, that preceded the establishment of the Clinic; the program led
to the publication of an issue of the journal entitled “The Adequacy of the Presidential
Succession System in the 21st Century: Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities
in Constitutional and Extraconstitutional Arrangements,” 79 Fordham L. Rev. 775-1157
(2010). We each also participated in a class with the Clinic, sharing our experiences with
the students and responding to their questions.
We are each aware from our own public service of the importance of anticipating and
developing approaches to the handling of contingencies that, if they occurred, could
endanger our nation. We have been reminded time and again that what may appear at one
time to be remote does in fact occur. Luckily, we have met past challenges and have taken
steps to improve our system, but we have not addressed every gap.
The accompanying Report, entitled “Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in
the Modern Era: Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential
Succession,” is important for many reasons. It provides a thorough history of our nation’s
three succession statutes, examines the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that has served the
nation well, and discusses political party rules and procedures for responding to succession
contingencies in the pre-inaugural period. The three professors and nine students of
Fordham Law School who have studied the system of presidential succession and developed
this Report offer recommendations worthy of careful attention regardless of one’s point of
view on the subject generally or on any particular recommendation. Fordham Law School
has made valuable contributions in the field of presidential succession and this Report is the
latest and possibly most immediately constructive.
We thank Fordham Law School, its deans, professors, and students, for inviting us to
participate in this rich and vital endeavor. We have no doubt that this Report will be of
enormous benefit to decision makers and citizens more broadly and urge decision makers in
the federal government as well as our national party leadership to give it their most serious
consideration.

Birch Bayh
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III. Foreword
In April 2010, Fordham University School of Law hosted
a two-day symposium on the Adequacy of the Presidential
Succession System in the 21st Century. The symposium
included as speakers and panelists many of the foremost
scholars who have addressed issues relating to the law
and practicalities of transition in the case of temporary
interruption of leadership by the President of the United
States or, of far greater potential concern, national tragedy
resulting in the death or inability of the President or Vice
President or both.
The symposium was considered by those who attended
and others in the field who reviewed the transcript to be an
extraordinarily substantive and informative conference. As
a result, William Michael Treanor, then Dean of Fordham
University School of Law, suggested that a clinic be created
to study and propose solutions for the many and challenging
issues that remain unaddressed by the Constitution, the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and current federal and state
statutes.
A clinical seminar was thus established for the Fall 2010
and Spring 2011 terms, led by former Dean John D. Feerick,
who has had a lifelong interest in these issues, has published
books and articles on them, and worked closely together with
Senator Birch Bayh and others in Congress on the drafting,
passage, and ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Dean Feerick was joined by Adjunct Professor Dora Galacatos
of Fordham Law School and Senior Counsel for the Law
School’s Feerick Center for Social Justice and Adjunct
Professor Nicole A. Gordon, a former chair of the New York
State Bar Association Federal Constitution Committee. Nine
students of different backgrounds were selected to participate
in the clinic, which required a significant commitment and
intensive work to master the literature and intricacies of the
subjects raised by the topic.
Beyond their study, the students shaped this Report after
determining subjects that it would address. The seminar
examined the question of what true “gaps” exist in the
current succession process (i.e., those for which there is no

10

clear direction in law), as opposed to possible gaps for which
a solution does exist but is not ideal. The students ordered
priorities among the true gaps and decided which are the
most urgent and practical to address.
A further purpose of the seminar was to make a non-partisan,
constitutionally sound, and practical contribution that could
be recognized as worthy and within the immediate reach
of the political process. There was an interest not simply
in producing a Report, but in acting on it: presenting it to
decision makers in Congress, in the executive branch, and
in the political parties, and arguing the merits of the group’s
recommendations addressing this complex area to forestall the
extraordinary challenges that could someday face this country
if contingencies occur that so far are unaccounted for in the
succession law.
The Clinic decided not to propose a constitutional amendment,
understanding the extreme difficulty of instituting change in
this manner. Instead, the students focused on suggestions for
statutory change, exercise of executive (and personal) powers,
amendment of political party and congressional rules, and
practical plans that can be implemented in the absence of any
change in the law, but that are consistent with the Constitution
and existing succession law.
The Clinic’s recommendations are summarized in the
Executive Summary and Part VIII of the Report. These
recommendations represent the consensus of the group and
should not be attributed to any one person.
We are grateful for the assistance of numerous participants
in our work who are named in the acknowledgements and
without whose contributions we would not have understood
the subject as well, as readily, or as deeply.
John D. Feerick
Dora Galacatos
Nicole A. Gordon
June 2012
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IV. Executive Summary
The attempted assassination in January 2011 of United
States Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, Arizona,
highlights the fact that the safety of our political leaders is
under constant threat. The President of the United States,
more than any other individual, unites and strengthens the
nation and serves as a source of stability in crisis situations.
The gaps and contingencies that exist in the current system
of presidential succession leave our country vulnerable to
a vacuum in national leadership. It is easy to conclude that
the unaddressed contingencies in the current system of
presidential succession are remote, but the unexpected and
unforeseen do occur. A catastrophic event can leave both the
President and Vice President dead or unable at the same time.

succession as set forth in the text of the Constitution—Article
II, Section 1, Clause 6, and the Twelfth, Twentieth, and
Twenty-Fifth Amendments—the Presidential Succession Act
of 1947, other federal and state statutes, political party rules,
and documents such as “letter agreements” that provided
for a transition process in certain circumstances. The Clinic
examined a broad range of proposals regarding presidential
succession and interviewed, among others, many of the
experts who participated in the Fordham symposium.

The Presidential Succession Clinic at Fordham University
School of Law, composed of three professors and nine
students, undertook in July 2010 the task of analyzing
the existing framework for succession and advancing
recommendations to address these gaps and contingencies.
The Symposium on Presidential Succession, sponsored by
the Fordham Law Review in April 2010, highlighted these
weaknesses.i Many of the nation’s foremost public servants in
past succession crises joined with other experts in academia,
law, national security, public policy, and politics to discuss
these issues. They encouraged continued work in this field
leading to the establishment of the Clinic.

• Certainty and predictability in the transition of
leadership;

The work of a law school clinic may be seen by some as a
largely academic endeavor; however, as former Dean William
Michael Treanor noted at the symposium, “[g]iven the terrible
frequency with which Presidents fail to complete their terms
of office and the frequency with which they are disabled, any
ambiguities concerning presidential succession and any flaws
in the rules governing succession have the capacity to lead
to national disaster.”ii We agree. The unforeseen and remote
can occur, and advance contingency planning can prevent
confusion or even chaos at a time of national distress.

First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address certain
instances of inability of a President or Vice President. These
include:

The Clinic began by studying the system of presidential

Second, succession to the presidency is possible through a
line including members of both the legislative and executive
branches. The gaps and contingencies in this area include:

i

Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 21st
Century: Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional
and Extraconstitutional Arrangement, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 775 (2010).

ii

Id. at 775-76.

In making recommendations for reform, we were guided by
five values:
• Adherence to the Constitution;

• Legitimacy of a presidential successor in the eyes of the
public;
• Party continuity; and
• Depth in qualifications of a possible successor.
The Clinic studied three distinct areas: presidential and vicepresidential inabilities not provided for by the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment; the line of succession; and the pre-inaugural
period.

•

Inability of a President when there is a vacancy in the
office of Vice President;

•

Dual inability of a President and Vice President;

•

Inability of a Vice President; and

•

Inability of a statutory successor while acting as President.
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•

The questionable constitutionality of having legislative
leaders in the line of succession;

•

Concerns about the qualifications and presidential
pedigree of executive officers in the line of succession;

•

The effects of the “bumping” provision in the current
succession law, which can result in multiple individuals
exercising the powers of the President in a short period of
time; and

•

Lack of clarity whether Acting Cabinet Secretaries are in
the line of succession.

Finally, each segment within the pre-inaugural period,
running up to the start of the quadrennial presidential term
on January 20, presents distinct gaps and contingencies.
We address these with particular attention to democratic
legitimacy and current political realities. They include:
•

Party procedures that do not adequately address the
death or resignation of a presidential or vice-presidential
candidate prior to Inauguration Day;

•

Lack of clarity about the duties of presidential electors
and Congress with respect to the casting and counting of
electoral votes in the event of the death or resignation of a
presidential or vice-presidential nominee, or both; and

•

Lack of an institutionalized process for nominating
Cabinet members during the transition between
presidential administrations.
•••

The Clinic is aware of the political challenges to reform in this
area. Although we have certain preferred recommendations,
we recognize the obstacles to change and have made a range
of proposals to offer decision makers different options to
consider. We also note with respect to our recommendations
for executive action that these will almost all require
cooperation with the legislative branch and that some of
the recommendations surely reflect actions already taken by
recent administrations, but which are not necessarily known
to the public.

12

A. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Inability
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
establishes procedures for both the filling of a vacancy in
the office of the Vice President and for addressing a case of a
presidential inability. The Amendment’s availability in 1973
and 1974, when both the elected President and Vice President
resigned from their offices, provided essential stability and
continuity at a time of great national turmoil.
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has dealt
successfully with challenges encountered since its adoption
in 1967, neither the Amendment nor the 1947 Act addresses
several key threats to presidential continuity posed by a
presidential or vice-presidential inability.
First, the Amendment is predicated on the availability of
an able Vice President. In the event that the office of Vice
President is vacant or the Vice President, due to his own
inability, is unable to act with the Cabinet under Section 4
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Amendment does not
provide an alternative means for making a declaration that
the President is unable. History has shown that a vacancy or
inability in the office of the Vice President is a contingency
that cannot be ignored.
Second, the Amendment does not establish a procedure for
declaring the inability of the Vice President. In the event that
a President dies, resigns, or is removed from office, a situation
may arise in which an unable Vice President would assume the
presidency. In addition, a President anticipating a temporary
inability or one who is unable but recognizes his own inability
will likely be reluctant to transfer his powers even briefly to an
unable Vice President. Furthermore, an unable Vice President
may not be in a position to exercise his responsibility pursuant
to Section 4 to declare a President unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office.
Third, neither the Amendment nor the 1947 Act establishes
procedures for declaring the inability of an Acting President
during a vice-presidential vacancy or inability.

Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era:

ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)

Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability
Recommendations:
Statutory Action:
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President,
upon declaration of his own inability, can transfer his
powers voluntarily to the next in the line of succession in
instances of vice-presidential inability or vacancy.
2. Authorize the person next in the line of succession
after the Vice President, together with a majority of the
Cabinet, to declare the inability of the President or Acting
President in instances of vice-presidential inability or
vacancy.
Executive Contingency Planning:
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a
prospective executive declaration of inability at the
beginning of his service, in which he would define the
situations which in his view would render him unable
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in
the future and would provide that the declaration of his
inability goes into effect based upon a review process set
out by the President or Acting President.
Vice-Presidential Inability Recommendation:
Executive Contingency Planning:
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in
which he would define the situations which in his view
would render him unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the vice presidency in the future and would
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into
effect based upon a review process set out by the Vice
President.

B. Line of Succession
Article II of the Constitution names the Vice President
as the first person on whom the powers and duties of the
presidency will devolve and authorizes Congress to establish
a line of succession after the Vice President. The Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 expands the line to include the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro
tempore of the Senate, and then the Cabinet Secretaries in the
order in which their departments were created.
Debate about the constitutionality of including legislative
leaders in the line of succession has remained a steady
undercurrent in the legislative history of the Presidential
Succession Acts of 1792, 1886, and 1947. There are two
major criticisms of including legislative leaders in the line of
succession. First, some argue that the Speaker of the House
and President pro tempore of the Senate are not “Officers”
within the meaning of Article II. Second, some maintain that
the inclusion of legislative officers in the line of succession
compromises the principle of separation of powers between
the executive and legislative branches.
In the case of presidential inability, the Speaker and the
President pro tempore can become Acting President in the
absence of a Vice President. Including legislators for this
purpose in the line of succession is especially problematic
because they are required by statute to resign their roles and
seats in Congress in order to act as President and cannot
simply return to their previous positions when the inability
of the President is removed. Thus, temporarily acting as
President until an inability is removed could effectively
end the political career of a legislative leader. This creates a
disincentive for a legislative leader to act as President at a time
when stable leadership is most urgent.
Moreover, the Speaker and the President pro tempore can
“bump” members of the Cabinet who are acting as President,
which can result in multiple successors serving as Acting
President during a short period.
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Line of Succession Recommendations

C. Pre-Inauguration Period

Statutory Action:

The current system of pre-inauguration presidential
succession is governed by a legal framework based on
constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, and
political party rules. Contingencies that may occur during
the period prior to a General Election are governed almost
exclusively by party rules. The political parties are authorized
by their rules to fill any vacancies in the nominations for the
offices of President and Vice President.

5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs
exclusively through the Cabinet after the President
and Vice President. In the case of removal, death, or
resignation of the President, the Cabinet member
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should
be required to resign from the Cabinet. In a case of
inability, the Cabinet member assuming the powers and
duties of the presidency should not be required to resign.
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted,
establish a binary line of succession that first runs through
Congress, and then the Cabinet, in instances of death,
resignation, and removal. Successors would be required
to resign in these circumstances. The line of succession
would run solely through the Cabinet in instances of
presidential and vice-presidential inability or failure to
qualify. Under this proposal, when a Cabinet member
assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that
Cabinet member would not be required to resign.
7. Confirm whether Acting Secretaries are included in the
line of succession, and, if so, either remove them from the
line, or alternatively, amend the 1947 Act so that Acting
Secretaries can assume the powers and duties of the
presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation, but
only after succession has passed through all of the Cabinet
Secretaries.

The parties are similarly authorized to fill vacancies that may
occur on their respective national tickets after the General
Election, prior to the casting of the Electoral College votes in
mid-December.
The Twelfth Amendment governs contingencies that may
occur between the casting of the Electoral votes in midDecember and the counting of those votes by Congress on
January 6. The Amendment is silent as to whether Congress
can invalidate electoral votes cast for a presidential or vicepresidential nominee who dies after the meeting of the
Electoral College and before Congress counts the electoral
votes.
The Clinic has concluded that Congress is required to count
these votes and that it must declare the winners even if they
have both died since the meeting of the Electoral College.
The Twentieth Amendment addresses the death of either a
President-elect or Vice President-elect during the fourteen
days between the congressional count of the electoral votes
on January 6 and Inauguration Day on January 20. In the case
of the death or resignation of the President-elect, the Vice
President-elect becomes President on January 20. In the case
of the death or resignation of the Vice President-elect, the
new President is required to nominate a Vice President to be
approved by a majority of both houses of Congress.
In the event of the double death of the successful presidential
and vice-presidential candidates, the Speaker would become
Acting President pursuant to the 1947 Act. Such a scenario
may, however, result in a change in the party of the presidency
contrary to the will of the electorate.
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Pre-Inaugural Period Recommendations:
Political Party Rules:
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential
candidate before the political party conventions, require
the parties to hold an open meeting to decide which
replacement candidate(s) will receive the delegates’ votes.
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential
nominee between the political party conventions and the
General Election, require the parties to either hold an
open meeting to select a replacement candidate or recall
the convention delegates.
10. During the period between the General Election and
the meeting of the Electoral College, provide that
the vice-presidential candidate replaces a deceased or
resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and
that the candidate’s party issue recommendations to the
presidential electors as to a new candidate for the office of
Vice President.
Congressional Rules:
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential
or vice-presidential candidate between the meeting of the
Electoral College and the counting and declaration of the
Electoral College votes by Congress, require Congress to
count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the time
of the Electoral College vote.
Executive Contingency Planning:
12. During the period between the counting and declaration
of Electoral College votes by Congress and Inauguration

Day, the outgoing President should consider promptly
nominating any Cabinet nominees the Presidentelect submits to him, and Congress should confirm as
many nominees as possible prior to Inauguration Day,
consistent with the proper discharge of Congress’s advice
and consent responsibility. One or more newly confirmed
Cabinet Secretaries should remain at a secure location
outside of Washington, D.C. on Inauguration Day. This
recommendation is particularly important in the case of
an exclusively executive line of succession, as the Clinic
recommends.

D. Conclusion
The work of the Constitution’s Framers in creating a system
for presidential succession has provided stability and
continuity for the nation during many uncertain moments
in its history. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, adopted after
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, further
buttressed the system of presidential succession by providing
mechanisms for: the seamless succession of the Vice President
to the presidency in the case of a vacancy in that office; the
filling of a vacancy in the vice presidency; and addressing
instances of presidential inability.
Our recommendations are designed to be consistent with
the separation of powers and the framework of checks and
balances, to protect the electorate’s choice of President
and Vice President and their party for a four-year term,
and to ensure the stability and continuity of government
in the modern era. We believe the adoption of the Clinic’s
recommendations will support these goals.
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V. Inability and Presidential Succession Issues
A. Introduction
The Framers of the Constitution constructed a succession
provision that enabled the Vice President to assume the
powers and duties of the President in the event of the death,
resignation, removal, or inability of the President.1 The
succession provision, however, did not cover all possible
contingencies. The adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
in 1967 filled several important gaps, but it did not provide
for every instance of presidential inability or address the case
of a vice-presidential inability.2 These open areas continue to
present policy challenges, constitutional issues, and questions
of construction of current statutes.

B. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
1. History of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963
renewed Congress’s interest in providing safeguards in
the event of presidential inability.3 Senator Birch Bayh, as
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, largely led these efforts.4 After conducting
extensive hearings and debates and considering the opinions
of the American Bar Association and others on the topic,
Congress completed work on what would become the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment in July of 1965.5 The Amendment
was ratified on February 10, 1967.6
Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment codifies the
precedent set by President John Tyler in 1841 when he
assumed the office of the President rather than the position of
Acting President upon President William Henry Harrison’s
death.7 Under Section 1, when the President dies, resigns, or
is removed from office, the Vice President becomes President,
rather than Acting President, and is no longer Vice President.8
This section is intended to ensure that there is never a vacancy
in the office of President.9
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment deals with a vicepresidential vacancy. When there is a vice-presidential vacancy
resulting either from the death, resignation, or removal of
the Vice President or from the Vice President’s succession to
the presidency upon the death, resignation, or removal of the
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President, the new President must nominate a Vice President,
who is subject to confirmation by a majority of both houses of
Congress.10 The term “vacancy” does not cover an inability of
the President or Vice President.11
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment address
presidential inability. Section 3 provides a mechanism by
which the President can declare his own inability in a writing
to the President pro tempore and the Speaker, which results
in the Vice President serving as Acting President until the
President declares that his inability has been removed.12
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sets forth the
process by which the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet, or another body as Congress may provide,i can act
together to declare the President unable to perform the duties
of his office when he cannot or will not do so himself.13 The
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet must transmit
to the President pro tempore and the Speaker their written
declaration that the President is unable to perform the duties
of his office.14 In both instances, once presidential inability is
declared, the Vice President becomes Acting President while
also continuing as Vice President.15
Under Section 4, the President can dispute the determination
of his inability by declaring in writing to the President
pro tempore and the Speaker that no inability exists.16 The
President then resumes his powers and duties at the end of
a four-day period unless the Vice President and Cabinet
majority object within four days of the President’s written
declaration.17 If within that four-day period the Vice
President and the Cabinet majority transmit to the President
pro tempore and the Speaker a written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the duties of his office,
the issue is then given to Congress which can, by a vote of
two-thirds in each house, declare the President unable.18 If
Congress does not act within twenty-one days, or if either
House supports the President, the President resumes his
powers.19 In the interim, the Vice President remains the
Acting President.20
i

Congress has never exercised its power to substitute a body for the Cabinet
to work with the Vice President under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.
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2. Applications of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment
President Gerald R. Ford was the first and so far only person
to become President under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. In 1974, Vice President Ford became President
when President Richard M. Nixon resigned from office.21
President Ford was also the first person to become Vice
President under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
in 1973.22 After President Nixon’s first Vice President, Spiro
Agnew, resigned, Nixon nominated then-Representative Ford
to be the new Vice President, and both houses of Congress
confirmed him. Less than a year later, Vice President Ford
became President upon President Nixon’s resignation from the
presidency, and President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller
to be his Vice President. Rockefeller then became Vice
President under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
after both houses of Congress confirmed him in 1974.23
President Ronald Reagan underwent anesthesia in 1985.
He followed the procedures of Section 3 of the TwentyFifth Amendment by submitting a letter to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House,
although he stated that he was not invoking Section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment because he did not want to set a
precedent.24 In his letter, President Reagan explained that he
did “not believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended
its application to situations such as the instant one.”25
President Reagan said he was following a “longstanding
arrangement” with his Vice President rather than the
constitutional provision created for inability.ii26
President George W. Bush was the first President to formally
invoke Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 2002
in anticipation of undergoing sedation.27 In 2007, President
Bush again invoked Section 3 to transfer presidential powers
and duties to Vice President Richard Cheney when he
underwent a second procedure during his term in office.28 In
both instances, President Bush followed the process set forth
in Section 3 by transmitting a written declaration of his own
inability to perform the duties of his office to the President
ii

After he left office, President Reagan acknowledged invoking the TwentyFifth Amendment at this time. See Ronald Reagan, An American Life 500
(1990).

pro tempore and the Speaker.29 President Bush reclaimed the
powers and duties of the presidency by issuing a letter to the
President pro tempore and the Speaker on the same day in
both instances.30
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been
employed, but it arguably could have been in the wake of the
attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30,
1981.31 Although White House Counsel Fred Fielding had
prepared draft documents prior to the assassination attempt
providing for the invocation of either Section 3 or Section 4
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment under such circumstances,
no formal transfer of power occurred.32 The misstatement of
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who was the top Cabinet
official in the line of succession, that until Vice President Bush’s
return to the White House he was in charge because
“[c]onstitutionally . . . you have the President, the Vice President,
and the Secretary of State, in that order,” reflected confusion
about the order of succession.33 Chief of Staff James Baker and
presidential counselor Edwin Meese III rejected a discussion of a
transfer of presidential power “until they learned more from the
doctors.”34 Vice President Bush made clear that he would not act
as President in the absence of a formal transfer of power.35

C. Contingencies Not Addressed by the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for many—but
not all—contingencies in the event of presidential inability.
Currently, there exists no legal mechanism to: declare a
President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office in the event of either a vice-presidential vacancy or
inability; declare a Vice President unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office; or declare an Acting President
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency.
That the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address these
contingencies, referred to generally as the “inability gaps,”
was not an oversight by its drafters.36 At the time of the
drafting, Representative Richard Poff asked John Feerick,
then a member of the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession, to
suggest language for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that
would cover the case of simultaneous inability of the
President and Vice President.37 Professor Feerick identified
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the inability gaps referred to above and drafted language that
would permit succession in the event of dual inability as well
as in the event of a vice-presidential inability.38

processes.”46 Nevertheless, the inability gaps that persist are
serious and must be addressed because mass catastrophe,
illness, or some other happenstance can occur at any time.

Professor Feerick proposed, in the case of a vice-presidential
vacancy or inability, that “the person next in the line of
succession shall act in lieu of the Vice-President” to determine
presidential inability.39 He also suggested that “[t]he inability
of the Vice-President shall be determined in the same manner
as that of the President except that the Vice-President shall
have no right to participate in such determination.”40 This
language and the drafted contingencies were not included in
the final amendment.

1. Inability of the President in Certain
Circumstances

Furthermore, both an amendment proposed by a bipartisan
majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1958 and an
amendment proposed by Senator Birch Bayh in 1963 had
addressed these inability gaps in a similar manner.41 Herbert
Brownell, Attorney General under President Eisenhower,
explained that the proposed 1958 amendment provided
that “‘if at any time there is no Vice President,’ the functions
envisaged for the Vice President by the proposed new
constitutional amendment ‘shall devolve upon the officer
eligible to act as President next in the line of succession to the
office of President, as provided by law’.”42 Thus, the next in the
line of succession was to have the authority to act in concert
with the Cabinet in determining presidential inability.43
The ABA’s final proposal similarly contained a provision by
which the next in the line of succession, if there were no able
Vice President, could act with a majority of the Cabinet to
determine presidential inability.iii44
When Congress did not include language in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to address the inability gaps identified, Senator
Samuel Ervin commented that attempting to fill every
gap could jeopardize ratification of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.45 As Professor Feerick points out, “[i]t was
believed at the time that an amendment providing for every
possible scenario would be too complex and therefore unlikely
to survive the difficult congressional and state ratification
iii
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The language of Senate Resolution 139 was very similar to Professor
Feerick’s in his letter to Representative Poff. John D. Feerick, The TwentyFifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Applications 60 (2d ed.1992).

Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which
permit the declaration of a presidential inability, are premised
on the availability of an able Vice President.47 Neither section
comes into play if the office of the Vice President is vacant or
its occupant is himself unable.48 Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment is unavailable to a President who wishes to transfer
power temporarily if there is a vice-presidential vacancy because
there is no Vice President to act as President.49 Furthermore,
although Section 3 may be available to the President during a
vice-presidential inability, a President would be hard pressed
to transfer authority to an unable Vice President. Similarly,
Section 4 depends on the presence of an able Vice President
to work with the Cabinet in declaring a presidential inability.
Section 4 does not provide a substitute for the Vice President
to make such a declaration if the vice presidency is vacant or the
Vice President is himself unable and thus incapable of declaring
a case of presidential inability.50

2. Inability of the Vice President in Certain
Circumstances
Currently, no mechanism exists by which a Vice President
can be declared unable to perform the powers and duties
of his office.51 As previously discussed in Part V.C.1, this
gap results in a number of unaddressed issues if the Vice
President is, in fact, unable. First, if the President dies, resigns,
or is removed from office, the Vice President automatically
becomes President under Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, even in a case of a Vice President’s undeclared
inability.52 Second, if a President sought to transfer his powers
temporarily to the Vice President under Section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, he would be transferring powers
to a Vice President unable to exercise them. Furthermore,
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment cannot be invoked
when the Vice President is unable because the Vice President
is a necessary actor in the determination of presidential
inability under Section 4.53
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3. Inability of the Acting President in
Certain Circumstances
Current succession law provides no mechanism for dealing
with an inability of an Acting President, whether a Vice
President or statutory successor.iv

D. Recommendations
Congress, following President Kennedy’s assassination,
acted wisely in proposing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
eliminate major gaps in the system of presidential succession.
We urge the President and Congress to move forward to
address the remaining inability gaps.
The Clinic believes much can be done to anticipate and
address these gaps with changes in the law and contingency
planning. In 1988, participants of the Miller Center
Commission on Presidential Disability and the TwentyFifth Amendment, including Senator Birch Bayh, Herbert
Brownell, and Fred Fielding, advanced many helpful
recommendations for contingency planning. Such planning
has routinely taken place since at least 1980.54 The exercise is
of course confidential, and while we identify gaps and suggest
responses to them, we well understand that others in positions
of responsibility have already engaged in contingency
planning and may find our recommendations duplicative of
work already undertaken. Nonetheless we support continued
planning, as is surely underway, recalling the wisdom of the
writers of the Federalist Papers that “a wise nation . . . does not
rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become
essential to its safety.”55
iv

The situation in which an Acting President is exercising the powers and
duties of the presidency during a presidential inability and a vice-presidential
vacancy raises issues beyond the scope of this Report. These include the
question whether an Acting President can exercise presidential power under
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and nominate a new Vice
President while the President is alive but unable. For further discussion of
this issue, see generally William F. Baker & Beth A. Fitzpatrick, Presidential
Succession Scenarios in Popular Culture and History and the Need for
Reform, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 835 (2010) and Examination of the First
Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Hearing
on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975).

1. Statute
The Clinic supports a statutory approach that mirrors the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to address the inability gaps. There
is sufficient basis in the Constitution and law for doing so.
We recommend that Congress enact legislation facilitating
the President’s ability to voluntarily transfer his powers to
the next in the line of succession during a vice-presidential
vacancy or inability. We also recommend conferring authority
on the next in line in conjunction with the Cabinet to
declare a presidential inability in the absence of an able Vice
President.v
A mechanism for the voluntary transfer of power by the
President or Acting President to the next in line in the
absence of an able Vice President would track the provisions
in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, requiring a
record of the transfer by written declaration to the President
pro tempore and the Speaker of the House or, if they are not
available, by a filing in the Office of the Department of State.vi
For the more difficult case of an obviously unable President or
Acting President who refuses or is unable to declare his own
inability, a declaration by the next in line together with the
Cabinet would assure responsible handling of the matter and
would promote confidence among the public at large.56
Reliance on the Cabinet members, who are close to the
President and can evaluate the President’s or Acting
President’s situation, together with the next immediate
successor of either party, would minimize the risk of abuse
of power and facilitate an appropriate transfer. A statutory
approach could also, like the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
contain provisions for dealing with a disagreement between
the unable President or Acting President and the person who
is next in line acting together with the Cabinet.
Turning to a justification of this approach, we review the
reach of Congress’s power and the role of the next in line.
v

See infra Part V.D.2

vi

The Office of the Department of State is an appropriate repository as an
alternative to filing with legislative leaders because those leaders might be the
next in the line of succession, as would be the case under current law. This
recommendation presents a potential problem, however, if the next in the
line of succession is the Secretary of State.
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a. Congressional Authority
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution gives
Congress the authority to decide who is to act as President in
the event that both the President and the Vice President are
unable to perform the duties of their offices, as well as in the
event that the President is unable when the vice presidency is
vacant.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.57

The 1792, 1886, and 1947 Acts, by which Congress created
lines of succession beyond the Vice President, rest on this
authority.58 The statutes reflect the idea that a clear line of
succession allows the government to continue to function
in the case of simultaneous vacancies and/or inabilities by
ensuring that there is always a qualified successor to carry out
the powers and duties of the presidency.
However, when there is no able Vice President and the
President is incapable of declaring his own inability, the 1947
Act has no mechanism for declaring presidential inability.59
Thus, although Congress has the constitutional authority to
create the line of succession, the 1947 Act does not exercise
that authority to its full extent.
In addition to the language of Article II, Congress appears to
have authority to address this gap pursuant to the Necessary
and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the
Constitution. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides
that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.”60
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The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause broadly in its 1819 decision
in McCulloch v. Maryland.61 Holding that Congress had the
authority to charter a bank, even though the Constitution did
not explicitly give Congress such power, Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote:
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution
must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with
respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to
be carried into execution, which will enable that body to
perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.62

While the Court has given the Clause an expansive reach, it
has also stated that the Clause “is not the delegation of a new
and independent power, but simply provision for making
effective the powers theretofore mentioned.”63
Experts on presidential succession have suggested that a
statute providing a mechanism by which the President or
Acting President could be declared unable to perform the
duties of his office would be sound under the Necessary
and Proper Clause because it would be consistent with
the express power of Congress under the Constitution to
establish the line of succession.64 One commentator writes
that such a statute “would not appear to grant a new and
independent power to Congress, [but] only a measure to
ensure the legitimate end of providing for a successor beyond
the Vice President in circumstances where additional process
is deemed necessary as an effective use of power.”65 Providing
for the determination of presidential inability is “necessary to
ensure that the executive power does not fall into abeyance
. . . [and so this] power is clearly within the scope of the
[Necessary and Proper Clause].”66
Even those who oppose a broad reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause in terms of presidential succession agree that
the clause allows for intervention where both the President
and Vice President are incapacitated. Presidential succession
scholar Ruth Silva, writing prior to the adoption of the
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Twenty-Fifth Amendment, noted that the Constitution
gives Congress the express power to provide for presidential
succession only “when there is neither a functioning President
nor a functioning Vice President.”67 She argued that
“[b]ecause enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers
denies all others unless incident to an expressed power or
necessary to its execution,” Congress does not have the
authority to legislate regarding any scenario but that of a dual
inability and/or vacancy.68 Herbert Brownell agreed that
“congressional action under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause
would seem restricted to the uncommon situation in which
both the President and Vice President are incapacitated.”69

Thus, the contingent grant of power theory supports the
idea that the next in the line of succession should have a role
in the determination of presidential inability. However, to
permit the next in the line of succession alone to determine
presidential inability would grant him more power than
what is granted to the Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, which does not permit the Vice President to
act alone but requires him to act along with a majority of
the Cabinet or other congressionally designated body.75 As a
result, reliance on the theory of a contingent grant of power
might yield a result that is not consistent with the framework
set forth in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

b. Th
 e Role of the Next in the Line of Succession in
Determining Incapacity

c. Summary

Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, many
who wrote on the topic of presidential succession relied on
the contingent grant of power theory to justify an authority
in the next in the line of succession to determine presidential
inability.70 Professor Silva explained that, according to this
theory, “it is a well-established rule of law that the one to
whom the power is granted is to decide when the emergency
has arisen.”71 Silva wrote,
[T]he Vice President, or the “officer” designated by law to act
as President, is constituted the judge of a President’s inability
. . . . The Constitution provides that the power of acting as
President belongs to the Vice President or to the “Officer”
while a President is disabled. Since the Constitution
mentions only the successor, he is the judge of the facts.72

Herbert Brownell agreed that “whenever any official by law .
. . is designated to perform certain duties on the happening of
certain contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person
who bears the responsibility for performing the duties must
also determine when the contingency for the exercise of his
powers arises.”73 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy issued
an opinion in 1961 adopting this theory, stating that the
“Vice President or [an]other ‘officer’ designated by law to act as
President has the authority under the Constitution to decide
when inability exists.”74

Some may argue that only a constitutional amendment
can expand upon the existing mechanism for declaring a
presidential inability. The Clinic, however, is persuaded
that Congress has the power to enact a statute providing a
mechanism for the determination of presidential inability
during a vice-presidential inability or vacancy. Based on the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and a theory of contingent grants
of power, accepted by scholars familiar with presidential
succession issues, the Clinic believes Congress has the
authority to legislate in this area. The Clinic recommends that
such a statute be enacted on the basis that it is necessary and
proper to implement Congress’s express power under Article
II, Section 1, Clause 6 to provide for the line of succession
and to ensure the continuation of effective government. We
recommend the adoption of a statute that acknowledges
that the next in the line of succession has the power to
determine, with the Cabinet or another body that Congress
may choose, the existence of an inability of the President or
Acting President in the absence of an able Vice President. We
recommend that this statute also confirm that a President
or Acting President may voluntarily transfer his powers and
duties to the next in the line of succession during a vicepresidential inability or vacancy.
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2. Executive Action
The Clinic believes congressional enactment of a statute
addressing presidential inability gaps, in the absence of a
constitutional amendment, presents a sound and feasible
approach. However, the Clinic recognizes that enactment of a
statute can be a lengthy process and that meanwhile national
emergencies can occur at any time. In the absence of statutory
reform, the Clinic is aware that executive branch officials have
instituted comprehensive practices, procedures, and rules to
ensure preparedness in the event of gaps in leadership. The Clinic
endorses such anticipatory contingency planning and suggests
that prospective executive declarations of inabilityvii provide an
effective way to address both presidential and vice-presidential
inability even as congressional action is under consideration.
Article II, Section 1 permits Congress to provide for a line of
succession only in the event of a dual inability and/or vacancy in
the presidency and vice presidency.76 An executive declaration of
prospective inability would permit the President, Vice President,
or Acting President to describe, in a formal writing, the situations
in which he would consider himself unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office.viii Executive declarations of
prospective inability allow the President, Acting President, or Vice
President to provide for future instances of inability and thereby
permit timely implementation of the current succession law.
An executive declaration of inability permits the line of
succession to be triggered during a vice-presidential vacancy
or inability by giving the President or Acting President a way
in which to declare himself unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office prospectively, in the event that he becomes
unable to declare his own inability in the future. An executive
declaration of prospective inability by the Vice President
similarly allows the succession law to go into effect as intended.
vii

Executive declarations of inability are similar to letter agreements. See
Appendix B for a compilation of letter agreements and declarations from
various administrations.

viii

The Clinic acknowledges that such a writing will require some person
or persons to decide whether the conditions set forth in the executive
declaration of prospective inability are present. The Clinic notes that an
executive declaration of prospective inability could possibly authorize a
designated party to resign on behalf of the President or Vice President in
defined circumstances. See the Eisenhower-Nixon Letter Agreement in
Appendix B. A sample Executive Declaration of Inability is also included in
Appendix B.
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a. H
 istorical Support for Executive Declarations of
Inability
Declarations for future contingencies are consistent with
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which allows
the President to temporarily transfer his powers when
he “recognizes his inability—or the imminence of his inability.”77 Although the President can transfer his power
during foreseen periods of inability, he might be able to do
so “even prospectively for unexpected yet contemplated
future incidents.”78 Former Attorney General Nicholas B.
Katzenbach testified that “the President should be able to
arrange for the Vice President to act . . . in the event of a
certain contingency . . . which would be a self-executive [sic]
provision.”79
Others agree. Noting that President Bush signed a letter
formally transferring his powers to Vice President Cheney
prior to undergoing anesthesia, Adam Gustafson argues
“there is no overwhelming constitutional reason why such
a letter may not be sent further in advance.”80 Indeed, some
have suggested that the President and Vice President can
“outlin[e] procedures for contingent cessions of executive
power” for “unplanned future inabilities.”81 These procedures
might extend as well to a statutory successor in contemplation
of a possible vacancy in the vice presidency or an inability
of the Vice President. Although prospective declarations
of inability “would require a broad reading” of Section 3, a
narrow reading of Section 3 that “discourages the President
from taking present action for future contingencies . . . may
undermine the Amendment’s purpose of promoting executive
branch continuity.”82
This cession of power is not unprecedented in American
history. Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, when no mechanism for the declaration
of presidential inability existed, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower recognized the urgency of addressing presidential
succession issues.83 In 1958, he presented to Vice President
Nixon a “letter agreement,” setting forth certain procedures
in the event of his future inability as President.84 President
Eisenhower wrote that he and Vice President Nixon “could
do much to eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in
advance, as to the proper steps to be taken at any time when
[he] might become unable to discharge the powers and
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duties of the President.”85 President Eisenhower stated that
“this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear
intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather
a statement of our common intention to act completely
according to the spirit of . . . the Constitution.”86

Upon the occurrence of one of these situations, if the Vice
President has made a declaration of prospective inability, the
next in the line of succession would then be in a position to
declare the inability of the President or Acting President, as
circumstances require.

Pursuant to the letter agreement, Vice President Nixon was to
act as President if President Eisenhower determined himself
to be unable or if Vice President Nixon determined President
Eisenhower was unable; Eisenhower would resume his
presidential duties upon his own declaration that the inability
had ended.87 Later administrations followed the EisenhowerNixon precedent by entering into letter agreements to provide
for prospective inability, including President Kennedy and
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson;88 and President Johnson
and Speaker of the House John W. McCormack.89 President
Johnson and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey apparently
never entered into a written agreement.90 There appears to
be evidence that, even after the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton
had executed letter agreements with their Vice Presidents
indicating their intentions for the transfer of power in case
of inability.91 One commentator noted that prior to the
adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, letter agreements
“did not have the force of law behind them and depended
entirely on the good will of the incumbent President and Vice
President.”92

Although the Vice President does not have the explicit
authority under the Constitution to declare his own inability,
the Clinic believes such authority is implicit. A mechanism by
which vice-presidential inability can be declared is necessary
for an effective system of presidential succession. Historical
precedent supports this approach since past and current
administrations have engaged in contingency planning to
address issues arising from a vice-presidential inability.93

b. Summary
In case a presidential inability arises during a vice-presidential
vacancy or inability, an executive declaration of prospective
inability can fill the gap that is not addressed by the TwentyFifth Amendment by allowing the President to define a
future inability. The declaration of a future inability, although
not explicitly provided for in Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, is consistent with the purpose of Section 3 (and
the Article II succession provision) to promote executive
branch continuity and has historical precedent.
The Clinic believes vice-presidential inability is also best
addressed through the use of executive declarations of
prospective inability. An executive declaration of prospective
inability would permit the Vice President to describe the
situations that he considers would render him unable.

3. Other Options
a. Vice-Presidential Inability
The Clinic considered various options to deal with vicepresidential inability and ultimately favored executive
declarations of prospective inability, as described above.
Below is a summary of other options we considered.
i. Statute
The Clinic considered congressional enactment of a
statute providing a mechanism for a determination of vicepresidential inability. The Vice President plays a vital role
in succession through his authority, with the Cabinet, to
determine presidential inability under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment; thus, a statute providing for a determination
of the Vice President’s inability could be seen as necessary
and proper to enable the person next in the line of succession
to play a vital role in the event of a Vice President’s inability.
Ultimately, the Clinic did not believe such a statute would
pass constitutional muster because the Constitution specifies
that Congress can act in the event of a dual inability; it
does not provide that Congress can act in the case of a vicepresidential inability alone.94 Silva and Brownell, as indicated
above, believed congressional authority was limited to
circumstances in which both the President and Vice President
were unable or absent.95
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ii. Impeachment
Impeachment would be a dubious and problematic route
to address the problem of vice-presidential inability. The
wrongdoing contemplated by the Constitution’s requirement
of “high crimes and misdemeanors” has been somewhat
broadly construed, but, although impeachable conduct
need not be criminal, inability still stands far apart from
bribery, treason, and the other types of “political” crimes
that constitute a willful abuse of office and that justify
impeachment and removal.96 Further, partisan considerations
have frequently played a role in impeachment and removal.
The impeachment and removal of a President or Vice
President for inability is both unsupported by the language
or any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution and
could set a dangerous precedent for the use or threat of
impeachment and removal as a partisan political weapon.97
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VI. Line of Succession Issues
A. Introduction
Under Article II, Section I, Clause 6 of the Constitution, the
Vice President is the first successor to the powers and duties of
the presidency, and Congress is authorized to create a line of
succession.1 The line of succession beyond the vice presidency
has taken three different forms over the past 220 years. The
Presidential Succession Act of 1792 (“1792 Act”) included
a line of succession that was strictly legislative in nature,
running to the President pro tempore of the Senate and then
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.2 Then, the
Presidential Succession Act of 1886 (“1886 Act”) changed the
line of succession to an entirely executive line, running through
the Cabinet Secretaries.3 The Presidential Succession Act of
1947, as amended (“1947 Act”), changed the line of succession
to include both legislators and executive officers, starting with
the Speaker, followed by the President pro tempore, and then
Cabinet Secretaries in the order of their departments’ creation:
the “Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary
of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation,
Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, and Secretary of Homeland Security.”4
The 1947 Act, like the 1792 Act, has been subject to criticism
on constitutional grounds as well as on the basis of policy
considerations. There is a serious question regarding both
the constitutionality of including legislative members in the
line of succession and the “bumping” provision that permits a
Cabinet member, acting as President, to be replaced by the
Speaker or President pro tempore.
As a matter of policy, the succession of legislative members
presents numerous concerns, including violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers, the possibility of a sudden
and complete shift in party control of the executive branch,
and conflicts of interest issues in instances of impeachment
or removal of the President. On the other hand, inclusion
of executive officers also raises questions about Cabinet
members’ qualifications to serve as Acting President. The
Clinic treats each of these issues in the sections that follow
and advances a recommendation for returning to the
executive line of succession as provided for in the 1886

Act. Failing adoption of this recommendation, the Clinic
recommends an exclusively Cabinet line of succession for
cases of presidential inability. This reform will facilitate a
voluntary transfer of presidential power when circumstances
require it and will reduce disruption in legislative leadership,
but otherwise will preserve legislative succession.

B. Constitutional Concerns
1. Constitutionality of the Legislative Line
of Succession
The constitutionality of the 1947 Act and, more generally,
of the legislative line of succession is questionable. The first
constitutional question is whether the term “Officer,” as
understood by the Framers and as it appears in Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6, includes legislators. Article II, Section 1,
Clause 6 provides in relevant part:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office . . . the Congress may by Law
. . . declar[e] what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected.5

Congressional leaders and scholars have interpreted the term
“Officer” to mean “Officer of the United States,”6 which refers
only to executive branch officers who are nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. Thus, some argue that
legislators are not qualified under the Constitution to act as
President.7
It is also argued that, based on the description of the executive
branch and the use of the term “Officer” elsewhere in the
Constitution, the Framers did not anticipate legislators
succeeding to the presidency. For example, in 1864, Senator
James Bayard of Delaware referred to Article II, Section 1,
Clause 2, which provides for the election of presidential
electors, as an instance in which the term “Officer” is placed
in opposition to those holding legislative positions.8 This
clause distinguishes between Senators and Representatives,
on the one hand, and persons “holding an Office of Trust
or Profit under the United States,”9 on the other. Based on
this distinction, Senator Bayard concluded that Senators
and Representatives are not “Officers,” nor do they “hold
office under the United States;” rather, they hold a position
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of “trust,”10 and therefore are not qualified to succeed to the
presidency under the Constitution. Furthermore, Senator
Bayard argued that legislators are not “officers of the United
States” because citizens from individual states or districts elect
them, rather than citizens from throughout the country.11
Similar arguments arise from the language in Article II,
Section 1, Clause 1, which states in relevant part that “[the
President] shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.”12
Moreover, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, states, “[t]he House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States”13 and Article I,
Section 3, Clause 1, states, “[t]he Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen
by the Legislature thereof, for six Years.”14 If the Framers
intended legislative members to fill “Officer” positions, then
they presumably would have used the same language in the
Constitution for both the executive and legislative branches;
however, the Framers refer to legislators as “chosen” for either two
or six years, and they omitted the language “hold his Office.”15
Additionally, the 1947 Act may violate the Incompatibility
Clause of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.16 The Constitution
makes clear that sitting members of Congress cannot hold
“any civil Office under the Authority of the United States.”17
Therefore, the clause “civil Office under the Authority of the
United States”18 must refer exclusively to the members of the
executive and judicial branches because the Constitution
does not say any “other” civil office. In language following
in the same clause, the Constitution provides that “no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance
in Office[,]”19 again suggesting that a legislator is not an
“Officer.” The language of Article I, Section 6 thus appears to
exclude legislators from those who are “Officers.”20
The constitutional provisions governing impeachment also
raise issues related to the definition of “Officer.” Article II,
Section 4 provides for the impeachment of the President,
Vice President, and “all civil Officers of the United States.”21
Over time, the interpretation of the words “all civil Officers”
has come to exclude legislators,i and thus supports the
i

28

See Appendix C for a discussion of this interpretation related to the
impeachment trial of Senator William Blount.

argument that legislators are not “Officers” and are not
eligible to succeed to the presidency. Other provisions of the
Constitution also support this view. Specifically, Article II,
Section 3 gives the President the authority to “Commission
all the Officers of the United States.”22 However, members of
Congress do not receive commissions to serve in the House of
Representatives or the Senate, thus supporting the argument
that legislators are not “Officers of the United States.”23
On the other hand, some scholars note that the Framers used
the term “Officers” in Article II, Section 1 instead of the term
“Officers of the United States.”24 Thus, it is argued that the
ratifying states may have found the distinction unimportant
because the Speaker and the President pro tempore are described
as “Officers” of their houses elsewhere in the Constitution.25
Yet, even if members of Congress are deemed “Officers”
and are eligible to act as President, their inclusion in the
line of succession raises issues about separation of powers.
As President James Madison noted in 1792, an Acting
President from the legislative branch would blur the lines of
separation of powers.26 In addition, the Speaker participates
in the impeachment process, and the President pro tempore
votes in removal proceedings, which presents an obvious
conflict of interest since the 1947 Act places both in the line
of succession. In fact, this conflict of interest was present in
the 1868 effort to remove President Andrew Johnson for
violating the Tenure of Office Act.27 Johnson succeeded to
the presidency after the assassination of President Abraham
Lincoln and carried on as President with no Vice President.28
When then President pro tempore Benjamin F. Wade voted
in the removal trial of President Johnson, he effectively voted
for his own succession to the presidency by voting “guilty”
to remove President Johnson, because, under the 1792 Act,
the President pro tempore was next in the line of succession
after the Vice President.29 Ultimately, the effort to remove
President Johnson failed by one vote, but the incident cast
light on the issue of potential conflicts of interest in the
context of a legislative line of succession.30
Moreover, the historical record reveals the political maneuvering
that led to the insertion of legislators into the 1792 Act. The
Federalists and anti-Federalists were engaged in a power
struggle.31 The Federalists did not want the line of succession
to run through the Cabinet because Thomas Jefferson, an
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anti-Federalist, was Secretary of State at the time.32 Alexander
Hamilton, leader of the Federalist Party, persuaded his fellow
Federalists in the Senate to overlook the constitutional questions
about the 1792 Act in order to establish a legislative line of
succession that would exclude Jefferson.33
Although the arguments outlined above cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the legislative line of succession, other
arguments support its constitutionality. The primary support
comes from the text of Article I, Sections 2 and 3,34 which
provides for the House of Representatives and the Senate to
choose their “other Officers,” in addition to the two legislative
positions referred to by name in the Constitution: Speaker and
President pro tempore.35 Thus, if the Speaker and President pro
tempore are referred to as “Officers” in Article I, Sections 2 and
3,36 and the word “Officer” in Article II, Section 1 refers to all
“Officers,”37 members of Congress are, arguably, constitutionally
eligible to be included in the line of succession.
Furthermore, historical practice supports the constitutionality
of the legislative line of succession. The Second Congress,
which passed the 1792 Act placing legislators in the line
of succession, included six membersii of the Constitutional
Convention who approved the final language of the
Constitution38 and thus were uniquely qualified to interpret
the Framers’ intent. However, four of the six membersiii
present in the Second Congress voted against the 1792
Act,39 including President James Madison, who at the time
was a Representative from Virginia. As noted previously,
President Madison believed that the inclusion of the
President pro tempore and the Speaker in the line of succession
was not constitutional because they were not “Officers”
in the constitutional sense and that any other reading of
the Constitution would violate the separation of powers.40
Additionally, President Madison believed that the forced
resignation of the President pro tempore or Speaker under
the 1792 Act would remove any authority those individuals
might previously have held in order to act as President.41
ii

These members were Abraham Baldwin, Elbridge Gerry, Thomas
Fitzsimons, Nicholas Gilman, James Madison, and Hugh Williamson. See 3
Annals of Cong. 417-18 (1791).

iii

Those voting against the 1792 Act were Abraham Baldwin, Nicholas
Gilman, James Madison, and Hugh Williamson. Id.

2. Presidential Qualifications
Constitutional considerations also arise regarding other kinds
of qualifications for those in the line of succession. Article II,
Section 1, Clause 5 provides:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President;
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall
not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.42

The 1947 Act confirmed that this provision would apply
to those in the line of succession with the language, “this
section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the
office of President under the Constitution.”43 While these
requirements are clear, the question remains whether an
individual who may be constitutionally qualified to act as
President is “qualified” in the eyes of the national electorate.
For example, notwithstanding that the President pro tempore
is third in line of succession after the President, that position
is traditionally filled by the Senator with “the longest record
of continuous service,”44 rather than by a Senator who is
being evaluated as a possible successor to the President. If the
Senate’s only criterion for nominating a President pro tempore
is the length of a Senator’s service, we respectfully suggest that
the Senate should change its practice or the position should
be removed from the line of succession.
The qualifications of Cabinet members raise other issues.
A number of departments have generated considerable
controversy because those departments necessarily engage
in practice and policy that at any given time may be under
debate; in addition, Cabinet Secretaries may be unfamiliar
to the electorate (as may be legislative leaders).iv Therefore,
iv

For example, a survey of 1,000 “likely voters” on April 1-2, 2011, discusses
whether the American public is knowledgeable of the current Cabinet. For a
more detailed explanation of the survey, see Locke, Solis Are Least Known of
Obama Cabinet Members, Rasmussen Reports (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.
rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama_administration/
april_2011/locke_solis_are_least_known_of_obama_cabinet_members.
Similarly, on March 17-20, 2011, a Pew Research Center survey found
that only forty-three percent of Americans know that John Boehner is the
Speaker of the House. See Bruce Drake, What Does John Boehner Do for a
Living? Less Than Half in Poll Know, Poll Watch Daily (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.pollwatchdaily.com/2011/04/01/what-does-john-boehner-dofor-a-living-less-than-half-in-poll-know/.
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when considering whether the legislative or executive line of
succession is appropriate, the issue of qualifications in both
the constitutional sense and as seen through the eyes of the
electorate must be considered.

3. “Bumping” Provision
“Bumping” is a term that has come to describe cases in which
legislators—not the President or Vice President—replace a
Cabinet member who is an Acting President. Under the 1947
Act, Cabinet members who have succeeded to the powers and
duties of the office of President in the absence of a Speaker or
President pro tempore may be displaced or bumped from the
presidency once a Speaker or President pro tempore is elected or
qualifies for office. This provision does not allow for Cabinet
members to bump one another or for a Speaker to bump the
President pro tempore or vice versa, but it does create a scenario
for several officeholders to serve as President in a short time.
The possibility of multiple successors in a short period appears
to violate Article II, Section 1, which authorizes Congress
only to enact a law that would declare what “Officer” would
act as President until “a President shall be elected,” and not a
law that would allow others to bump Acting Presidents from
office.45 Furthermore, Article II, Section 1 states that the
Acting President “shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected.”46
The rationale behind inclusion of the bumping provision is
not well documented in the legislative history of the 1947
Act. The debates on the 1886 Act, however, do include
references to bumping.47 In 1883, Senator George Edmunds
of Vermont first proposed having the Secretary of State act
as President, should no Speaker or President pro tempore be
available, and then relinquishing the office once a Speaker
or President pro tempore was available to act as President.48
Senator George Hoar opposed this, stating that it is not
within Congress’s power under the Constitution to provide
for two or three officers in succession to act as President.49 The
1886 Act did not provide for bumping.

30

C. Uncertainty in Times of Presidential
Successionv
1. Acting Secretaries in the Line of
Succession and Structural Issues
Raisedvi
It is unclear whether the Acting Cabinet Secretaries are in the
line of succession under the 1947 Act.vii During congressional
debates leading up to the 1947 Act the topic of their inclusion
did not come up once.50 Senator Kenneth Wherry, who
introduced a Senate Bill, S. 564, which was later passed into law
as the 1947 Act, said, “the bill accomplishes what I want to do,
and that is to make the Speaker always the man that is to be the
Acting President.”51 Senator Wherry thought that the Speaker
was the closest official to the electorate.52 He stated:
My theory is that as long as they all are elected officers I
would much rather it would go to the Speaker first; then to
the President pro tempore as the next closest to the Speaker,
maybe. But in the event neither one of them is available,
then go down through the line we have now, and they act as
President only until either the President, Vice President, the
Speaker, or the President pro tempore qualifies. In that order
they can supplant the Secretary of State.53

v

It is highly unlikely but not unquestionably clear that the Speaker of the
House pro tempore and the Acting President pro tempore of the Senate are
not currently included in the line of succession. See Appendix E. There have
been two bills introduced by Congressman Brad Sherman since September
11, 2001 that specifically state that the Speaker of the House pro tempore is
not considered the Speaker of the House for the purposes of presidential
succession. Both of these bills are silent with regard to the Acting President
pro tempore of the Senate. The Clinic, recognizing that this is a point that
has not previously been discussed in the literature on presidential succession,
does not find a convincing argument for the inclusion of these legislators in
the current line of succession. For a discussion of Congressman Sherman’s
bills see Appendix D. The Clinic, however, recommends that Congress
explicitly clarify whether Acting Secretaries and substitute congressional
leadership are included in the line of succession. We think it inappropriate to
include the latter—interim legislative officials—in the line of succession.

vi

An Acting Secretary is an officer who was not appointed as a Cabinet
secretary by the President, but who nonetheless now holds the powers of a
Cabinet secretary. By contrast, a Cabinet secretary is an individual who was
appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate for the
position of Cabinet Secretary. For a discussion of the bills introduced since
September 11, 2001 see Appendix D.

vii

“We have spoken to acting secretaries who told us they had been placed in
the line of succession.” Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, Preserving
Our Institutions: The Second Report of the Continuity of
Government Commission 34 (2009).

Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era:

ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)

Thus, it is unlikely that Senator Wherry intended to include
Acting Secretaries. They are more removed from the electorate
than the Speaker, President pro tempore, and Cabinet Secretaries.
Further, Senator Wherry advocated for succession to run, after
the Speaker and President pro tempore, “through the line we have
now,” which under the 1886 Act was only the Cabinet Secretaries
confirmed as such, thus excluding Acting Secretaries.54 However,
the language of the 1947 Act itself is ambiguous.
The inclusion of Acting Secretaries in the line of succession
is supported by comparison of the language of the 1947 Act
and the 1886 Act.55 The 1886 Act explicitly included only
Cabinet Secretaries confirmed as such. After enumerating
the list of Cabinet Secretaries who were included in the line
of succession, Section 2 of the 1886 Act provided, “[t]hat
the preceding section shall only be held to describe and apply
to such officers as shall have been appointed by the advice
and consent of the Senate to the offices therein named.” 56 In
contrast, the language of the 1947 Act is less clear. Section
19(d)(1) of the 1947 Act provides that “the officer of the
United States who is highest on the following list, and who
is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of
the office of President shall act as President.”57 The list that
follows is a list of the Cabinet Secretaries. Section 19(e) goes
on to state, “[s]ubsection (d) of this section shall apply only
to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate.”58 The lack of language in the 1947 Act explicitly
limiting succession to Cabinet Secretaries, “confirmed as
such,” raises the question whether the Acting Secretaries are
in the line of succession. However, the fact that the 1886 Act
did not include the Acting Secretaries, that Senator Wherry’s
statement quoted above likely did not contemplate inclusion
of Acting Secretaries, and that there is a complete absence of
discussion of Acting Secretaries in the legislative history of the
1947 Act weigh against any interpretation of the 1947 Act
that would include Acting Secretaries in the line of succession.
If Acting Secretaries are in the line of succession, then Section
19(d)(1) of the 1947 Act means that an Acting Secretary in a
higher-listed department may become Acting President ahead
of the lower-listed Cabinet Secretaries.59 Section 19(d)(1)
states only that, “the officer of the United States who is
highest on the following list . . . shall act as President.”60 There
is no distinction made between an Acting Secretary or a

Cabinet Secretary who was appointed and confirmed as such.
Thus, under one interpretation, an Acting Secretary of State
would have a valid claim to become Acting President ahead of
the Secretary of the Treasury.61
Whatever Congress’s intent in passing the 1947 Act, the
Clinic has grappled with the soundness of including the
Acting Secretaries in the line of succession. Their inclusion
greatly expands the line of succession, but it raises several
concerns about the implementation of the line of succession
and the qualifications of the individuals who could assume
the powers and duties of the presidency.viii

D. Additional Concerns
1. Democratic Pedigree
Commentators most often defend placing members of
Congress in the line of succession before Cabinet members
on the basis of democratic pedigree, arguing that members of
Congress are elected officials and thus, most representative
of the national electorate after the President and Vice
President.62 It is argued that Cabinet members, on the
other hand, are not elected, but are only appointed by the
President.ix Although they are not chosen by the electorate,
Cabinet members do represent the electorate’s mandate
as designees of the President, who is the most politically
representative figure of the national constituency.x63
Furthermore, Cabinet members, other than interim
appointments, are not only appointed by the President but
also must be confirmed by the Senate, which places them
in the unique position of having been confirmed by “two
continental institutions,”64 in contrast to the Speaker of the
House and the President pro tempore, who are selected only by
their local constituency and then by their respective houses.65
viii

For further discussion on the effect Acting Secretaries might have on
implementing the line of succession, as well as the concerns regarding their
presidential qualifications, see Appendix E.

ix

President Truman, in his address to Congress, made the point—as a
criticism—that with a Cabinet line of succession, the President has the
ability to nominate the person who would be the “immediate successor
in the event of [the President’s] own death or inability to act.” H.R. Doc.
No.79-246, at 1 (1945).

x

The President may be elected without a majority or even a plurality of
the popular vote; however, the electorate of all the states still votes for the
electors for President and Vice President.
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2. Party Continuity
The current line of succession can effectuate a change of party
in the White House if the legislative leader who assumes the
powers and duties of the presidency belongs to the party
opposite to that of the elected President. Because a party shift
could occur at any time during a presidential term and the 1947
Act does not provide for special elections, the party which
was not elected to the presidency could control the office of
the President for up to four years (should a dual inability and/
or vacancy occur, for example, on or after Inauguration Day),
contrary to the electorate’s mandate. Such a shift may be viewed
as illegitimate in the eyes of the electorate.

3. Historical Precedent
There is historical precedent for a legislative line of succession.
Scholars such as James E. Fleming argue that if the question of
the constitutionality of a legislative line of succession were to
come before the Supreme Court, the burden of proof would
be on those arguing against the constitutionality of the 1792
Act and the 1947 Act.66

E. Recommendations For Future Action
1. Executive Line of Successionxi
The Clinic recommends an executive line of succession that
would include all Cabinet Secretaries in the order in which
their departments were established. Cabinet Secretaries
xi
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The Clinic also discussed maintaining the current legislative-Cabinet line
of succession, but to modify it to maintain party continuity by placing the
leaders of the President’s party in the House of Representatives and the
Senate in the line of succession rather than the Speaker and President pro
tempore regardless of their party affiliation. The Clinic does not support this
recommendation. First, the question remains unanswered as to whether the
Speaker and President pro tempore are “Officers” in the constitutional sense.
The creation of additional offices within the House of Representatives and
the Senate would create positions that are even less clearly “Officers” because
these new positions are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
Second, because the proposed positions within Congress are not
constitutionally mandated—unlike the Speaker and President pro tempore—
they may be revoked based on a simple vote within each House, which
would add to the uncertainty in the line of succession. For a thoughtful
discussion and contrary recommendations on this subject see Joel K.
Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring
Presidential Continuity, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 959, 1038-39 (2010).

should be required to resign from their positions if they act
as President in cases of death, resignation, or removal, not
because of a separation of powers issue, but so that their
offices can be filled with a new Secretary and so that there
will be a full Cabinet. As a matter of constitutional law, an
executive line of succession cannot be challenged because
Cabinet Secretaries, unlike legislative leaders, are clearly
“Officers” under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6. Furthermore,
Cabinet Secretaries, by virtue of their position in government
and having day-to-day involvement in the administration of
the executive branch, are more likely than legislators to run
the executive branch consistent with the views held by the
former or unable President.
Furthermore, an executive line of succession moots the
bumping provision. If legislators are no longer in the line of
succession, they cannot bump an executive officer acting as
President.

2. Binary Line of Succession
As an alternative to an executive line of succession, the Clinic
proposes that, in cases of presidential inability and vicepresidential inability or vacancy, the line of succession should
temporarily run through the Cabinet Secretaries. Under this
proposal, Cabinet Secretaries should not be required to resign
from their positions because no separation of powers issues
are implicated and Cabinet Secretaries can return to their
former offices without a second presidential nomination and
subsequent Senate confirmation. This approach promotes
party continuity during times of temporary presidential
inability. In the event of a dual presidential and vicepresidential vacancy due to death, resignation, or removal
from office, under this binary approach the line of succession
would continue as it currently stands under the 1947 Act with
successors running first to the legislative leaders and then to
Cabinet Secretaries.xii
xii

See Appendix D for Congressman Brad Sherman’s similar proposal.
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F. Recommendations For Immediate Action
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VII. Pre-Inauguration Succession Contingencies
A. Introduction
The peaceful and orderly transfer of executive power,
beginning with the popular election and culminating with the
inauguration of the new President, is crucial to the continuity
of a democratic government that is responsive and accountable
to the electorate. Lack of clarity in the constitutional provisions,
federal statutes, state laws, and party rules governing candidate
succession during the pre-inaugural period threatens orderly
transfers of presidential power.i The contingencies raised below
therefore merit attention, are ripe for reform, and are no less
important than post-inaugural contingencies.

B. Legal Framework
Constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, and
political party rules govern the modern system of preinaugural presidential succession.ii This section identifies the
sources of law that are applicable at specific junctures in the
pre-inaugural period and the relationships among them.
Contingencies that may occur prior to a General Election,
during which prospective candidates campaign for their
parties’ nominations in primaries, caucuses, and party
conventions, are governed almost exclusively by party rules
and state law. The Rules of the Republican Party, adopted by
the 2008 Republican National Convention on September 1,
2008 and amended by the Republican National Committee
on August 6, 2010, state:
The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized
and empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may
occur by reason of death, declination, or otherwise of the
Republican candidate for President of the United States or
the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United
States, as nominated by the national convention, or the
Republican National Committee may reconvene the national
convention for the purpose of filling any such vacancies.1
i

This discussion is limited to death or resignation of a candidate or nominee.
The possible contingencies arising from temporary or permanent inability,
though worthy of prompt attention and scrutiny, are numerous and largely
beyond the scope of this inquiry in the pre-inaugural period.

ii

See Appendix A for the text of these constitutional provisions, federal
statutes, and political party rules. See Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of the
state statutes.

Similarly, the Democratic National Committee has the
responsibility of filling vacancies on the party’s national ticket
that occur prior to the General Election. The Charter &
the Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United States, as
amended by the Democratic National Committee on August
20, 2010, provide that:
The Democratic National Committee shall have general
responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic Party between
National Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Charter
and to the resolutions or other actions of the National Convention.
This responsibility shall include . . . (c) filling vacancies in the
nominations for the office of President and Vice President.2

The Democratic National Committee, in the Call for the
2012 Democratic National Convention, stipulates:
In the event of death, resignation or disability of a nominee
of the Party for President or Vice President after the
adjournment of the National Convention, the National
Chairperson of the Democratic National Committee shall
confer with the Democratic leadership of the United States
Congress and the Democratic Governors Association and
shall report to the Democratic National Committee, which is
authorized to fill the vacancy or vacancies.3

The Constitution provides in Article II, Section 1, Clause 4
that “[t]he Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which
Day shall be the same throughout the United States.”4 In 1845,
Congress established the date for the General Election in a
presidential year to be the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
November. The General Election involves the process whereby
presidential electors are chosen by popular vote in each state.5
In the event of a mass catastrophe, such as a terrorist attack that
prevents citizens from going to the polls or the death of a party’s
nominee in the period prior to the General Election, Congress
is constitutionally authorized to delay the date of the election.6
Fortunately, Congress has never had to act on this authority.iii
iii

In contrast, local governments have postponed elections in emergency
situations. The terrorist attack in New York City on Tuesday, September 11,
2001, resulted in the postponement of citywide primary elections scheduled
that day and which were already underway at the time of the attack. A
New York Supreme Court order canceling the election was followed by an
executive order by Governor George E. Pataki temporarily suspending the
election. Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election?,
32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 523, 525-26 (2005).
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Prior to the General Election, each state is responsible for
selecting its presidential electors.7 Generally, candidates
for presidential elector are nominated by the state political
parties, which are responsible for filing the electors’ names
with the Secretary of State of their respective states.8 Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2 provides the manner in which these
selections are to be made:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.9

After the General Election, the electors are required to
meet and are expected to cast their electoral votes for the
candidates to whom they are pledged. Under current law,
the presidential electors meet in their respective state capitals
and in the District of Columbia forty-one days following the
General Election.10 At these fifty-one separate meetings, the
electors cast their electoral votes in the manner required by
the Twelfth Amendment, which states:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for
as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President and of the number of votes for each, which
lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate.11

Federal law does not require electors in each state to vote for
any particular candidate.12 Many states, however, mandate
by statute that electors vote for candidates to whom they
have pledged their votes.13 These statutory mandates create a
potential crisis if a presidential or vice-presidential candidate
dies between Election Day in November and the meeting of
the Electoral College in mid-December. In such a case,
“[t]heoretically, the electors would be free to vote for anyone
they pleased. But the national party rules for the filling of
vacancies by the national committees would still be in effect,
and the electors would probably—but not necessarily—
36

respect the decision of their national committee on a new
nominee.”14 The political parties, relying on the authority
granted to them in their respective party rules and bylaws,
likely would recommend a replacement candidate for whom
the electors should vote.
After the electoral votes are cast by the electors and certified
by the appropriate state official, the votes are sealed and
transmitted to the President of the United States Senate, the
Vice President.15 The Twelfth Amendment provides that
“[t]he President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates
and the votes shall then be counted.”16 By federal statute, the
joint session of Congress is required to take place at 1:00
p.m. on January 6 in the calendar year following the meetings
of the Electoral College.17 The person receiving the greatest
number of votes for President becomes President, provided
he receives a majority of the electoral votes.18 Likewise,
the person receiving the greatest number of votes for Vice
President becomes Vice President, provided he receives a
majority of the electoral votes.19
If no candidate for President receives a majority, the House
of Representatives is required, pursuant to the Twelfth
Amendment, to go into session and choose the President
“from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding
three on the list of those voted for as President.”20 The state
delegations cast their votes for President “by states,” with each
state having one vote; a candidate must receive the votes of an
absolute majority of state delegations—twenty-six—in order
to become President-elect.21
Similarly, if no candidate for Vice President receives a
majority of the electoral votes, then, pursuant to the Twelfth
Amendment, the Senate is required to go into session and
choose the Vice President “from the two highest numbers on
the list.”22 A candidate must receive the vote of the “majority
of the whole number” of Senators—fifty-one—in order to
become Vice President-elect.23
Section 4 of the Twentieth Amendment provides that, in the
event of the death of any of the candidates from whom the
respective Houses may choose the President or Vice President,
Congress retains the authority to provide for a possible
solution:
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The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of
any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives
may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have
devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the
persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.24

If the House of Representatives fails to choose a Presidentelect in time for the inauguration on January 20,25 then
Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment specifies that the
Vice President-elect becomes Acting President until the
House chooses a President when the right of choice devolves
upon it.26 If the Senate has also failed to choose a Vice
President-elect by Inauguration Day, then, under the 1947
Act, the next in the line of succession, currently the Speaker of
the House, becomes Acting President until either the House
selects a President or the Senate selects a Vice President.27
If the President-elect dies between the counting of the electoral
votes by Congress on January 6 and Inauguration Day on
January 20, then under the Twentieth Amendment the Vice
President-elect becomes President.28 In the event of the death
of the Vice President-elect during this period, the President,
at the beginning of his term of office, must nominate a new
Vice President for congressional confirmation pursuant to
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.29 In the event that
both the President-elect and Vice President-elect die during
this same period, the statutory line of succession goes into
effect on Inauguration Day, placing the Speaker, the President
pro tempore, and then Cabinet Secretaries, in the order of
their departments’ creation, in the line for the presidency.30
The Speaker then becomes the Acting President for the full
presidential term; but, if neither a Speaker nor a President
pro tempore is available, the Cabinet member next in line of
succession would become Acting President until a Speaker or
President pro tempore becomes available.31

C. Succession Prior to the General Election
If death or resignation occurs prior to the General Election,
the political party of the candidate can fill the vacancy in the
ticket.32 As stated above, Congress can also delay the date of
the presidential election.33 In the rare instances, in which the
vice-presidential candidate has died or resigned, the national
party executive committees, usually in consultation with
the presidential candidate, convened to select a replacement

candidate in accordance with the party rules. For example,
President Taft’s incumbent Vice President, James S. Sherman,
died on October 30, 1912, just days before the national popular
election of 1912.34 Vice President Sherman’s name remained on
the ballot because his death occurred so close to the election.35
On November 12, 1912, the Republican National Committee
selected Columbia University President Nicholas Murray
Butler as Sherman’s replacement.36 Electors for Sherman voted
for Butler when the Electoral College met.37
In 1972, Democratic presidential nominee George
McGovern selected Senator Thomas Eagleton as his vicepresidential candidate, and the party subsequently nominated
him at the national party convention.38 Senator Eagleton
withdrew his name from nomination on July 31, 1972 after
he disclosed that he had been hospitalized three times for
the treatment of depression.39 The Democratic National
Committee nominated McGovern’s replacement choice for
Vice President—Sargent Shriver—on August 8, 1972, in a
meeting open to the press.40
The rules of both major political parties delegate a great
deal of discretion to their executive committees for selecting
replacement candidates.41 In exercising this discretion,
the parties should fulfill the electorate’s expectations
of transparency, process, and certainty by clarifying the
procedure for selecting replacement candidates in the party
rules and bylaws. As necessary, these changes should be
adopted before the national party conventions.

1. Succession Prior to the National Party
Convention
If the death or resignation of a presidential candidate occurs
prior to the national party convention,iv the party executive
committee determines the obligation of the pledged
delegates, if any, won through primary elections.42 Two
possible amendments to party rules that should be considered
are releasing the pledged delegates from their obligation to
vote for certain candidates or awarding the pledged delegates
won by the absent candidate to another candidate.
iv

If the death or resignation of a candidate occurs before any primary elections
are held, there may still be issues concerning state qualifying periods, names
printed on ballots, early voting, and absentee voting. These merit attention
but are outside the scope of this Clinic.
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2. Succession After the National Party
Convention
The death or resignation of a presidential or vice-presidential
candidate after the national political party convention but
prior to the General Election poses additional concerns. The
national party executive committee has the authority to name
a replacement candidate here as well.43 The primary voters and
the convention delegates have already fulfilled their duties.
While not impossible, recalling the thousands of convention
delegates would present an enormous financial and
logistical burden and may not prove to be more transparent,
democratic, or certain than a meeting of the national party
executive committee.

3. Recommendations
The national party committees should examine the need for
criteria and procedures to guide the selection process in the
event of the death, resignation, or inability of a candidate
prior to the General Election. For instance, in the case of
vacancy caused by death or resignation, the party executive
committee could meet to select a replacement candidate,
in consultation with members of Congress and Governors
from the same party,v and together lay out criteria for
replacement candidates. The criteria should vary to account
for the many circumstances leading to the succession of a
presidential candidate and might include national security
experience, previous exposure to the electorate, or continuity
of policy positions with the deceased or resigned candidate.
The national party executive committee could also create
expedited timelines for recalling convention delegates.
We would expect the presidential candidate to have a
major role in the process if his running mate has died or
withdrawn. Conversely, we would expect the vice-presidential
running mate to receive every appropriate consideration
as the replacement candidate for a presidential nominee
who had died or resigned before the General Election. This
v
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The national political party conventions are held in the summer, leaving
anywhere from two to three months between the convention and the
national popular election on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
November. Members of Congress and governors are usually granted
unpledged delegate status and may vote as they wish for the party nominees
during the party conventions. Therefore, consultation with these individuals
will provide the parties with guidance similar to that given by the unpledged
delegates at the party conventions.

consideration would have different weight if the succession
event occurred after the election when the electorate has
expressed itself.
The value of transparency suggests that the meetings of the
national party committees when considering replacement
candidates should be open to the public and the press and
should be televised. When a national party committee
takes on the extraordinary role of selecting a replacement
candidate, the privacy ordinarily afforded to internal party
decisions should be sacrificed to ensure that the public
confidence is served by the party’s process and the results of
its deliberations.vi

D. Succession After General Election but
Before the Meetings of Electoral College
Replacement of a candidate who has died or resigned during
the forty-one day period between the General Election on
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and the
casting of votes by the Electoral College in mid-December
must respect the fact that the electorate has spoken through a
national election. Historically, the national party committees
have instructed the party’s electors how to cast their electoral
votes in the event of the death of a candidate.44 However,
whether there is a legal obligation for a presidential elector
to vote according to party instructions, including a vote for a
replacement nominee, is a question “that cannot be answered
with any certainty.”45
vi

The Charter and the Bylaws of the Democratic Party provide that
“[a]ll meetings of the Democratic National Committee, the Executive
Committee, and all other official Party committees, commissions and
bodies shall be open to the public, and votes shall not be taken by secret
ballot.” Democratic Nat’l Comm., The Charter & The Bylaws of
the Democratic Party of the United States 7 (2010), available at
http://www.democrats.org/files/misc/pdf/Charter_and_Bylaws_8_20_10.
php (Article Nine, Section 12). The Rules of the Republican Party provide
that “[a]ll meetings of the Republic National Committee and all of its
committees shall be open meetings, except as provided for by Robert’s Rules
of Order,” and that “[n]o votes (except elections to office when properly
ordered pursuant to the provisions of Robert’s Rules of Order) shall be taken
by secret ballot in any open meeting of the Republic National Committee or
of any committee thereof.” Republican Nat’l Comm., The Rules of
the Republican Party 6, 7 (2008), available at http://www.gop.com/
images/legal/2008_RULES_Adopted.pdf (amended by the Republican
National Committee on August 6, 2010).
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Speaking to this contingency, a 1932 House Report
interpreting Article II, Section 3 and the Twelfth Amendment
stated that electors are free agents: “[p]residential electors,
and not the President, are chosen at the November election.
The electors, under the present Constitution, would be
free to choose a President, notwithstanding the death of a
party nominee.”46 Under this interpretation, electors cannot
be compelled to vote for their party’s nominees.47 Several
historical instances of “unfaithful” electors have not stopped
Congress from counting those electors’ votes,48 supporting the
view that presidential electors are free agents.49
Yet, history and custom also indicate that Congress can
invalidate electoral votes cast against party instructions in
the case of a nominee’s death. Horace Greeley, the 1872
presidential nominee of the Democratic and Liberal
Republican parties, died on November 29, 1872, a few weeks
after the national popular election held on November 5,
1872. Sixty-three of the sixty-six presidential electors whom
Greeley won voted for other candidates in accordance with
party instructions. Congress declined to count the three votes
from Georgia cast for Greeley against party instructions on
the ground that electoral votes cast for a dead person50 were
invalid.51 Congress, however, grouped those three electoral
votes with all other electoral votes cast for purposes of
determining the number needed for an electoral majority.52
According to the law of some states, presidential electors
are held accountable if they do not vote as instructed by the
party at the meeting of the Electoral College.vii More than
half the states and the District of Columbia have adopted
laws aimed at deterring unfaithful electors.53 In a majority
of these states, an elector pledges to vote for his party’s
nominee for President and Vice President when the Electoral
College meets to cast its votes. In the other states, electors
are obligated to vote for the winners of the states’ popular
elections.54 Although the courts have never addressed the
vii

question whether state laws binding electors are enforceable,
the courts have upheld the constitutionality of these laws. In
Ray v. Blair, the Supreme Court held that it is constitutional
for states to allow parties to require pledges from the electors55
as the electors are actors on behalf of their respective states.56
Moreover, the Court held that a state has the right to reject
the appointment of an elector who refuses to take the pledge
required by his party.57
The result of a national popular election presumably cements
in the minds of the voters the expectation that the successor
to the incoming President will be the newly-elected Vice
President. Of course, under the Twentieth Amendment,
this would not occur until Inauguration Day.58 Nevertheless,
to fulfill voters’ expectations after a presidential election,
the successful vice-presidential nominee should be assured
of succession if the successful presidential nominee dies
or resigns after Election Day, even if the electors have the
power to cast their votes for someone else in the period
before Inauguration Day, when the Twentieth Amendment
would take effect.viii Since voters would expect the electors to
vote for the winners of each state’s popular vote, in such an
instance, the party executive committees should exercise their
discretion to instruct the electors to vote for the successful
vice-presidential nominee to replace the deceased presidential
nominee and to recommend, not instruct, a vote by the
electors for a new vice-presidential nominee.
viii

The nominees for President and Vice President, of course, are not “elected”
on Election Day. Rather, voters elect electors on Election Day, and the
electors in turn elect a President and Vice President when they meet in
December to cast their electoral votes. Even at this point, the nominees for
President and Vice President are not yet “elected” because Congress must
validate and count the electoral votes. A presidential nominee becomes the
President-elect and a vice-presidential nominee becomes the Vice Presidentelect upon the count and declaration of electoral votes by Congress. See
generally Neale, supra note 51, at 3-4. But see H.R. Rep. No. 72-345, at
4 (1932) (“[V]otes which were cast for a person, who was eligible at the
time the votes were cast but who has died before the votes are counted by
Congress . . . . must be counted by Congress.”).

Six states have enacted civil and criminal penalties for faithless electors. See
Appendix F, Chart 5 for the text of these states’ statutes.
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1. Recommendations
In the event of the death of a successful presidential nominee
after the General Election but before the meeting of the
Electoral College, we urge the parties to adopt rules that
automatically elevate the vice-presidential nominee to the
position of presidential nominee.ix In addition, the party
should issue recommendations to the electors for whom
they should vote for Vice President.x To the extent that state
laws binding presidential electors conflict with the above
recommendation, state legislatures should amend those
statutes and release electors from an obligation to cast an
electoral vote for a dead nominee.xi

E. Succession After the Electoral College Vote
but Before the Counting and Declaration of
Electoral Votes by Congress
Congress is the ultimate arbiter of electoral votes in the event
of the death or resignation of a successful presidential or vicepresidential nominee, or both, during the period between
the meeting of the Electoral College and January 6, when
ix

The general notion of elevating the candidate for Vice President of
the same party to the presidential spot has some support in Congress,
although the means identified for effectuating this are different from the
recommendation in this Report. See Presidential Succession Act of 2010,
H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010) (suggesting the elevation of the vicepresidential candidate of the same party to the presidential slot and the
selection of the replacement vice-presidential candidate via predetermined
contingent choices by presidential electors).

x

Because it would be non-binding, this specific recommendation likely would
play an important role in limiting the political jockeying by electors to put
the election before Congress. If a sufficient number of electors feel forced
to vote in a way with which they disagree, they may switch their electoral
votes for President and thereby deny all of the candidates a majority of the
electoral votes, throwing the election to the House of Representatives. While
a non-binding suggestion carries the authoritative weight of the party, the
ultimate election of the replacement Vice President should be left up to the
individual electors. See generally Amar, supra note 49, at 219. Of course, in
the event that the presidential election is thrown into the House or the vicepresidential election into the Senate, Congress would have the authority to
disregard party recommendations or instructions. See U.S. Const. amend
XX, § 4.

xi

40

Apparently, only Wisconsin’s statute regarding presidential electors explicitly
releases electors from their statutory obligation upon the death of the
candidate to whom they are pledged. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75 (LexisNexis
2011).

Congress counts the Electoral College votes.59 The Twelfth
Amendment states that “[t]he President of the Senate shall . . .
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.”60
It is unclear whether Congress can invalidate electoral votes
cast for a presidential or vice-presidential nominee who dies
after the meeting of the Electoral College.61
As in other pre-inaugural periods, the death or resignation
of a presidential or vice-presidential nominee poses less
urgent problems than in the case of double death or double
resignation.62 There are two outcomes if Congress counts the
votes for a nominee who has won a majority of the electoral
votes but dies or resigns after the votes have been cast. First, in
the event of death or resignation of the presidential nominee,
the vice-presidential nominee would become President upon
taking the presidential oath of office on Inauguration Day.63
Second, in the event of the death of the vice-presidential
nominee, the President, after assuming office, must nominate
a new Vice President pursuant to Section 2 of the TwentyFifth Amendment.64
If Congress counts the electoral votes for the successful
presidential and vice-presidential nominees who both had
died after the meeting of the Electoral College, the next
person in the line of succession would become Acting
President upon taking the oath of office on January 20.65
Thus, if the next in line is a member of a different party from
that of the deceased President-elect and Vice President-elect,
the result would be a change in the party of the Presidentelect, contrary to the expressed will of the electorate. This
would present a politically difficult situation for members
of Congress charged with determining the outcome of a
presidential election. The alternative—the refusal of Congress
to count votes cast for nominees living at the time of the
Electoral College vote—would run afoul of the Twelfth
Amendment.

1. Recommendation
Ultimately, in light of the constitutional mandate in the
Twelfth Amendment to count all electoral votes and the
statutory provision66 disfavoring objections to electoral votes
cast for living nominees, we believe that Congress lacks the
authority to refuse to count electoral votes cast for nominees
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who were living at the time of the meeting of the Electoral
College. Congress must count those votes, regardless of
subsequent death or resignation.xii

F. Succession after Count and Declaration
of Electoral Votes by Congress but before
Inauguration Day
As noted previously, the death of either a President-elect or
Vice President-elect during the fourteen days between the
congressional count and declaration of the electoral votes on
January 6 and the inauguration on January 20 is addressed by
the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments, respectively.
How to address the death or resignation or inability of both
the President-elect and Vice President-elect during this period
may present complications if there is no Speaker or President
pro tempore. The 1947 Act contains the list of officers eligible
to act as President in these circumstances, which would
trigger the Cabinet line of succession.67 However, there
may not have been any Cabinet nominations made by the
outgoing President for the Senate to confirm at the request
of a newly-elected President.xiii Thus, the outgoing President’s
Cabinet members would be in the line of succession to act as
President if they had not yet resigned.
Recent practice has been for the President-elect to release the
names of his Cabinet nominees and for Senate committees
to hold confirmation hearings for uncontroversial nominees
xii

Furthermore, objections to electoral votes are prohibited by statute if those
votes were “regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully
certified.” 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). Although the Greeley precedent would
invalidate electoral votes cast for candidates who died before the meeting
of the Electoral College, this does not mean that Congress can invalidate
electoral votes cast for qualified nominees who were alive at the time of the
Electoral College vote. A “qualified” nominee is one who meets the Article
II, Section 1 requirements to run for President: “No person except a natural
born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age
of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.

xiii The Constitution provides that only a President, not a President-elect, “shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate shall
appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States . . . .” U.S. Const. art. II, §
2, cl. 2.

before January 20. The term “confirmation hearing” is not
fully accurate because there is no presidential nominee for
the Senate committee to confirm prior to January 20. Rather,
Senate committees hold such hearings to decide whether to
recommend confirmation of the nominees to the full Senate,
a vote which can only occur after the newly-inaugurated
President officially nominates his Cabinet selections.68

1. Recommendations
To ensure an orderly transition in a time of crisis, the Clinic
recommends adopting the Continuity of Government
Commission’s recommendation69 for cooperation between
the outgoing and incoming presidential administrations to
expedite the confirmation of incoming Cabinet members.xiv
The outgoing President and Congress have affirmative duties
in this regard under the Presidential Transition Act of 1963.70
The Clinic suggests that the outgoing President consider
promptly nominating Cabinet nominees the Presidentelect submits to him prior to Inauguration Day.xv Congress
should confirm as many of these nominees as possible prior
to Inauguration Day, consistent with the proper discharge of
its advice and consent responsibility.71 As is now the practice,
one or more of these individuals should not attend the
presidential inauguration and should be located away from
Washington, D.C. to ensure a line of succession that reflects
the results of the most recent presidential election.xvi
xiv

The proposed cooperation between outgoing and incoming administrations
to expedite the confirmation of Cabinet members and secure the continuity
of government has support in Congress. See Presidential Succession Act of
2010, H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. § 4 (2010) (supporting the Continuity of
Government Commission’s seventh recommendation).

xv

We believe that such an action by a sitting President would set a positive
and powerful precedent to be followed by future Presidents. If this
recommendation is not adopted, however, the current practice of holding
hearings before Inauguration Day should continue.

xvi

We recognize that under a Cabinet line of succession, the death, resignation,
or failure to qualify of the President- and Vice President-elect before
Cabinet nominations are submitted to the outgoing President is a gap
that is not addressed by these recommendations. Under a legislative line
of succession, the contingency does not create a gap because the Speaker
becomes Acting President upon taking the oath of office on January 20.
See H.R. Rep. No. 72-345, at 2 (1932). Because the Clinic recommends
the adoption of a Cabinet line of succession, the Cabinet selection process
should be expedited and should be one of the first items addressed by the
President-elect and the presidential transition team.
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VIII. Summary of Recommendations
Presidential and Acting Presidential Inability
Recommendations:
Statutory Action:
1. Acknowledge that the President or Acting President,
upon declaration of his own inability, can transfer his
powers voluntarily to the next in the line of succession in
instances of vice-presidential inability or vacancy.
2. Authorize the person next in the line of succession
after the Vice President, together with a majority of the
Cabinet, to declare the inability of the President or Acting
President in instances of vice-presidential inability or
vacancy.
Executive Contingency Planning:
3. The President or Acting President should prepare a
prospective executive declaration of inability at the
beginning of his service, in which he would define the
situations which in his view would render him unable
to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency in
the future and would provide that the declaration of his
inability goes into effect based upon a review process set
out by the President or Acting President.
Vice-Presidential Inability Recommendation:
Executive Contingency Planning:
4. The Vice President should prepare a prospective executive
declaration of inability at the beginning of his service, in
which he would define the situations which in his view
would render him unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the vice presidency in the future and would
provide that the declaration of his inability goes into
effect based upon a review process set out by the Vice
President.
Line of Succession Recommendations
Statutory Action:
5. Establish an executive line of succession that runs
exclusively through the Cabinet after the President
and Vice President. In the case of removal, death, or
resignation of the President, the Cabinet member
assuming the powers and duties of the presidency should
44

be required to resign from the Cabinet. In a case of
inability, the Cabinet member assuming the powers and
duties of the presidency should not be required to resign.
6. In the event an executive line of succession is not adopted,
establish a binary line of succession that first runs through
Congress, and then the Cabinet, in instances of death,
resignation, and removal. Successors would be required
to resign in these circumstances. The line of succession
would run solely through the Cabinet in instances of
presidential and vice-presidential inability or failure to
qualify. Under this proposal, when a Cabinet member
assumes the powers and duties of the presidency, that
Cabinet member would not be required to resign.
7. Confirm whether Acting Secretaries are included in the
line of succession, and, if so, either remove them from
the line, or alternatively, amend the 1947 Act so that
Acting Secretaries can assume the powers and duties of
the presidency, in the order of the departments’ creation,
only after succession has passed through all of the Cabinet
Secretaries.
Pre-Inaugural Period Recommendations:
Political Party Rules:
8. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential
candidate before the political party conventions, require
the parties to hold an open meeting to decide which
replacement candidate(s) will receive the delegates’ votes.
9. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential
nominee between the political party conventions and the
General Election, require the parties to either hold an
open meeting to select a replacement candidate or recall
the convention delegates.
10. During the period between the General Election and
the meeting of the Electoral College, provide that
the vice-presidential candidate replaces a deceased or
resigned presidential candidate of the same ticket and
that the candidate’s party issue recommendations to the
presidential electors as to a new candidate for the office of
Vice President.
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Congressional Rules:
11. In the event of the death or resignation of a presidential
or vice-presidential candidate between the meeting of the
Electoral College and the counting and declaration of the
Electoral College votes by Congress, require Congress to
count votes cast for a candidate if he was alive at the time
of the Electoral College vote.
Executive Contingency Planning:
12. During the period between the counting and declaration
of Electoral College votes by Congress and Inauguration

Day, the outgoing President should consider promptly
nominating any Cabinet nominees the Presidentelect submits to him, and Congress should confirm as
many nominees as possible prior to Inauguration Day,
consistent with the proper discharge of Congress’s advice
and consent responsibility. One or more newly confirmed
Cabinet Secretaries should remain at a secure location
outside of Washington, D.C. on Inauguration Day. This
recommendation is particularly important in the case of
an exclusively executive line of succession, as the Clinic
recommends.
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AppendiCES
A. Constitutional, Statutory, and Party Rule
Provisionsi
1. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,
and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the
State Legislature.1

2. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be
chosen.2

3. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as
they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall
not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall
have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration
shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled
to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six,
New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland
six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five,
and Georgia three.3

4. Article I, Section 2, Clause 4
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State,
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election
to fill such Vacancies.4
i
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5. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker
and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment.5

6. Article I, Section 3, Clause 2
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence
of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may
be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first
Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year,
of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and
of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that
one third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies
happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of
the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make
temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the
Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies].6

7. Article I, Section 3, Clause 3
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.7

8. Article I, Section 3, Clause 4
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.8

9. Article I, Section 3, Clause 5
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United
States.9

10. Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall
be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.10

This Appendix contains constitutional provisions without noting whether
the provision has been subsequently amended.
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11. Article I, Section 3, Clause 7

17. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law.11

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.17

12. Article I, Section 5, Clause 1

18. Article II, Section 1, Clause 4

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in
such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may
provide.12

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.18

13. Article I, Section 5, Clause 2
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.13

14. Article I, Section 5, Clause 3
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in
their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire
of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.14

15. Article I, Section 5, Clause 4
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without
the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses
shall be sitting.15

16. Article II, Section 1, Clause 1
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the
Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President,
chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:16

19. Article II, Section 1, Clause 5
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President;
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall
not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.19

20. Article II, Section 1, clause 6
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.20

21. Article II, Section 1, Clause 7
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.21
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22. Article II, Section 1, Clause 8
Before he enter on the Execution of His Office, he shall take
the following Oath or Affirmation:--”I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”22

23. Article II, Section 3
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene
both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment,
he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper;
he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall
Commission all the Officers of the United States.23

24. Article II, Section 4
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.24

25. Twelfth Amendment
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President and in distinct ballots the person voted for
as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which
lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the
seat of the government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall,
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;-The person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
48

numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for
as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President, the votes shall be taken
by states, the representation from each state having one
vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or
members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all
the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of
Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the
right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day
of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as
President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional
disability of the President.--The person having the greatest
number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President,
if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the
two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of twothirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.25

26. Twentieth Amendment
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms
of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of
January, of the years in which such terms would have ended
if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their
successors shall then begin.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of
January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
Sec. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of
the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice
President elect shall become President. If a President shall not
have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify,
then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall
then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to
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act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly
until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Sec. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of
the death of any of the persons from whom the House of
Representatives may choose a President whenever the right
of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of
the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall
have devolved upon them.
Sec. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of
October following the ratification of this article.
Sec. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission.26

27. Twenty-fifth Amendment
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
Sec. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a new Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.
Sec. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter when the President transmits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of
the executive department or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to perform the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter
written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within
twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same
as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the
powers and duties of his office.27

28. Presidential Succession Act of 1792
Chapter VIII. An act relative to the Election of a President
and Vice President of the United States, and declaring the
Officer who shall act as President in case if Vacancies in the
offices both of President and Vice President.
(March 1, 1792)
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That except in case of an election of a President
and Vice President of the United States, prior to the ordinary
period as herein after specified, electors shall be appointed in
each state for the election of a President and Vice President
of the United States, within thirty-four days preceding the
first Wednesday in December, one thousand seven hundred
and ninety-two, and within thirty-four days preceding the
first Wednesday in December in every fourth year succeeding
the last election, which electors shall be equal to the number
of Senators and Representatives, to which the several states
may by law be entitled at the time, when the President
and Vice President, thus to be chosen, should come into
office: Provided always, That where no apportionment of
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Representatives shall have been made after any enumeration,
at the time of choosing electors, then the number of electors
shall be according to the existing apportionment of Senators
and Representatives.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That the electors
shall meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday
in December, at such place in each state as shall be directed,
by the legislature thereof; and the electors in each state shall
make and sign three certificates of all the votes by them
given, and shall seal up the same certifying on each that a list
of the votes of such state for President and Vice President is
contained therein, and shall by writing under their hands, or
under the hands of a majority of them, appoint a person to
take charge of and deliver to the President of the Senate, at
the seat of government, before the first Wednesday in January
then next ensuing, one of the said certificates, and the said
electors shall forthwith forward by the post-office to the
President of the Senate, at the seat of government, one other
of the said certificates, and shall forthwith cause the other of
the said certificates to be delivered to the judge of that district
in which the said electors shall assemble.
Section 3. And be it further enacted, That the executive
authority of each state shall cause three lists of the names of
the electors of such state to be made and certified and to be
delivered to the electors on or before the said first Wednesday
in December, and the said electors shall annex one of the said
lists to each of the lists of their votes.
Section 4. And be it further enacted, That if a list of votes,
from any state, shall not have been received at the seat of
government on the said first Wednesday in January, that
then the Secretary of State shall send a special messenger to
the district judge in whose custody such list shall have been
lodged, who shall forthwith transmit the same to the seat of
government.
Section 5. And be it further enacted, That Congress shall be
in session on the second Wednesday in February, one thousand
seven hundred and ninety-three, and on the second Wednesday
in February succeeding every meeting of the electors, and the
said certificates, or so many of them as shall have been received,
shall then be opened, the votes counted, and the persons who
shall fill the offices of President and Vice President ascertained
and declared, agreeably to the constitution.
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Section. 6. And be it further enacted, That in case there
shall be no President of the Senate at the seat of government
on the arrival of the persons entrusted with the lists of the
votes of the electors, then such persons shall deliver the lists of
votes in their custody into the office of the Secretary of State,
to be safely kept and delivered over as soon as may be, to the
President of the Senate.
Section 7. And be it further enacted, That the persons
appointed by the electors to deliver the lists of votes to the
President of the Senate, shall be allowed on the delivery of
the said lists twenty-five cents for every mile of the estimated
distance by the most usual road, from the place of meeting of
the electors, to the seat of government of the United States.
Section 8. And be it further enacted, That if any person
appointed to deliver the votes of the electors to the President
of the Senate, shall after accepting of his appointment neglect
to perform the services required of him by this act, he shall
forfeit the sum of one thousand dollars.
Section 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of
removal, death, resignation or inability both of the President
and Vice President of the United States, the President of the
Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no President of
the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
for the time being shall act as President of the United States
until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected.
Section 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever
the offices of President and Vice President shall both
become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a
notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state,
and shall also cause the same to be published in at least one of
the newspapers printed in each state, specifying that electors
of the President of the United States shall be appointed or
chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding
the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing:
Provided, There shall be the space of two months between
the date of such notification and the said first Wednesday in
December, but if there shall not be the space of two months
between the date of such notification and the first Wednesday
in December; and if the term for which the President and
Vice President last in office were elected shall not expire on
the third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of
State shall specify in the notification that the electors shall be
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appointed or chosen within thirty-four days preceding the
first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, within
which time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or
chosen, and the electors shall meet and give their votes on the
said first Wednesday in December, and the proceedings and
duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the
directions prescribed in this act.
Section 11. And be it further enacted, That the only
evidence of refusal to accept or of a resignations of the Office
of President and Vice President, shall be an instrument in
writing declaring the same, and sub-scribed by the person
refusing to accept or resigning, as the case may be, and
delivered into the office of the Secretary of State.
Section 12. And be it further enacted, That the term of four
years for which a President and Vice President shall be elected
shall in all cases commence on the fourth day of March next
succeeding the day on which the votes of the electors shall
have been given.28
Chapter XVII – An Act to authorize the President of the
United States in certain cases to alter the place for holding
a session of Congress. (Approved April 3, 1794)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in congress assembled, That
whenever the Congress shall be about to convene, and, from
the prevalence of contagious sickness, or the existence of other
circumstances, it would in the opinion of the President of
the United States, be hazardous to the lives or health of the
members to meet at the place to which the Congress shall
then stand adjourned, or at which it shall be next by law to
meet, the President shall be, and he hereby is authorized, by
proclamation, to convene the Congress at such other place as
he may judge proper.

29. Presidential Succession Act of 1886
Chapter 4. An act to provide for the performance of the
duties of the office of President in case of the removal,
death, resignation, or inability both of the President and
Vice-President. - Jan 19, 1886.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That in case of removal, death, resignation, or
inability of both the President and Vice-President of the
United States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or
in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then
the Secretary of Treasury, or if there be none, or in case of his
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary
of War, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death,
resignation, or inability, then the Attorney-General, or if
there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation,
or inability, then the Postmaster-General, or if there be none,
or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then
the Secretary of the Navy, or if there be none, or in case of his
removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary
of the Interior, shall act as President until the disability of the
President or Vice-President is removed or a President shall be
elected: Provided, That whenever the powers and duties of
the office of President of the United States shall devolve upon
any of the persons named herein, if Congress be not then in
session, or if it would not meet in accordance with law within
twenty days thereafter, it shall be the duty of the person
upon whom said powers and duties shall devolve to issue a
proclamation convening Congress ‘in extraordinary session,
giving twenty days’ notice of the time of meeting.
Section 2. That the preceding section shall only be held
to describe and apply to such officers as shall have been
appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate to
the offices therein named, and such as are eligible to the
office of President under the Constitution and not under
impeachment by the House of Representatives of the United
States at the time the powers and duties of the office shall
devolve upon them respectively.
Section 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, one
hundred and forty-seven, one hundred and forty-eight, one
hundred and forty-nine and one hundred and fifty of the
Revised Statutes are hereby repealed.29
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30. Presidential Succession Act of 1947

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security.

Section 19. Vacancy in offices of both President and Vice
President; officers eligible to act (a)(1) If, by reason of death,
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify,
there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as
Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.

(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection
shall continue so to do until the expiration of the then
current Presidential term, but not after a qualified and prior
entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal of
the disability of an individual higher on the list contained
in paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability to qualify
on the part of an individual higher on such list shall not
terminate his service.

(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death,
resignation, removal from office, or inability of an individual
acting as President under this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a
Speaker is to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of
the office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails
to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore
of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro
tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a)
or subsection (b) of this section shall continue to act until
the expiration of the then current Presidential term, except
that (1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office
is founded in whole or in part on the failure of both the
President-elect and the Vice-President-elect to qualify, then
he shall act only until a President or Vice President qualifies;
and (2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office
is founded in whole or in part on the inability of the President
or Vice President, then he shall act only until the removal of
the disability of one of such individuals.
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from
office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is no President
pro tempore to act as President under subsection (b) of this
section, then the officer of the United States who is highest
on the following list, and who is not under disability to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall
act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury,
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the
Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce,
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of
Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education,
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(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified
in the list in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held
to constitute his resignation from the office by virtue of the
holding of which he qualifies to act as President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only
to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under
the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only
to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal
from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro
tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of
the office of President devolve upon them.
(f ) During the period that any individual acts as President
under this section, his compensation shall be at the rate then
provided by law in the case of the President.30

31. Rule Number 9 of the Republican Partyii
Filling Vacancies in Nominations
(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized
and empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may
occur by reason of death, declination, or otherwise of the
Republican candidate for President of the United States or
the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United
States, as nominated by the national convention, or the
Republican National Committee may reconvene the national
convention for the purpose of filling any such vacancies.
ii

As adopted by the 2008 Republican National Convention, September 1,
2008, and amended by the Republican National Committee on August 6,
2010.
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(b) In voting under this rule, the Republican National
Committee members representing any state shall be entitled
to cast the same number of votes as said state was entitled to
cast at the national convention.

The Bylaws

(c) In the event that the members of the Republican National
Committee from any state shall not be in agreement in
the casting of votes hereunder, the votes of such state shall
be divided equally, including fractional votes, among the
members of the Republican National Committee present or
voting by proxy.

...

(d) No candidate shall be chosen to fill any such vacancy
except upon receiving a majority of the votes entitled to be
cast in the election.31

Article 2 – Democratic National Committee
Section 8. Attendance and Quorum and Voting.

(g) Proxy voting shall be permitted. Proxies may be either
general or limited and either instructed or uninstructed. All
proxies shall be in writing and transferable if so specified. No
DNC member may at any one time hold or exercise proxies
for more than one other DNC member; provided, however,
that proxy voting shall not be permitted in voting to fill a
vacancy on the National ticket.32

32. Selected Sections of the Charter and
Bylaws of the Democratic Party

ENDNOTES
1

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.

The Charter

2

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

Article 3 – Democratic National Committee

3

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

4

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.

5

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.

6

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.

7

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.

8

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.

9

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.

....

10

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

(c) filling vacancies in the nominations for the office of
President and Vice President. . . .

11

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.

12

Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.

13

Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.

14

Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.

15

Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.

16

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

17

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

18

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.

19

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.

20

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.

21

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.

22

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.

23

Id. art. II, § 3.

24

Id. art. II, § 4.

25

Id. amend. XII.

26

Id. amend. XX.

Section 1. The Democratic National Committee shall have
general responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic Party
between National Conventions, subject to the provisions of
this Charter and to the Resolutions or other actions of the
National Convention. This responsibility shall include:

Article 9 – General Provisions
Section 8. To assure that the Democratic nominee for the
office of President of the United States is selected by a fair and
equitable process, the Democratic National Committee may
adopt such statements of policy as it deems appropriate with
respect to the timing of Presidential nominating processes and
shall work with state Parties to accomplish the objectives of
such statements.
Section 12. All meetings of the Democratic National
Committee, the Executive Committee, and all other official
Party committees, commissions and bodies shall be open to
the public, and votes shall not be taken by secret ballot.
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27

Id. amend. XXV.

28

Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).

29

Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).

30

Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19
(2006)).

31

Republican Nat’l Comm., The Rules of the Republican Party
89 (2008), available at http://www.gop.com/images/legal/2008_RULES_
Adopted.pdf (amended by the Republican National Committee on August
6, 2010).

Democratic Nat’l Comm., The Charter & The Bylaws of the
32	
Democratic Party of the United States 3 (2010), available at
http://www.democrats.org/files/misc/pdf/Charter_and_Bylaws_8_20_10.
php (Article III, Section 1(c)).

B. Executive Declarations of Inability, Letter
Agreements & Section 3 Letter Precedents
1. Past Presidential Letter Agreements
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Vice President Richard
M. Nixon entered into a letter agreement that provided for
President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon to initiate a
transfer of presidential powers to Vice President Nixon on a
temporary basis.1 President Eisenhower would retain the right
to resume those powers upon a simple declaration that he was
ready to do so.2
Later administrations followed President Eisenhower and Vice
President Nixon’s precedent by entering into letters providing
for instances of presidential inability. They existed between:
President John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon B.
Johnson;3 and President Johnson and Speaker of the House of
Representatives John McCormack,4 because President Johnson’s
ascendancy to the presidency following President Kennedy’s
assassination left the vice presidency vacant. President Ronald
Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush executed
declarations of inability pursuant to section three of the TwentyFifth Amendment.5 Several of these letters appear below.

President when the President is unable to discharge them. There
is uncertainty expressed as to how there could be determined the
degree of the President’s disability that would justify transferring
his powers and duties to the Vice President.
An inability to discharge properly the powers and duties of
the Presidency could come about in several ways. One would
be disease or accident that would prevent the President from
making important decisions. Such periods of inability could
be prolonged but, even if only the length of hours, could
require action should there be any question of real importance
and urgency to be decided without delay.
Another form of inability could come about through a failure of
communications between the President and the Capital at any
time that he might be absent therefrom. A somewhat similar case
might be an uncertainty about the whereabouts of the President,
occasioned by a forced landing of the Presidential airplane.
Other types of inability could unquestionably arise.
There have been many proposals for clarifying this situation,
some by law, others by Constitutional Amendment. My own
opinion is that it would be difficult to write any law or an
Amendment in such fashion as to take care of every contingency
that might possibly occur. While the great area of uncertainty
now existing could and should be drastically reduced, I am not
sure that even the most carefully devised plan, objectively arrived
at, could remove doubt in every instance.

Letter from President Eisenhower to then-Vice President
Nixon, February 5, 1958

However, it seems to me that so far as you and I are concerned
in the offices we now respectively hold, and particularly in view
of our mutual confidence and friendship, we could do much to
eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to
the proper steps to be taken at any time when I might become
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the President.
Based upon my studies of the history of the Constitution and
upon the advice of Constitutional authorities, I am of the
opinion that this agreement would not in any way contravene
the clear intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is
rather a statement of our common intention to act completely
according to the spirit of this portion of the Constitution.

As both of us know, there are differences of opinion as to the
exact meaning of that feature of the Constitution which provides
that the Vice President will have the powers and the duties of the

Through such an agreement, we can assure that the best
interests of the country would not be damaged by the doubts
and indecisions that have at times existed in similar cases

a. L
 etter Agreement During the Eisenhower
Administration
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in the past. Moreover with this advance agreement, you
could without personal or official embarrassment, make any
decisions that seemed to you proper in cases where my ability
to discharge my powers and duties may be in serious question.
This note, which I have been planning for some time to write,
is merely to confirm, in writing, the gist of the agreement that
you and I have reached between ourselves.
It is simply stated:
In any instance in which I could clearly recognize my own
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency I
would, of course, so inform you and you would act accordingly.
With the exception of this one kind of case, you will be
the individual explicitly and exclusively responsible for
determining whether there is any inability of mine that makes
it necessary for you to discharge the powers and duties of
the Presidency, and you will decide the exact timing of the
devolution of this responsibility on you. I would hope that
you would consult with the Secretary of State, Governor
Adams and General Heaton, and if feasible, with medical
experts assembled by him, but the decision will be yours only.
I will be the one to determine if and when it is proper for me
to resume the powers and duties of the Presidency.
I know, of course, that you would make any decision for
taking over the presidential powers and duties only when
you feel it necessary. I have no fear that you, for any fleeting
or inconsequential purpose, would do so and thereby create
confusion in the government. Circumstances would have to
guide you, and if the imminence or occurrence of any world or
domestic emergency demanded, you would have to act promptly.
There is always the possibility that, as in the cases of Garfield
and Wilson, I might, without warning, become personally
incapable of making a decision at the moment when it should
be made. The existence of this agreement recognizing your
clear and exclusive responsibility for deciding upon the
inability of the President to perform his duties and exercise
his powers will remove any necessity or desire on the part of
friends and staffs to impede the right and authority of the
Vice President in reaching his decision on the matter.
There is only one final thought I would like to add. If any

disability of mine should, in the judgment of any group of
distinguished medical authorities that you might assemble, finally
become of a permanent character, I would, of course, accept
their decision and promptly resign my position. But if I were not
able to do so, and the same group of consultants would so state,
then you would take over not only the powers and duties but the
perquisites of the Presidency, including the White House itself.
In temporary cases of my “inability,” we agree that you should act
for the necessary period in your capacity as Vice President and,
additionally, as “Acting President.”
With warm regard, As ever 6
Letter Agreement from President Eisenhower to then-Vice
President Nixon
The President and the Vice President have agreed that the
following procedures are in accord with the purposes and
provisions of Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution, dealing
with Presidential inability. They believe that these procedures,
which are intended to apply to themselves only, are in no sense
outside or contrary to the Constitution but are consistent with
its present provisions and implement its clear intent.
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if
possible—so inform the Vice President, and the Vice
President would serve as Acting President, exercising the
powers and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President,
the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him
appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and would
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.7

b. Letter Agreement During the Kennedy
Administration
In August 1961 President Kennedy and Vice President
Johnson agreed to follow the procedures set forth below:
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if
possible—so inform the Vice President, and the Vice
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President would serve as Acting President, exercising the
power and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President,
the Vice President after such consultation as seems to him
appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
(3) The President, in either event would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the office.8

c. L
 etter Agreement From President Johnson to Speaker
John W. McCormack
President Lyndon Johnson sent a signed letter agreement to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives John W. McCormak on
December 23, 1963, which Speaker McCormak signed as well. It
was accompanied by a fifteen-page explanatory memorandum. The
letter and memorandum were not released publicly. The Clinic
obtained a copy from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library.
December 23, 1963
Dear Mr. Speaker:
Confirming our oral agreement regarding the procedures to
be followed in the event of my inability to exercise the powers
and duties of the Presidency, I am reducing the agreement
to writing and would appreciate your signing the original
of this letter and returning it to me for safekeeping in the
Presidential files. Enclosed for your use is a signed duplicate
original. The terms of the agreement are as follows:
1. In the event of inability, the President would – if possible
– so inform the Speaker of the House, and the Speaker of the
House would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers
and duties of the Office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from communicating with the Speaker of the House,
the Speaker of the House, after such consultation as seemed
to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide
upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
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3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
4. After being informed by the President of his inability or, in
the event of an inability which would prevent the President
from communicating with the Speaker of the House, after the
latter satisfies himself that such inability exists, the Speaker
of the House will resign as Speaker and as Representative in
Congress before undertaking to act as President.
Sincerely,
President Johnson did not enter into a signed letter agreement
with Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, but instead had an
oral agreement.9

d. L
 etter Declarations During the Reagan
Administration
President Ronald Reagan signed a letter to the President
pro tempore and the Speaker of the House in 1985, which
transferred presidential power to Vice President Bush,
pursuant to their longstanding agreement, for the duration of
his intestinal surgery.
Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House on the Discharge of the President’s
Powers and Duties During His Surgery
July 13, 1985
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:)
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will
be briefly and temporarily incapable of discharging the
Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the
President of the United States.
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney
General, I am mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of
the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and of the
uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary
periods of incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this
Amendment intended its application to situations such as the
instant one.
Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement
with Vice President George Bush, and not intending to set a
precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office in the
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future, I have determined and it is my intention and direction
that Vice President George Bush shall discharge those powers
and duties in my stead commencing with the administration
of anesthesia to me in this instance.
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine
that I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional
powers and duties of this Office.
May God bless this Nation and us all.
Sincerely,
RONALD REAGAN10
Upon resuming his powers and duties following surgery,
President Reagan’s letter to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House was as follows:
Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House on the President’s Resumption of
His Powers and Duties Following Surgery
July 13, 1985
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:)
Following up on my letter to you of this date, please be advised
I am able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers
and duties of the Office of the President of the United States. I
have informed the Vice President of my determination and my
resumption of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,
RONALD REAGAN11

2. Letters Pursuant to Section 3 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment
a. Letters During the George W. Bush Administration
President George W. Bush sent two letters to the President pro
tempore and the Speaker of the House temporarily transferring
his powers to Vice President Richard B. Cheney during his
presidency, once in 2002 and again in 2007. The text of these
letters were:
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of
the Powers and Duties of President of the United States

As my staff has previously communicated to you, I will undergo
this morning a routine medical procedure requiring sedation.
In view of present circumstances, I have determined to transfer
temporarily my Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice
President during the brief period of the procedure and recovery.
Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
this letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am unable
to discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of the office
of President of the United States. Pursuant to Section 3, the
Vice President shall discharge those powers and duties as Acting
President until I transmit to you a written declaration that I am
able to resume the discharge of those powers and duties.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush12
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers
and Duties of President of the United States
June 29, 2002
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall
constitute my written declaration that I am presently able to resume
the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of the office
of President of the United States. With the transmittal of this letter,
I am resuming those powers and duties effective immediately.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush13
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary
Transfer of the Powers and Duties of the President of the
United States
July 21, 2007
Dear Madame Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
This morning I will undergo a routine medical procedure
requiring sedation. In view of present circumstances, I have
determined to transfer temporarily my Constitutional powers
and duties to the Vice President during the brief period of the
procedure and recovery.

June 29, 2002
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
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In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the TwentyFifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this
letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am
unable to discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of
the office of the President of the United States. Pursuant to
Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those powers and
duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written
declaration that I am able to resume the discharge of those
powers and duties.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush14
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Resuming the Powers
and Duties of the President of the United States
July 21, 2007
Dear Madame Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the TwentyFifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this
letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am
presently able to resume the discharge of the Constitutional
powers and duties of the office of the President of the United
States. With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those
powers and duties effective immediately.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush15

An inability to properly discharge the powers and duties of
my office could arise in several ways. One would be disease
or accident that would prevent me from making important
decisions. Another form of inability could arise through a
breakdown of communications from me at a time of increased
urgency, uncertainty as to my whereabouts, or any such similar
scenarios involving a lapse or breakdown in communication.
Upon execution, this declaration will trigger the statutory
line of succession pursuant to Article II of the Constitution,
permitting the person next in the line of succession to act as
President until my recovery or the earlier recovery of the Vice
President, should he be disabled.
The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to
my inability declaration are as follows:
[To be determined by the sitting President]
Sincerely,
President [ ]

b. S
 ample Vice-Presidential Executive Declaration of
Inability
To the President Pro Tempore and the Speaker of the House:

3. Sample Executive Declarations of
Inability
The Clinic has prepared the following sample declarations
of inability – a sample presidential executive declaration of
inability and a sample vice-presidential executive declaration
of inability.

a. S
 ample Presidential Executive Declaration of
Inability
To the President Pro Tempore and the Speaker of the House:
As you are aware, there is currently no constitutional or legal
provision by which my inability can be declared in the event
of a vice-presidential vacancy or vice-presidential inability.
Through this document I wish to express situations which, if
they were to arise, would result in my view in a declaration of
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my inability. This advance declaration, by providing for the
declaration of my inability in described circumstances, will
allow for the smooth transfer of presidential power.

As you are aware, there is no specific constitutional or legal
provision by which I can declare my own inability to perform
the powers and duties of the vice presidency. I believe I
have the right to do so and, indeed, the responsibility in
circumstances where the President is disabled or a vacancy in
the presidency has arisen.
Through this document I wish to express my view of situations,
if they were to arise, that would constitute a basis for me to
declare my own inability. An inability to properly discharge
the powers and duties of my office could arise in several ways.
One would be disease or accident that would prevent me from
making important decisions. Another form of inability could
arise through a breakdown of communications between the
President and me at a time of increased urgency, uncertainty
as to my whereabouts, or any such similar scenarios involving a
lapse or breakdown in communication.
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This prospective declaration of inability will allow for the
smooth transition of power to the person next in line of
succession were the President to become unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, or died, resigned, or was
removed, all contingencies appearing in Article II, Section
1, Clause 6 of the Constitution. Obviously, I hope none
of these occasions occurs during our term in office but
prudence dictates that I contemplate such possibilities and act
accordingly.
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The individuals I authorize to make the determination as to
my inability declaration are as follows:
[To be determined by the sitting Vice President]
Sincerely,
Vice President [ ]

endNOTES
1

Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb. 5,
1958), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidentialpapers/second-term/documents/566.cfm.

2

Id.

3

John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 907, 922 (2010).

4

See id.

5

Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House on the Discharge of the President’s Powers and Duties During His
Surgery (July 13, 1985) [hereinafter Reagan Letter], available at http://
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/71385b.htm. See supra
Part V, footnotes 24–26 and accompanying text.

6

Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard Milhous Nixon
(Feb. 5, 1958), available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/
presidential-papers/second-term/documents/566.cfm; see also White House
Statement on Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to
Procedures in the Event of Presidential Disability, Pub. Papers 196 (March
3, 1958), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11313.

Report of the Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession

59

ADVANCE DRAFT- Cite as: 81 Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2012)

C. Legislative History of the Presidential
Succession Acts
1. The Presidential Succession Act of 1792
On December 20, 1790, the First Congress addressed the
issue of presidential succession.1 A bill was presented to the
House of Representatives providing that an “Officer” shall
act as President when vacancies arise in both the offices
of President and Vice President.2 This bill was referred to
the Committee of the Whole on the next day but was not
considered until January 10, 1791.3 The debates reveal
considerable controversy surrounding the question as to
which “Officers” should be included in the line of succession.
Suggestions ranged from the President pro tempore of the
Senate to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court.4 No consensus was reached.5
The Second Congress first addressed the matter of
presidential succession on November 15, 1791.6 On
November 30, 1791, the Senate passed a bill entitled “An
act relative to the election of a President and Vice President
of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall
act as President in case of vacancies in the offices both of
President and Vice President” and sent it to the House of
Representatives for debate.7 The bill placed the President
pro tempore ahead of the Speaker of the House in the line of
succession. Representatives initially rejected the placement
of legislative officers in the line of succession because it might
lead to “caballing” and “electioneering” in the choice of a
Speaker.8 Representative Hugh Williamson contended that
an “extensive construction” of the word “Officer” would allow
for any individual in the United States to be properly placed
in the line of succession.9 While Representatives Theodore
Sedgwick and Elbridge Gerry argued that the Speaker was an
“Officer,”10 Representative Gerry argued that a legislative line
of succession might violate separation of powers by blending
the executive and legislative branches.11
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By February 9, 1792, the Committee of the Whole was
considering placing the Secretary of State in the line of
succession.12 The House approved the proposal by a vote
of 32 to 22, with five members of the Constitutional
Convention voting with the majority13 and one voting
against the proposal.14 Then-Representative James Madison,
among others, supported placing the Secretary of State in
the line of succession during times of a dual vacancy and/
or inability for a number of reasons.15 Madison questioned
the constitutionality of including the President pro tempore
and the Speaker in the line of succession because they were
not “Officers” within the meaning of the Constitution.16
Moreover, Madison believed that if the Framers had
contemplated the President pro tempore and Speaker as
possible successors to the presidency, then “they would
probably have been there designated . . . instead of being
left to Legislative selection.”17 Finally, Madison believed the
inclusion of the President pro tempore and Speaker violated
the incompatibility clause and separation of powers.18
The Senate subsequently rejected the bill because the
Federalists successfully lobbied their supporters in order
to prevent Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, from
becoming eligible to succeed to the presidency.19 As a result,
on February 20, 1792, the Senate reinserted the President pro
tempore and Speaker of the House in place of the Secretary
of State into the line of succession.20 Additionally, the
Presidential Succession Act of 1792 (“1792 Act”) provided
for a special election for President21 in the case of a dual
vacancy, and called for the Secretary of State, in such an
instance, to notify the executive of every state that electors for
the President should be appointed within “thirty-four days
preceding the first Wednesday in December,” provided that
there were two months between the notification and the first
Wednesday in December.22 The Senate then referred the bill
to the House, and the following day, the House approved the
amendment by a vote of 31 to 24.23 The 1792 Act included
a provision for holding a special election, and it appears
that Congress contemplated a full four-year term for a new
President and Vice-President selected under this statute.24
The bill was signed into law on March 1, 1792.
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2. The Presidential Succession Act of 1886
Ninety-four years later, on January 19, 1886, Congress
superseded the 1792 Act when President Grover Cleveland
signed the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 (“1886 Act”).25
Vice President Thomas Hendricks had died in Indianapolis
in November 1885. President Cleveland’s message to
Congress on December 8, 1885 regarding the death of the
new Vice President called for a constitutional amendment
to clarify the line of succession should both the President
and Vice President die or become unable to serve. While the
Presidential Succession Act that was proposed and passed
shortly afterward was primarily the work of the Congress,
President Cleveland supported the legislation and signed the
bill into law.26
The House Select Committee on the Election of President
and Vice-President (“Select Committee”) submitted a report
concluding, among other things, that legislators were not
“Officers” as envisioned by the Framers and that an executive line
of succession would remove many of the questions arising from
a legislative line of succession. For instance, an executive line of
succession would remove the possible violation of separation
of powers and conflicts of interest in the event of impeachment
proceedings and trials in the House and Senate.27
Moreover, the drafters of the 1886 Act made it clear that
they intended to supersede the special election provision of
the 1792 Act. The Select Committee believed that in times
of inability of the President, an Acting President was only to
act as the “locum tenens,” or placeholder, until the inability
terminated.28 If the President died, the Acting President
was to fill the position “for the remainder of the term of
the removed President, and upon the occurring of the next
regular quadrennial election for President and Vice-President
and their inauguration on the succeeding 4th of March the
term of the officer acting as President should end.”29 Although
the Select Committee’s Report clearly stated its intent to
revoke the special election provision, the language of the
1886 Act is unclear. The 1886 Act contains the language
“shall act as President until the disability of the President or
Vice-President is removed or a President shall be elected,” and

“it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers
and duties shall devolve to issue a proclamation convening
Congress in extraordinary session, giving twenty days’
notice of the time of the meeting.”30 Thus, there is a lack of
agreement as to whether the 1886 Act did in fact supersede
the special election provision of the 1792 Act.ii 31
The 1886 Act did not pass without dissent. Many members
writing for the Minority of the Select Committee believed
that the 1886 Act did not go far enough to address future
issues pertaining to presidential succession.32 Specifically, those
in the Minority identified three distinct periods in which a
presidential vacancy might arise that remained unaddressed:33
(1) Where the President-elect dies or becomes
constitutionally disabled (for “inability” and “disability” are
used interchangeably) before inauguration.
(2) Where there is a failure of election of both President and
Vice-President, when the election is thrown in the House . . . .
(3) Where there is a failure to count the vote and declare
the result “in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives”; as, if one House or the other should fail,
for any cause, to meet the other, and our recent history more
than suggests the possibility of this contingency.34

a. Debates Leading Up To the 1886 Act
Members of Congress proposed several changes to the
1792 Act during the 94 years before Congress ultimately
amended the Act in 1886.35 The first significant analysis of the
constitutionality of the 1792 Act took place in 1856.36 On
June 26, 1856, Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky made
a motion to investigate what would happen when “both the
President and Vice President were dead, or unable to act”
and to address the issue of what happens “when the President
alone is either dead, removed from office, or from any cause
is unable to act.”37 On August 5, 1856, the Senate Judiciary
Committee issued a report (the “Report”) on Senator
Crittenden’s proposal affirming the view that Sections 9
i

Ultimately, Congress revisited the issue of special elections, and they are no
longer provided for in the 1947 Act.
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and 10 of the 1792 Act,ii which provide for a legislative line
of succession and a special election, were constitutional.38
However, the Judiciary Committee was not convinced
that the 1792 Act prevented “the mischief of confusion
and anarchy.”39 Specifically, the Report expressed concern
regarding the potential absence of a President pro tempore
and Speaker and the possibility that either the President
pro tempore or the Speaker might not possess the “requisite
qualifications, under the Constitution, to be invested with the
duties and powers of an acting President.”40

particeps criminis, or participants in a crime, if a President
faced impeachment and removal.44 Moreover, the Judiciary
Committee questioned whether Cabinet members were truly
“Officers” under the Constitution when their positions had
terminated or were suspended.45 For example, if an Acting
President found a Cabinet member to be “obnoxious” or to
be an individual he disagreed with, he might decide to replace
the Cabinet member.46 Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee
recommended extending the line of succession to the
Supreme Court.47 The Report stated:

To remedy these potential problems, the Report analyzed a
number of possible solutions.41 For example, to guard against
the problem of vacancies in both the positions of President
pro tempore and Speaker, a suggestion was made to extend the
line of succession to the Cabinet.42 Although the Judiciary
Committee believed an extension of the line of succession
to the Cabinet would solve the problem of a dual vacancy
in the offices of President pro tempore and the Speaker by
including more individuals who would be eligible to qualify
to act as President, the Judiciary Committee quickly found
cause for rejecting the proposal.43 The Report cites the
potential issue of Cabinet members being implicated as

[A]nd if there be no President of the Senate, then the Speaker
of the House of Representatives for the time being shall
act as President of the United States until the disability be
removed or a President shall be elected; and if there should
be no President of the Senate nor Speaker of the House of
Representatives for the time being, and it be not a case of
vacancy caused by removal, the chief justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, or if there be no chief justice in
office, or it be a case of vacancy caused by removal, then the
associate justices of the said Supreme Court, successively,
according to seniority of commission, shall act as President
of the United States until the disability be removed or a
President shall be elected.48

ii

Section 9 of the 1792 Act states:
And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, resignation or
inability both of the President and Vice President of the United States, the
President of the Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no President
of the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the
time being shall act as President of the United States until the disability be
removed or a President shall be elected.
Section 10 of the 1792 Act states:
And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of President and Vice
President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith
cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and
shall also cause the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers
printed in each state, specifying that electors of the President of the United
States shall be appointed or chosen in the several states within thirty-four
days preceding the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing:
Provided, There shall be the space of two months between the date of such
notification and the said first Wednesday in December, but if there shall
not be the space of two months between the date of such notification and
the first Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the President
and Vice President last in office were elected shall not expire on the third
day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall specify in the
notification that the electors shall be appointed or chosen within thirty-four
days preceding the first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing,
within which time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen,
and the electors shall meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday
in December, and the proceedings and duties of the said electors and others
shall be pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act.
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Finally, the Report concluded that such a “provisional”
President would only be invested with the executive functions
until the “disability” was removed or the Electoral College
chose a new President.49 While the Judiciary Committee did
a thorough analysis of the 1792 Act, no further legislative
action was taken on the basis of the Report.
For the next twenty-five years, there was little or no discussion
on presidential succession, until the assassination of President
James Garfield,50 which brought to the nation’s attention the
need for reform. At the time of President Garfield’s death,
there was neither a President pro tempore nor a Speaker of
the House.51 Upon President Garfield’s death, Vice President
Chester A. Arthur took the oath of office in the early morning
of September 20, 1881 by New York State Supreme Court
Justice, John R. Brady, and then again on September 22, 1881
by United States Supreme Court Justice Morrison R. Waite.52
President Arthur immediately called the Senate into special
session in order to elect a President pro tempore and to take up
the matter of presidential succession.53 He wrote to the Senate:
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Questions which concern the very existence of the
Government and the liberties of the people were suggested by
the prolonged illness of the late President, and his consequent
incapacity to perform the functions of his office. It is
provided by the second article of the Constitution, . . . that
‘in case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and
duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the VicePresident.’
What is the intendment of the Constitution in its
specifications of ‘inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the said office’ as one of the contingencies which calls the
Vice-President to the exercise of Presidential functions?
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued
intellectual incapacity, or has it a broader import?
What must be its extent and duration?
How must its existence be established?
Has the President whose inability is the subject of inquiry
any voice in determining whether or not it exists, or is
the decision of that momentous and delicate question
confided to the Vice-President, or is it contemplated by the
Constitution that Congress should provide by law precisely
what should constitute inability, and how and by what
tribunal or authority it should be ascertained?
If the inability proves to be temporary in its nature, and
during its continuance the Vice-President lawfully exercises
the functions of the Executive, by what tenure does he hold
his office?
Does he continue as President for the remainder of the four
years’ term?
Or would the elected President, if his inability should cease in
the interval, be empowered to resume his office?
And if, having such lawful authority, he should exercise
it, would the Vice-President be thereupon empowered to
resume his powers and duties as such?54
On December 6, 1881, Senator James Beck and Senator Samuel
Maxey sought to answer President Arthur’s questions and proposed
resolutions to reform the 1792 Act.55 Senator Beck prepared a
resolution asking that the Committee on the Judiciary examine
the laws enacted pursuant to Article II, Section 1 concerning
presidential succession so that “all doubts or defects which may

exist in our present laws on this subject may be remedied and future
controversy prevented.”56 Similarly, Senator Maxey prepared a
resolution stating:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and
is hereby, instructed to inquire what legislation, if any,
is necessary to carry into effect the provision of the
Constitution in case of the removal of the President from
office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the said office, as well as the provision
in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of both
the President and Vice-President; and said committee will
report by bill or otherwise.57

Two days later, on December 8, 1881, Senator Augustus
Garland introduced a bill58 “to provide for the performance
of the duties of the Presidential office in case of the removal,
death, resignation, or inability of the President and VicePresident” with no further details.59
On December 14, 1881, Congress resumed discussion on
presidential succession and Senator Beck noted numerous
questions surrounding the 1792 Act, including: in the case
of special elections the possibility of presidential terms
beginning and expiring in the middle of congressional terms;
the expiration of a President pro tempore’s or Speaker’s term
of office while acting as President; the length of time that the
Vice President would hold office, whether it would be for
the remainder of the term or until an inability was removed;
separation of powers if the President pro tempore or Speaker
were to take the office; and the meaning of the term “Officer”
in the Constitution.60
Although all these questions arose in the course of
Senator Beck’s attempt to revise the 1792 Act, it was the
constitutionality of the 1792 Act that emerged as the
principal issue, specifically whether the President pro
tempore and Speaker of the House are “Officers” under the
Constitution.61 Senator Beck relied on an 1862 speech by
Senator James A. Bayard to argue that legislators are not
“Officers” under the Constitution able to succeed to the
presidency.62 Senator Bayard had cited the example of Senator
William Blount,63 who, during his trial after impeachment,
pled he was not a “civil officer of the United States”64
and therefore, not liable to impeachment.65 This plea was
sustained in the Senate and the attempt to impeach Senator
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Blount was abandoned.66 Senator Bayard believed this
decision made clear that legislative officers were not “Officers
of the United States”67 because the decision was made by the
Senate “organized as a court, sitting under oath, after a public
argument and hearing by the ablest counsel in the country on
both sides,”68 and should stand as precedent.69
Senator Bayard had next looked to the difference in language
between Article II, Section 1 regarding the presidential
term of Office,70 and Article I, Sections 271 and 3,72 regarding
the terms of Representatives and Senators. Senator Bayard
suggested that if the positions of Representatives or Senators
were those of “Officers,” the Framers would have used the
same constitutional language as applied to the President,
“shall hold his Office.”73 Article I, Section 2, for example,
could have read, with respect to Representatives: “who shall
hold their office for the term of six years,”74 rather than the
language that was adopted, which reads, “The House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year . . . .”75 Additionally, Article I, Section 3, referring
to Senators, states that “The Seats of the Senators of the
first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second
Year . . . .”76 Senator Bayard suggested that if the Framers
meant for these positions to be those of “Officers,” then the
Framers would have written “[t]he term of office of Senators
of the first class shall expire at the expiration of the second
year.”77 Furthermore, Senator Bayard noted the language of
the Incompatibility Clause,78 which prevents any Senator
or Representative, during the time for which he is elected,
from holding “any civil Office.”79 It does not state that these
individuals are prevented from holding any “other” civil
Office, which implies that they do not already hold “civil
Offices.” Senator Bayard then pointed to Article II, Section
1, providing for the election of electors80 and the language
distinguishing between Senators and Representatives
and persons “holding an Office of Trust or Profit under
the United States.”81 He concluded that Senators and
Representatives are not “officers of the United States” nor do
they hold “office under the United States”; rather they hold
the position of a “station” or “trust.”82 In support of this view,
Senator Bayard offered the fact that the people of the United
States elect neither Senators nor Representatives; rather,
state legislatures elected Senators and the people from state
districts elect members of the House of Representatives.83
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Senator Beck agreed with these points and entered into
the record additional support for addressing the question
of presidential succession, including his correspondence
with the Official Reporter, D.F. Murphy, in 1881.84 The
correspondence took place four days after President Garfield
was shot and dealt with the history and issues surrounding
presidential succession.85 In his correspondence, Murphy
pointed to a number of provisions of the 1792 Act that
concerned him.86 Specifically, Murphy noted that the
President pro tempore can change on a daily basis, as provided
for by a Senate resolution dated January 13, 1876, declaring,
“[t]hat the office of President pro tempore of the Senate is
held at the pleasure of the Senate.”87 Under the 1792 Act
the President pro tempore was not required to resign before
becoming Acting President, and therefore it was unclear
whether he would remain Acting President if the Senate
changed his status as President pro tempore. This is no longer a
concern because the 1947 Act requires both the Speaker and
the President pro tempore to resign before taking the oath as
Acting President.88
Subsequently, Senator Garland of Arkansas introduced a
bill repealing the legislative line of succession and replacing
it with an executive line of succession. Senator Garland
believed the line of succession should go through the Cabinet
Departments “commencing with the Secretary of State
and going down in the order in which they are generally
recognized and named in our proceedings, our laws, and
our correspondence.”89 Senator Garland recommended the
executive line of succession in order to maintain separation of
powers within the government.90 Just as then-Representative
James Madison believed the extension of the line of succession
to the judiciary would blur the lines of the separation of
powers, Senator Garland believed the extension of the
line of succession to the legislative branch would have the
same effect.91 Specifically, Madison noted that by including
the President pro tempore and the Speaker in the line of
succession, these individuals would retain their legislative
stations and “their incompatible functions will be blended;
or the incompatibility will supersede those stations, and then
those being the substratum of the adventitious functions,
these must fail also.”92 Furthermore, Senator Garland believed
that the executive line of succession enabled the President to
hand over his duties confidently.93 Senator Garland argued
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that an executive line of succession would appeal to the will of
the electorate because all Heads of Departments would have
received the Senate’s endorsement.94 Finally, Senator Garland
believed an executive line of succession would dispose of the
“Officer” question.95 In his opinion, the President pro tempore
and Speaker were only “Officers” of their respective bodies.96
In support of this argument, he offered Senator Blount’s
impeachment trial and the case of Senator John Smith from
Ohio, who was punished by expulsion, not impeachment,
because he was held not to be an “Officer” within the
meaning of the Constitution.97 This bolstered Senator
Garland’s position because if legislators are not impeachable,
then they are not “Officers of the United States” under the
Constitution.98

the furtherance of the President’s policies. In response to
challenges concerning the confirmation process of Cabinet
members, primarily that there is an “unwritten law” that
causes the Senate to confirm the President’s appointments
for the Departments,108 Senator Hoar noted that Senators
will need to take into consideration “this new possibility”
when advising and consenting as to the qualifications of
a nominated individual, and thus take more seriously the
nomination and confirmation process.109 However, Senator
Hoar did not believe that Acting Secretaries should be in the
line of succession. He stated, “an officer holding ad interim,
or an officer holding by Presidential appointment without
the consent of the Senate, is not entitled under this bill to
succeed, under any circumstances, to the Presidency.”110

Senator Garland next addressed objections to an executive
line of succession. Specifically, in response to objections
regarding presidential qualifications,99 Senator Garland
suggested a clause stating “each of such officers above named
shall have the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution
of the United States for President and Vice-President.”100
Other objections to the proposed executive line of succession
were based on the possible implication of a Cabinet officer
as particeps criminis in the impeachment of the President.101
Senator Garland suggested this issue could be eliminated by
a clause providing “that neither of such officers above named
shall have been implicated, directly or indirectly, in any matter
for which the President may have been impeached.”102 These
two suggestions by Senator Garland were included in Section
2 of the 1886 Act as enacted.103

Furthermore, Senator Hoar, like his colleagues, believed
constitutional questions regarding legislative officers and
party continuity were decisive reasons to change the line of
succession.111 Senator Hoar also identified the issue regarding
possible simultaneous vacancies in both the positions of the
President pro tempore and the Speaker as important in his
decision to propose an executive line of succession.112 Senator
Hoar reintroduced his bill,113 which the Senate passed and
forwarded to the House,114 but the House again failed to take
further action.115

Senator Hoar proposed an executive line of succession,
which would last for the duration of the presidential term,
eliminating any special election.104 Included in this line of
succession were all Heads of Departments, in the order in
which the Departments had been created.105 Senator Hoar
appeared to firmly believe that the Secretary of State should
be in the line of succession.106 He described the Secretary of
State as “usually the most conspicuous representative next to
the President of the United States, of the same opinions and
policies upon which the people put their stamp of approval
in the Presidential election.”107 Thus, in his view, the inclusion
of the Secretary of State and other Cabinet members in
the line of succession would allow for party continuity and

The issue of presidential succession did not reemerge as a
congressional concern until 1885, with the death of Vice
President Thomas A. Hendricks and President Grover
Cleveland’s message to the Forty-Ninth Congress.116 In his
message, President Cleveland stated:
The present condition of the law relating to the succession
to the Presidency . . . is such as to require immediate
amendment. This subject has repeatedly been considered
by Congress, but no result has been reached. The recent
lamentable death of the Vice President and vacancies at
the same time in all other offices the incumbents of which
might immediately exercise the functions of the Presidential
office, have caused public anxiety and a just demand that
a recurrence of such a condition of affairs should not be
permitted.117

Thus, with President Cleveland’s urging and on the basis of
the previous exhaustive debates on the issue of presidential
succession on the record, Senator Hoar reintroduced a
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modified bill in the Senate.118 The Senate passed the bill
on December 17, 1885,119 and upon review the House of
Representatives also passed the bill.120 The 1886 Act became
law on January 19, 1886.121

3. The Presidential Succession Act of 1947

and/or inability the individual succeeding to the presidency
should serve only until the next congressional election, at
which point a President would be elected or until a special
election to replace the President and Vice President was
held.133

After almost sixty years, the issues surrounding presidential
succession were resurrected following the death of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Vice President Harry S. Truman’s
subsequent ascension to the presidency in April 1945.122
Members of Congress became concerned at this time because
of the perceived political inexperience of Secretary of State
Edward R Stettinius, Jr., who under the 1886 Act was the
next in the line of succession.123 Postmaster General James A.
Farley raised the additional concern that under the 1886 Act,
the President would be able to appoint his own successor by
naming a new Secretary of State.124 According to Postmaster
General Farley this was undemocratic and should be
immediately modified.125 These concerns ultimately prompted
Congress to reexamine presidential succession.126

In sum, President Truman recommended that Congress
enact a law providing: that the Speaker of the House should
be first in the line of succession in the case of removal, death,
resignation, or inability of the President and Vice President,
and he should resign from the House before assuming the
powers and duties of the office of President; that if there is
no qualified Speaker, the President pro tempore should resign
from the Senate and act as President only until a qualified
Speaker is elected; that if there is neither a qualified Speaker
nor a qualified President pro tempore, the Cabinet member
next in the line of succession should act as President until
either a qualified Speaker or a qualified President pro tempore
is elected; and that if Congress decides to enact a special
election provision, the election should be held as soon as
practicable.134

On June 19, 1945, President Truman delivered a special
message to Congress, which echoed Postmaster General
Farley’s concerns and urged Congress to adopt new legislation
to address presidential succession.127 President Truman argued
that his ability to name his own successor was contrary to
democratic principles and should not be vested with the
President.128 President Truman believed that the next in the
line of succession should come as close as possible to being
nationally elected.129 Thus, he recommended the Speaker
of the House as next in the line of succession.130 President
Truman felt the Speaker was the individual who came closest
to being nationally elected because not only is the Speaker
elected as his district’s congressional representative, but also
by the House of Representatives as its Speaker.131

Initial responses to President Truman’s proposal were
favorable, but as time passed the terms stipulated in the plan
were questioned on constitutional grounds.135 On June 25,
1945, Representative Hatton W. Sumners of Texas introduced
a bill that reflected all of President Truman’s proposals,136
and subsequently the Committee on the Judiciary found
Representative Sumner’s bill to be constitutional.137 Sumner’s
bill provided that if concurrent presidential and vicepresidential vacancies occurred more than ninety days before
the next congressional election, presidential electors would
be chosen at the coming congressional election and if a
simultaneous vacancy did not occur within that ninety-day
period, no special election would take place.138

President Truman recommended that the Speaker be placed
ahead of the President pro tempore in the line of succession
because, in his view, the Speaker enjoyed a more democratic
pedigree, since members of the House of Representatives are
elected every two years, while Senators are elected every six
years.132 Therefore, the Speaker is more likely to be reflective
of the national political mandate at the time of succession.
President Truman proposed that in times of a dual vacancy

The House debated this bill. Those in favor believed it was
more democratic than the 1886 Act because the Speaker
reflected the most recent mandate of the national electorate.139
However, Representatives John Gwynne, Clarence E.
Hancock, and Raymond Springer criticized the bill and
argued that the Speaker and President pro tempore were not
constitutional “Officers.”140 Others argued that the bill would
inadvertently encourage the impeachment and removal of
the President, constituting a legislative encroachment on the
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executive.141 Representative John M. Robsion took particular
issue with the special election provision, arguing it could lead
to four different Presidents in one term and was bad policy.142
The House of Representatives ultimately removed the special
election provision from the bill.143 The House passed the
modified Sumners bill on June 29, 1945.144
Once the bill reached the Senate, no further action was
taken until 1947.145 The fact that the Republicans took
control of Congress in 1946 did not deter Truman, who still
advocated for congressional consideration of the legislative
line of succession.146 The bill, which was introduced by
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, did not contain a provision
for special elections and explicitly required the resignation
of the Speaker and President pro tempore before either
could act as President.147 Compulsory resignation received
much criticism, as many believed this would discourage a
Speaker or President pro tempore from acting as President
in the event of presidential inability.148 Further, the issues
regarding whether these legislative leaders were even
“Officers” under the Constitution reemerged.149 Senator
Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico argued that “[t]he officer
must continue to hold that office in order to continue to
qualify to act as President.”150 Thus, the person is no longer
an “Officer” under the Constitution and cannot, having
resigned his position, act as President.151 As these concerns
mounted, the Committee on Rules and Administration
submitted a report on March 24, 1947, which contained the
“minority view” of various Senators and described the bill
as “piecemeal legislation” while insisting that the relevant
issues had not been thoroughly studied.152
Representative Robsion submitted a report of the Committee
on the Judiciary on July 9, 1947 recommending that the bill
be enacted.153 The report included a letter dated June 11,
1947 from then Attorney General, Douglas W. McGregor, in
response to a request by the Committee on the Judiciary for
review of the constitutionality of the bill.154 Attorney General
McGregor endorsed the bill and opined that members
of Congress were “Officers” under the Constitution.iii155
iii

Attorney General McGregor cited Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 102
(1916), which stands for the proposition that impersonating a member
of the House of Representatives involved an “Officer” acting under the
authority of the United States. However, Officer in this sense is construed
according to its meaning in the penal code, not the Constitution. Id. at 11217.

McGregor also cited the 1792 Act and the fact that it
“represents a construction of article II by an early Congress,
whose views of the Constitution have long been regarded
as authoritative, and reflects a long-continued acquiescence
in such a construction.”156 Ultimately, the Senate passed the
bill on June 27, 1947157 and the House of Representatives
followed suit on July 10, 1947.158 On July 18, 1947, President
Truman signed the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 into
law.159 The 1947 Act, which is still in effect, includes most
of Truman’s proposals, with the notable exception of his
recommendation to provide for a special election.160
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D. Post-9/11/2001 Proposals and Presidential
Succession Initiatives
1. Proposed Post-9/11/2001 Legislation
The majority of legislative proposals following the attacks
of September 11, 2001 focus on the inclusion of legislative
leaders in the line of succession, the bumping provision of the
1947 Act, and mandatory resignation.i

a. Legislators
Legislative proposals since 9/11 have sought to address the
two principal issues regarding the inclusion of legislators in
the line of succession: party continuity1 and constitutionality.2
The potential for a disruption in party continuity is a matter of
genuine and continuing concern.3 In the ten years since 9/11,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
have been members of opposing political parties for three
years,ii and the President pro tempore of the Senate has been in
the President’s opposing party for four years.iii
Four bills,4 all introduced by Congressman Brad Sherman of
California, have proposed that the President have the power
to designate which party leader in each House of Congress
should be included in the line of succession.iv In the House, the
President could select among the Speaker, the Majority Leader,
and the Minority Leader.5 In the Senate, the President could
choose from among the President pro tempore, the Majority
Leader, and the Minority Leader.6 The President would
designate one of these legislators for the House and one for the
Senate by notifying the Clerk of the House of Representatives
and the Secretary of the Senate.7 Until the President submits a
letter designating otherwise, the Speaker and Majority Leader
of the Senate would be deemed successors.8
Other bills have sought to remove legislators from the line
of succession. Senator John Cornyn of Texas proposed a
i

This overview is current as of May 2011, when the Clinic concluded its
work.

ii

See Appendix F, Chart 2, for a list of former Speakers of the House of
Representatives and the Presidents during whose terms they served.

iii

See Appendix F, Chart 3, for a list of former Presidents pro tempore of the
Senate and the Presidents during whose terms they served.

iv

The Presidential Succession Act of 2004 also included this provision for the
President-elect. H.R. 5390, 108th Cong. (2004).

70

bill removing legislative officers from the line of succession
altogether.9 In a separate bill, Representative Sherman
proposed removing legislators from the line of succession
unless there is neither a President nor a Vice President to take
office on Inauguration Day.10 In such an instance, the Speaker
of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate would
serve as next in line in that order.11 However, this legislation
explicitly states that the individual in this scenario acting as
President “may not nominate any individual to serve as Vice
President.”v12
Later proposals by Senator Cornyn and Representative
Sherman did not remove legislators,13 but left the Speaker
of the House and the President pro tempore in the line of
succession.14 Senator Cornyn stated that this change was
made because he hoped that “Congress [would] enact the
Presidential Succession Act of 2005 quickly, and that the
more controversial but nevertheless critical constitutional
issues arising out of current law can be addressed as well
through separate legislation.”15

b. Bumping
Legislators have attempted to remove the bumping provision
in six bills.16 Some of these bills provide that the individual
who first acts as President pursuant to the line of succession
may serve for the rest of the presidential term “or until the
disability of the President or the Vice President is removed.”17

c. Mandatory Resignation Provision
Under the 1947 Act, any individual who acts as the President
is required to resign his current post, prohibiting him from
resuming it later.18 As a result, potential successors may be
unwilling to assume the powers of the presidency during a
temporary inability. Only two of the post-9/11 bills would
have continued the compulsory resignation for executive
officers.19 In contrast, all but one bill provided for mandatory
resignation for legislators.20 The most recent proposed
v

The Clinic notes that this proposed restriction raises constitutional concerns
that are not addressed in this Report. Specifically at issue is whether the
Acting President has the authority to appoint a Vice President under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Examination of the First Implementation
of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
(1975).
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legislation would not require the resignation of either
executive or legislative leaders.vi21

d. Acting Secretaries
It is unclear whether the 1947 Act includes Acting
Secretariesvii in the line of succession.viii One post-9/11 bill
states that officers can only be in the line of succession if the
President appointed them to their office.22 Five other post9/11 bills state that, to be included in the line of succession,
officers must have been appointed by the President and
confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate to a
specific office listed. Therefore only Cabinet Secretaries
confirmed as such would be in the line of succession.23

e. Speaker of the House Pro Tempore
Representative Sherman has proposed two bills that would
allow the President to choose among various House leaders in
selecting a statutory successor, but the bills specifically provide
that a person acting as Speaker pro tempore is not considered
the Speaker of the House.24

f. Successors Outside the Washington, D.C. Area
Many commentators suggest that the greatest threat to continuity
in the presidency in the event of mass catastrophe stems from
the concentration of individuals in the line of succession present
within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.25
Five bills have proposed adding the Ambassadors to the
United Nations, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France
to the end of the line of succession after the Secretary of
Homeland Security.26
vi

This proposal raises constitutional issues not addressed in this Report,
specifically whether a member of the legislature would be able to serve
simultaneously in the executive branch. Currently, legislators must resign
before becoming Acting President. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006). The necessity of
that requirement has been debated throughout the history of the Succession
Acts.

vii

An “Acting Secretary” is an officer who was not appointed as a principal
officer by the President but who nonetheless holds the powers of a Cabinet
Secretary. By contrast a Cabinet Secretary is an individual who was
appointed by the President to be part of his Cabinet and confirmed by the
Senate. Both an Acting Secretary and a Cabinet Secretary would have been
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for the positions
they were originally appointed to before they could become Acting
President. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19.

viii

For a discussion of this issue see supra Part VI.C.

2. Additional Post-9/11/2001 Proposals
a. Introduction
Others besides legislators have made proposals since 9/11.
The Continuity of Government Commission, a joint effort
by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings
Institute, has released an evaluation of the current system of
presidential succession in the event of “a catastrophic attack
that would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals in the
line of succession.”27 Other proposals have been advanced by
various scholars, including Dr. John C. Fortier;28 Professor
Akhil Reed Amar;29 Professor Howard Wasserman;30
and Miller Baker, Esq.31 These proposals provide valuable
perspectives on alternative solutions to the presidential
succession deficiencies present in the current system.

b. Recommendations of The Continuity of Government
Commission
The Continuity of Government Commission provides
a detailed and thorough discussion culminating in seven
recommendations addressing presidential succession
deficiencies in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.32
Specifically, the Commission recommends: extending the line
of succession to individuals living outside of the Washington,
D.C. metropolitan area; removing legislative officers from
the line of succession; providing for a special election in the
event of a double vacancy occurring in the first two years of a
presidential term; reordering the line of succession; removing
Acting Secretaries from the line of succession; supplementing
procedures for declaring a President unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office; and addressing the
contingencies which may arise during the inaugural and preinaugural periods.33
i. Extend the Presidential Line of Succession Outside of
Washington, D.C.
The first recommendation made by the Commission is to
extend the presidential line of succession to individuals
living outside of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.34
The reason for this recommendation is the concern that
all the individuals in the current line of succession could
be eliminated in a mass catastrophe targeting the nation’s
Capital.35 During the Cold War, a nuclear missile posed
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the greatest threat to American security.36 Officials in
Washington, D.C. assumed they had the capability to retreat
from the Capital prior to an impending attack.37 With the
advent of global terrorism and the portability of weapons of
mass destruction, the potential threats have intensified.
To accomplish its goal of extending the line of succession to
individuals living outside Washington, D.C., the Commission
proposes two solutions. The first proposal would add
Ambassadors or governors to the line of succession.ix38
The Commission ultimately recommends that Congress
establish four or five new federal officer positions, requiring
appointment by the President and confirmation by the
Senate, each of which would be in the line of succession.39 The
Commission contemplates that the individuals nominated to
these offices would primarily be high government officials,40
such as former Presidents,x former Cabinet members, or even
current and former governors.xi41
ii. Remove Legislators From the Line of Succession
The second recommendation is to remove legislators from
the line of succession.42 Party continuity would thus be
maintained.43 The question whether legislators are “Officers”
within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 would
become moot. The bumping provision contained in 3 U.S.C.
§ 19(d)(2) would become ineffective and unnecessary.44
Finally, this would address the concern that during times of
temporary inability legislative leaders may not wish to resign
their posts to act as President, as is currently required. 45
Recognizing that it would be difficult to obtain legislative

ix

The inclusion of governors in the line of succession raises some
constitutional concerns that are not addressed in this Report. Specifically
at issue is whether governors can be federalized under the Commanderin-Chief Clause and what federalism implications may arise from such an
inclusion. See infra note xx.

x

Former Presidents who have served two terms are not precluded from
the line of succession by reason of the Constitution’s limitations on the
length of service. A president cannot be elected to more than two terms of
office, U.S. Const. amend. XXII, § 1, but arguably could serve by virtue
of appointment, ascending to the office through the line of succession. See
Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Presidency:
Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and S. Comm. on Rules
and Admin., 108th Cong. 59 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter The Presidency: Joint
Hearing] (testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t
Comm’n, and Research Assoc., Am. Enter. Inst.).

xi

See infra note xx.
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support for a bill that removes legislators, the Commission
makes four additional recommendations in the event that they
remain in the line of succession. First, to remove the bumping
provision of 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).46 Second, to change the criteria
for selecting the President pro tempore or replace the President pro
tempore in the line of succession with the Majority Leader of the
Senate.47 Third, to allow legislative leaders to act only in the event
of the death of a President and not during times of presidential
inability.48 Fourth, to address problems concerning the continuity
of Congress within the House of Representatives.49
iii. Provide for a Special Presidential Election
The Commission recommends that special presidential
elections be held within five months if a double vacancy
occurs in the first two years of a presidential term.50
iv. Reorder the Line of Succession
The Commission recommends reordering the line of
succession.51 The Commission argues that, in determining
the order of succession, Congress should consider not only
the year in which a Cabinet level position was created, but
also the likely qualifications of a Secretary who serves a given
department.52 The line of succession deemed appropriate by
the Commission is: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense;
Attorney General; Secretary of the Treasury; and new officers
created by Congress who are located outside of Washington,
D.C. in accordance with the Commission’s first proposal.53
v. Remove Acting Secretaries
The Commission recommends explicitly removing Acting
Secretaries from the line of succession,54 as was provided for in
the 1886 Act.55
vi. Supplement Inability Procedures
Another of the Commission’s recommendations is to
supplement the procedures for determining presidential
inability by officials who are in the line of succession after the
Vice President.56 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment establishes
procedures both for filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President as well as for addressing presidential inability, but
does not address how this might be accomplished in the
absence of an able Vice President. The Commission suggests
that Congress create a procedural framework whereby an
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officer lower in the line of succession can declare the inability
of an officer higher in the line57 and that Congress could
provide guidance on how a transfer might take place and how
Congress is to be notified.58 Additionally, the Commission
recommends that Congress, using its authority under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment,59 create an alternative body
that the Vice President can convene in order to declare a
presidential inability in the event that a majority of the
Cabinet cannot convene.60 Such a body could be comprised
of a majority of governors or some other group of individuals
from outside of Washington, D.C.61 If no alternative body is
created and a majority of the Cabinet members is rendered
unable by reason of a mass attack, then the possibility remains
that a surviving Vice President will have no constitutional
means for declaring the President unable to perform the
duties of his office.xii
vii. Address Inaugural and Pre-Inaugural Contingencies
The seventh and final recommendation made by the
Commission is to address inaugural and pre-inaugural
contingencies. The Commission recommends the adoption of
three proposals.62
First, Congress and the political parties would take care to
secure the line of succession during these times.63 This could
be accomplished primarily with a change in custom.64 The
outgoing and incoming administrations could work together
so that the outgoing President could nominate members of
the President-elect’s Cabinet.65 Then, before the inauguration,
the Senate could confirm the new nominees.66 Second, the
Commission recommends shortening the time between the
casting and counting of the Electoral College votes in order to
identify the President-elect as soon as possible.67 Finally, the
Commission recommends that the political parties plan for
the possibility of the deaths of both the President-elect and
Vice President-elect.68
xii

A majority of “the principal officers of the executive departments,” as set
out in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Section 4, was not thought of as a
quorum but as a majority of the Cabinet positions. John D. Feerick,
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and
Applications 202-03 (Fordham U. Press 1976). Acting Secretaries were
thought to be the members acting for their respective departments and, thus,
would be among the principal officers to participate in declaring a President
unable. Id. For a discussion of the departmental lines of succession, see
Appendix E of this Report.

c. Proposals by Dr. John C. Fortierxiii
Dr. John C. Fortier has made numerous thoughtful proposals
concerning presidential succession, some of which overlap
with the Commission’s proposals.69 Additional proposals
include creating a binary line of succession and removing
the bumping provision in 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).70 The latter
suggestions are discussed below.
i. Binary Line of Succession
In his 2003 testimony before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Dr. Fortier proposed creating two lines
of succession. First, in cases of presidential inability,
impeachment and removal, and death and resignation,
he recommends that presidential powers and duties
should devolve upon the Cabinet members.71 Second, if a
President and Vice President both fail to qualify, Dr. Fortier
recommends that it is both constitutional and practical to
have the presidential powers devolve upon qualified legislative
officers.xiv
According to Dr. Fortier, the powers of the President should
also flow to the Cabinet in the event of a double vacancy. This
recommendation addresses the conflicts of interest that may
arise in cases of impeachment and removal.72
In the case of death or resignation, Dr. Fortier also proposes
removing legislative officers from the line of succession.73 This
section of his proposal, however, does not specifically address
post-9/11 concerns. This proposal reflects Dr. Fortier’s
opinion on the question whether legislators qualify as
xiii Dr. John C. Fortier has been the Executive Director of the Continuity of
Government Commission since 2002. He has testified before the House of
Representatives and the Senate concerning the continuity of government.
Dr. Fortier has held teaching positions at the University of Pennsylvania,
University of Delaware, Boston College, and Harvard University.
xiv

The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 10, 52-53 (statement and
testimony of John C. Fortier, Exec. Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, and
Research Assoc., Am. Enter. Inst.). A legislator is arguably not an “Officer”
within the meaning of Article II, but a legislative officer is a “person” as used
in the Twentieth Amendment. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XX,
§ 3. The Twentieth Amendment states in part: “the Congress may by law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President
elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall
act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.” Id.
amend. XX, § 3 (emphasis added). However, concerns about including a
legislator in the line of succession through the Twentieth Amendment may
still raise separation of powers concerns.
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“Officers” within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause
6 of the Constitution.xv
According to Dr. Fortier, in the event that a President-elect or
Vice President-elect fails to qualify, it would be appropriate
for legislators to be in the line of succession.74 This situation
would most likely result from an election controversy or a
terrorist attack resulting in the death of the President-elect
and Vice President-elect shortly before the inauguration,
leaving no one to qualify as President and Vice President.75
Since members of the House of Representatives are elected
in the same General Election as the President-elect and Vice
President-elect, the Speaker of the House would arguably
best reflect the political sentiment of the country as a whole
as of Inauguration Day and is the best person to assume the
presidency. If legislators were not included in the line of
succession before Cabinet members in a failure-to-qualify
scenario, the powers of the President would flow to the
previous administration’s Cabinet or even to the previous
administration’s Acting Secretaries.76 This result would be
unlikely to reflect the political will of the electorate.
ii. Remove the Bumping Provision
Dr. Fortier recommends removing the bumping provision
of 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).77 He points out that a bumping
provision, particularly in the event of a catastrophic attack,
could create several negative consequences including:
having multiple Presidents over a short period of time; the
possession of potentially extortionary power by legislators
to affect the policy decisions of an Acting President; and the
election of a new Speaker of the House by a constitutionally
questionable quorum in the event that a mass catastrophe kills
or incapacitates a significant number of Representatives.78

d. Proposal by Professor Akhil Reed Amar: New
Position of Assistant Vice President xvi
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has proposed creating a new
Cabinet position of Assistant Vice President.79 According to
Professor Amar, the creation of this position would solve a
xv

For a discussion of this issue see supra Part VI.B.

xvi

Professor Amar is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale
University and has written extensively on presidential succession. See, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995).
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number of problems inherent in the current succession laws.80
The primary responsibility of the Assistant Vice President
would be “to receive regular briefings preparing him to serve
at a moment’s notice, and to lie low until needed: in the line
of succession but out of the line of fire . . . .”81 Professor Amar
intends this office to be highly visible to the American people,
proposing that the assistant vice-presidential nominee be
announced well before the November election so that a vote for
the presidential nominee would also signal an endorsement of
the Assistant Vice President.82 The office would require Senate
confirmation.83 In addition, the line of succession following
the Assistant Vice President would run directly to Cabinet
members.84 Finally, Professor Amar suggests that if creating a
new office is not politically viable, Congress could name one of
the current Cabinet members to be next in line after the Vice
President in a purely executive line of succession.85
Under this proposal, the bumping provision would become
unnecessary, mandatory resignations would not be required,
the Assistant Vice President would certainly be an “Officer”
within the meaning of Article II, congressional conflicts
of interest would be avoided, power transfers in times of
inability would be seamless, party and policy continuity
would be maintained, and democratic legitimacy would be
ensured through the Senate confirmation process.86
Professor Amar’s proposal is not without complications. First,
the office of Assistant Vice President could erode the political
status of the Vice President. Second, there is no guarantee
that the assistant vice-presidential candidate, announced prior
to an election, would assume that office, because the Senate
could refuse to confirm him or the President could change
his nominee after the election. Third, having to judge a third
individual when evaluating a presidential ticket may confuse
the electorate and complicate the selection of running mates.

e. Proposals by Professor Howard Wassermanxvii
Professor Howard Wasserman, in addition to making
proposals that overlap with those discussed above, has
proposed a unique solution to the problem of presidential
xvii Professor Wasserman is an Associate Professor of Law at Florida
International University and has written on presidential succession. See,
e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble With the Shadow Government, 52
Emory L.J. 281 (2003); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and
Presidential Succession, 90 Ky. L.J. 345 (2001).
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succession in the post-9/11 era that draws from the shadow
government implemented by President George W. Bush.87
Professor Wasserman’s proposal lays out a framework defining
the role and composition of a shadow government.88
i. Reorder the Line of Succession
First, Professor Wasserman advocates reordering the line of
succession.89 He places Cabinet members immediately after
the Vice President in the line of succession.90 The Speaker of
the House and the President pro tempore are not removed
under this proposal but are placed at the end of the line
of succession.91 Professor Wasserman would have the line
run first through the Cabinet because an Acting President
coming from the Cabinet would have been a top official in
the executive, a member of the President’s party, and chosen
by the President to further his policies.92 Including legislative
leaders at the end of the line of succession is a way to respond
to possible catastrophic events. According to Professor
Wasserman, one lesson of 9/11 “is that the line of succession
should contain everyone who constitutionally may be an
officer under the Succession Clause and who, as a normative
policy matter, should be included in the line.”93 As long as
a House of Congress is functioning, one of these legislative
leaders can be elected and assume the presidency, should
everyone else in the line be eliminated.94
ii. Create the Position of First Secretary
Professor Wasserman suggests creating a new Cabinet
member, the First Secretary, who would be nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate to lead a shadow
government.95 The First Secretary is different from the
Assistant Vice President suggested by Professor Amar. The
First Secretary would play an important role in the daily
operations of the government. While running the shadow
government, the First Secretary would “be in contact with the
President and the administration, as an active member of the
Cabinet, aware of and involved in the creation and execution
of public policy.”96 The shadow government would be
comprised of high-ranking members of each executive agency
and department, with the First Secretary at its head, and
would function in a secure location outside of Washington,
D.C.97 Professor Wasserman’s conception of a shadow

government would allow for continuity within the executive
branch after a catastrophic attack.98
Professor Wasserman identifies several benefits of a shadow
government. The First Secretary would be intimately involved
in the administration and in a position to assume power
seamlessly in the event of a double vacancy or catastrophic
attack.98 In addition, Professor Wasserman’s proposal for
a shadow government ensures that the public knows the
identity of the individual at its head.100
iii. Allow for Change in the Seat of Government
Professor Wasserman proposes a statute that would allow
the seat of government to function in a location other
than Washington, D.C.101 The need for such a move could
arise following a catastrophic attack, which renders the
government unable to function in Washington, D.C.

f. Proposals by Miller Bakerxviii
Miller Baker has made several proposals overlapping with
those discussed above but with modifications. These are:
to reorder the line of succession; to remove the bumping
provision; to provide for Cabinet bumping; and to allow the
President to determine the order of succession for Cabinet
members after those specifically enumerated in the Act.102
i. Reorder the Line of Succession
Baker proposes reordering the line of succession by removing
the lower listed Cabinet members, with the exception of
the Secretary of Homeland Security.103 He also proposes to
amend the 1947 Act to allow the President, at his discretion,
to nominate Cabinet members after those specifically
enumerated in the line of succession.104 Baker also suggests
that the President should have the power to nominate
individuals to be in the line of succession who are neither
Cabinet members nor legislators, such as governors, subject
to Senate confirmation.xix105 To address questions whether
this proposal would be constitutional, Baker suggests that
xviii Mr. Baker is a partner at the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP.
Mr. Baker appeared before the House of Representatives and the Senate to
testify about presidential succession after 9/11.
xix

See infra note xx.
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governors be “federalized” pursuant to the CommanderIn-Chief Clause.xx Under this proposal, the line would be
as follows: Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury;xxi
Secretary of Defense; Attorney General; Secretary of
Homeland Security; and other individuals as the President
would nominate and who would be confirmed by the Senate.106
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because the First Secretary would be a position in the Cabinet with the
specific task of assuming the presidency in the case of a double vacancy.
101 Wasserman, Shadow Government, supra note 30, at 321–22.
102 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 29, at 37–43 (testimony
and prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will &
Emery); The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 12–14, 33–43
(statement and testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will &
Emery).
103 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 29, at 37, 39 (testimony and
prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will &
Emery); The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 13, 41 (statement
and testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
104 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 29, at 37, 39–40 (testimony
and prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will &
Emery).
105 The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 41, 42 (testimony of M.
Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
106 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 29, at 39 (prepared statement of
M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
107 Id. at 40 (prepared statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will
& Emery); The Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 42 (testimony of
M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
108 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 29, at 40–42 (prepared
statement of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery); The
Presidency: Joint Hearing, supra note 25, at 12–13, 42 (statement and
testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery).
109 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm., supra note 29, at 40 (prepared statement
of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery) (“In my view, the
overriding goal of the Succession Clause is the smooth and seamless transfer
of Executive authority to the most senior successor authorized and available
to exercise such power.”).
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E. Acting Cabinet Secretaries and Acting
Legislative Leadership
1. Acting Secretaries
The manner through which staff may rise through a given
executive department to become an Acting Secretary is not
consistent within the various departments. Departmental
lines of succession are established through statutes, executive
orders, and in some instances at the discretion of the current
Cabinet Secretary. Major complications of including Acting
Secretaries in the line of succession arise from the length of
the line and the differences and inconsistencies in the order of
the line within agencies and the fact that the order within any
agency can be changed at any moment.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 establishes
the order in which an individual working in a Cabinet
department becomes Acting Secretary.1 In addition to
setting time and other limitations for service of Acting
Secretaries, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act allows the
President to direct who shall serve as Acting Secretary for
most of his Cabinet positions.2 Presidents have done this
through executive orders, which in some instances operate
in conjunction with statutes creating the lines of succession.3
Currently, executive orders and statutes establish the lines of
succession for all Cabinet positions except the Department
of Energy and the Department of Education.4 In total, there
are over 400 positions from which an individual can become
an Acting Secretary and, by virtue of having been confirmed
by the Senate, become the Acting President if the 1947 Act is
interpreted to include Acting Secretaries.5 Most notably, over
200 officers are eligible to become the Acting Secretary of
State alone.6
Since Presidents can easily issue, revoke, or amend executive
orders, the lines of succession within most departments
are flexible and can change dramatically in an instant. For
example, on December 18, 2001, President George W. Bush
issued seven executive orders changing the internal lines of
succession for the Departments of State, Treasury, Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Veterans Affairs.7 Thus,
if a catastrophic attack were to occur on the same day as such
a vast restructuring, uncertainty would surely ensue. With so
many officers in the line eligible to become Acting Secretaries,
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it would be difficult to establish just who is properly in the
line of succession and in what order. The nation may be faced
with an Acting Secretary, far down a departmental line of
succession, who becomes Acting President, but who in fact
was not authorized to do so.i
Aside from problems in implementing the line of succession,
an additional consideration is the qualifications of the
individuals who could become the Acting President by virtue
of serving as an Acting Secretary. This is not to say that an
Acting Secretary will never be qualified to become Acting
President. Certainly, there may be instances in which an
Acting Secretary, because of the nature of his position or
individual talents, will be better suited to become Acting
President than other individuals in the line of succession.
i

Departmental lines of succession vary from one department to the next,
both in depth and order. First, the number of individuals eligible to become
an Acting Secretary varies by department. Second, the order of succession
within the departments is established through various means including an
enumerated list, the order in which an individual was appointed to office,
the order in which an individual took his oath of office, or a combination
of these three systems. Having various methods to determine who becomes
an Acting Secretary may not typically pose problems. However, in a time of
national catastrophe, relying on multiple systems to determine who becomes
an Acting Secretary might lead to confusion. This is especially so when a
combination of these three systems is used within the same department.
For example, the Department of State first lists officers to become Acting
Secretary in the order they are listed, but after succession has passed through
these officers, it runs through another list of officers, but this time according
to the order in which they have taken the oath of office. See infra notes 2-4.

2. The Speaker of the House pro tempore and
The Acting President pro tempore of the
Senateii
Although it has been posited that Acting Secretaries may
be in the line of succession, no parallel argument has been
made that individuals acting as the Speaker (the “Speaker
pro tempore”)8 or as the President pro tempore (the “Acting
President pro tempore”)9 might be in the line as well.
The language of the 1947 Act does not specifically address
this possibility. The 1947 Act states “[i]f . . . there is neither
a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers
and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as
Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.”10
The 1947 Act also states “[i]f . . . there is no Speaker, or the
Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President
pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as
President pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.”11
Bills recently introduced by Congressman Sherman have
explicitly stated that the Speaker of the House pro tempore
is not included in the line of succession.12 As this is the only
indication that any authority has considered that the Speaker
pro tempore might be in the line of succession, the Clinic
finds no indication that the Speaker pro tempore or the Acting
President pro tempore is or was ever intended to be in the line
of succession in any of the Succession Acts. Additionally, the
Clinic would not support their inclusion on policy grounds.
ii

The Speaker pro tempore is an individual who is named to “act as Speaker pro
tempore.” Rules of the House of Representatives, 112th Cong.,
R. I(8). The Acting President pro tempore may include the Secretary of the
Senate, the Assistant Secretary of the Senate, or a Senator appointed by the
President pro tempore. Each of these individuals can perform the “duties of
the Chair” according to Rules of the Senate, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–
(3). Apart from the lack of statutory basis for inclusion of the Speaker pro
tempore and the Acting President pro tempore in the line of succession, public
policy considerations also militate strongly against their inclusion. Many
legislators can take these temporary positions—as many as the legislators
themselves decide—and they might be persuaded to do so in order to allow
a Speaker or President pro tempore to avoid having to resign his position and
thereby shield himself from having to serve only briefly as Acting President
in the case of a temporary presidential inability. The Clinic does not believe
that such contingent legislative leaders are in the line of succession or should
be for the policy reasons outlined above.
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endNOTES
1

The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3348, 3349,
3349d (2006).

2

The Secretaries of the Department of Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2006),
Department of Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 7132 (2006), and Department of
Education, 20 U.S.C. § 3412 (2006), have authority to set up their own
line of succession with officers in their own departments. The President,
however, if he desires, still has authority to write an executive order creating a
deeper line of succession than the department heads have chosen. 5 U.S.C. §
3345 (2006).

3

The following Departments have had their orders of succession set by
Executive Order:

Dep’t of Transp.: Exec Order. No. 13,485, 74 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 9, 2009);
see also 49 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs: Exec Order. No. 13,247, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,271
(Dec. 18, 2001) (amended by Exec Order No. 13,261 § 4(g), 67 Fed. Reg.
13,244 (Mar. 19, 2002)); see also Memorandum on Designation of Officers
of the Department of Veterans Affairs to Act As Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 195 (Feb. 13, 2003).
Dep’t of Homeland Sec.: Exec Order. No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Feb.
28, 2003) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13, 442, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,877
(Aug. 13, 2007)).
4

The Secretary of Energy set the Departments order of succession by
order. See Secretarial Succession, Threat Level Notification, and Successor
Tracking, DOE O 100 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at https://www.directives.
doe.gov/directives/current-directives/100.1-BOrder-1d (acting pursuant
to authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 7132(a) (2006)). The Secretary
of Education has the authority to designate the Department’s order of
succession. 20 U.S.C. § 3412(a)(1) (2006). The current order of succession is
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/om/fs_po/osods/intro.
html#3.

5

Positions requiring Senate confirmation were established by comparing the
current Congressional Research Service (CRS) publication declaring which
positions require Senate confirmation, Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong.
Research Serv., RL 30959, Presidential Appointee Positions
Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling
Nominations (2008), the officers listed in the various lines of succession,
supra notes 2–4, and the current officers listed in the lines of succession
who have been confirmed by the Senate despite not being listed by the CRS
report on Thomas.loc.gov/home/nomis.html.

6

See supra note 3. The line of succession includes over 200 officers who need
to be nominated by the President and who are confirmed by and with advice
and consent of the Senate. This means over 200 potential officers, if meeting
the other Presidential qualifications, could have sequential claims to become
Acting President from within the Department of State alone.

7

See supra note 3.

8

Rules of the House of Representatives, 112th Cong., R. I(8).

9

Rules of the Senate, 112th Cong., R. I(2)–(3).

10

Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2006).

11

Id. § 19(b).

12

H.R. 6557, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2749, 108th Cong. (2003).

Dep’t of State: Exec Order. No. 13,251, 67 Fed. Reg. 1599 (Dec. 28, 2001)
(as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,261, § 4(i), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243 (Mar.
19, 2002)).
Dep’t of Treasury: Exec Order. No. 13,246, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,270 (Dec. 18,
2001) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(f ), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,244
(Mar. 19, 2002)).
Dep’t of Defense: Exec. Order No. 13,533, 75 Fed Reg. 10,163 (Mar. 1,
2010).
Dep’t of Justice: Exec Order. No. 13,557, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,679 (Nov. 4,
2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 508 (2006); Authority of the President to Name
an Acting Attorney General, 2007 WL 5334854 (Op. O.L.C. Sept. 17,
2007).
Dep’t of Interior: Exec Order. No. 13,244, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,267 (Dec. 18,
2001) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(d), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243
(Mar. 19, 2002)).
Dep’t of Agriculture: Exec. Order No. 13,542, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,921 (May 13,
2010).
Dep’t of Commerce: Exec. Order No. 13,242, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,260 (Dec. 18,
2001) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261 § 4(b), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243
(Mar. 19, 2002)).
Dep’t of Labor: Exec Order. No. 13,245, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,268 (Dec. 18,
2001) (as amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(e), 67 Fed. Reg. 13,243
(Mar. 19, 2002)).
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.: Exec Order. No. 13, 461, 73 Fed. Reg.
9437 (Feb. 15, 2008).
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.: Exec Order. No. 13,243, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,262
(Dec. 18, 2001) (amended by Exec Order No. 13,261, § 4(c), 67 Fed. Reg.
13,244 (Mar. 19, 2002)).
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F. Charts
1. Post-9/11 Legislative Proposals
Proposal

Year

Order of Succession

Legislators
in the Line of
Succession

Mandatory
Resignation

Bumping
Provision

Acting
Secretaries

Speaker Pro
Tempore

Miscellaneous

House of Representatives
107 H.R. 3816

2002

Speaker/Minority Leader of
the House then Majority/
Minority Leader of the
Senate.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unclear

N/A

N/A

108 H.R. 2749

2003

Speaker/Minority Leader of
the House then Majority/
Minority Leader of Senate;
Secretary of Homeland
Security moved directly
after the Attorney General.

Yes

Yes

No

Unclear

Explicitly not
in the line of
succession.

Acting President
nominates Vice
President upon
any vacancy in
the office of Vice
President.

108 H.R. 5390

2004

Generally the Cabinet then
Ambassadors to the United
Nations, Great Britain,
France, Russia, and China.
But, if no President or
Vice President is elected
prior to the beginning of
the term, then Speaker
and Majority Leader of
Senate, respectively. But,
if there is no President or
Vice President or Cabinet
member or Ambassador
named in the succession
list, then the Speaker or
Minority Leader of the
House as designated by
the President. And if
none above (President,
VP, Cabinent & Speaker
House/Minority house) then
Majority or Minority Leader
of the Senate as designated
by the President shall act
as President.

Generally no.
But, yes if no
President or Vice
President has
been elected or
failed to qualify,
or if there is no
Cabinet member
or named
Ambassador to
act as President.

Yes

No

No

N/A

Individual acting
as President
because no
President or Vice
President has
been elected
cannot nominate
a Vice President;
determination
of an individual
being unable
to serve as
President must
be certified by the
Supreme Court.

109 H.R. 1943

2005

Adds the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the
Ambassadors to the United
Nations, Great Britain,
Russia, China, and France
at the end of the line of
succession.

Yes

Only for
legislators.

No

No

N/A

N/A

110 H.R. 540

2007

Adds the Ambassadors to
the United Nations, Great
Britain, Russia, China, and
France at the end of the
line of succession.

Yes

Only for
legislators.

No

No

N/A

N/A
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1. Post-9/11 Legislative Proposals (continued)
Mandatory
Resignation

Bumping
Provision

Acting
Secretaries

Speaker Pro
Tempore

Miscellaneous

The Speaker, Majority
Yes
Leader, or Minority Leader
of the House as designated
by the President, then the
Majority Leader, President
pro tempore, or Minority
Leader of the Senate
as designated by the
President, then the Cabinet,
then the Ambassadors to
the United Nations, Great
Britain, Russia, China, and
France.

No

No

No

Explicitly not
in the line of
succession.

N/A

2004

Adds the Secretary of
Homeland Security after the
Attorney General.

No

No

No

No

N/A

N/A

2005

Adds the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the
Ambassadors to the United
Nations, Great Britain,
Russia, China, and France
to the end of the line of
succession.

Yes

Only for
legislators.

No

No

N/A

N/A

Proposal

Year

Order of Succession

111 H.R. 6557

2010

108 S. 2073

109 S. 920

Legislators
in the Line of
Succession

Senate
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2. List of Speakers of the House of Representatives
Speaker*

District*

Congress *

Date Elected*

Party**

President***

Presidential
Party****

Frederick A.C.
Muhlenberg

Pennsylvania

1st

April 1, 1789

Pro-Administration

George Washington

Federalist

Jonathan Trumbull

Connecticut

2nd

October 24, 1791

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

Frederick A.C.
Muhlenberg

Pennsylvania

3rd

December 2, 1793

Anti-Administration

George Washington

Federalist

Jonathan Dayton

New Jersey

4th

December 7, 1795

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

Jonathan Dayton

New Jersey

5th

May 15, 1797

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

Theodore Sedgwick

Massachusetts

6th

December 2, 1799

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

Nathaniel Macon

North Carolina

7th

December 7, 1801

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Nathaniel Macon

North Carolina

8th

October 17, 1803

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Nathaniel Macon

North Carolina

9th

December 2, 1805

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Joseph B. Varnum

Massachusetts

10th

October 26, 1807

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Joseph B. Varnum

Massachusetts

11th

May 22, 1809

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Henry Clay

Kentucky

12th

November 4, 1811

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Henry Clay

Kentucky

13th

May 24, 1813

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Langdon Cheves

South Carolina

13th

January 19, 1814

Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Henry Clay

Kentucky

14th

December 4, 1815

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Henry Clay

Kentucky

15th

December 1, 1817

Democratic-Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

Henry Clay

Kentucky

16th

December 6, 1819

Democratic-Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

John W. Taylor

New York

16th

November 15, 1820

Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

Philip P. Barbour

Virginia

17th

December 4, 1821

Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

Henry Clay

Kentucky

18th

December 1, 1823

Democratic-Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

John W. Taylor

New York

19th

December 5, 1825

Republican

John Quincy Adams

Federalist, DemocraticRepublican, Whig

Andrew Stevenson

Virginia

20th

December 3, 1827

Jacksonian

John Quincy Adams

Federalist, DemocraticRepublican, Whig

Andrew Stevenson

Virginia

21st

December 7, 1829

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

Andrew Stevenson

Virginia

22nd

December 5, 1831

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

John Bell

Tennessee

23rd

June 2, 1834

Democratic

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

James K. Polk

Tennessee

24th

December 7, 1835

Jacksonian/Democratic

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

James K. Polk

Tennessee

25th

September 4, 1837

Jacksonian/Democratic

Martin Van Buren

Democratic

Robert M. T. Hunter

Virginia

26th

December 16, 1839

Democratic

Martin Van Buren

Democratic

John White

Kentucky

27th

May 31, 1841

Whig

William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler

Whig

*	Denotes information obtained from the Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives Historical Archives. See House History, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/speakers.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011). 					
**	Denotes information obtained from Encyclopedia Britannica online. See Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, ENCYCLOPAEDIA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/558470/Speaker-of-the-US-House-of-Representatives .house (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).						
***	Denotes information obtained from the Library of Congress archives. See Chronological List of Presidents, First Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011). 						
****	Denotes information obtained from the University of Virginia’s Miller Center. See American President: A Reference Resource, THE MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org/president
(last visited Sept. 16, 2011).

Speaker

District

Congress

Date Elected

Party

President
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2. List of Speakers of the House of Representatives (continued)
John W. Jones

Virginia

28th

December 4, 1843

Democratic

John Tyler

Democrat, Whig

John W. Davis

Indiana

29th

December 1, 1845

Democratic

James K. Polk

Democratic

Robert C. Winthrop

Massachusetts

30th

December 6, 1847

Whig

James K. Polk

Democratic

Howell Cobb

Georgia

31st

December 22, 1849

Democratic

Zachary Taylor/Millard
Fillmore

Whig

Linn Boyd

Kentucky

32nd

December 1, 1851

Democratic

Millard Fillmore

Whig

Linn Boyd

Kentucky

33rd

December 5, 1853

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

Nathaniel P. Banks

Massachusetts

34th

February 2, 1856

American

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

James L. Orr

South Carolina

35th

December 7, 1857

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic

William Pennington

New Jersey

36th

February 1, 1860

Republican

James Buchanan

Democratic

Galusha A. Grow

Pennsylvania

37th

July 4, 1861

Republican

Abraham Lincoln

Whig, Republican

Schuyler Colfax

Indiana

38th

December 7, 1863

Republican

Abraham Lincoln

Whig, Republican

Schuyler Colfax

Indiana

39th

December 4, 1865

Republican

Andrew Johnson

Democratic

Schuyler Colfax

Indiana

40th

March 4, 1867

Republican

Andrew Johnson

Democratic

Theodore M. Pomeroy

New York

40th

March 3, 1869

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

James G. Blaine

Maine

41st

March 4, 1869

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

James G. Blaine

Maine

42nd

March 4, 1871

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

James G. Blaine

Maine

43rd

December 1, 1873

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Michael C. Kerr

Indiana

44th

December 6, 1875

Democratic

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Samuel J. Randall

Pennsylvania

44th

December 4, 1876

Democratic

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Samuel J. Randall

Pennsylvania

45th

December 4, 1876

Democratic

Rutherford B. Hayes

Republican

Samuel J. Randall

Pennsylvania

46th

March 18, 1879

Democratic

Rutherford B. Hayes

Republican

J. Warren Keifer

Ohio

47th

December 5, 1881

Republican

James A. Garfield/
Chester A. Arthur

Republican

John G. Carlisle

Kentucky

48th

December 3, 1883

Democratic

Chester A. Arthur

Republican

John G. Carlisle

Kentucky

49th

December 7, 1885

Democratic

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

John G. Carlisle

Kentucky

50th

December 5, 1887

Democratic

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

Thomas B. Reed

Maine

51st

December 2, 1889

Republican

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

Charles F. Crisp

Georgia

52nd

December 8, 1891

Democratic

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

Charles F. Crisp

Georgia

53rd

August 7, 1893

Democratic

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

Thomas B. Reed

Maine

54th

December 2, 1895

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

Thomas B. Reed

Maine

55th

March 15, 1897

Republican

William McKinley

Republican

David B. Henderson

Iowa

56th

December 4, 1899

Republican

William McKinley

Republican

David B. Henderson

Iowa

57th

December 2, 1901

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

Joseph G. Cannon

Illinois

58th

November 9, 1903

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

Joseph G. Cannon

Illinois

59th

December 4, 1905

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

Joseph G. Cannon

Illinois

60th

December 2, 1907

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

Joseph G. Cannon

Illinois

61st

March 15, 1909

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

James Beauchamp
Clark

Missouri

62nd

April 4, 1911

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Speaker

District

Congress

Date Elected

Party

President

Presidential Party
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2. List of Speakers of the House of Representatives (continued)
James Beauchamp
Clark

Missouri

63rd

April 7, 1913

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

James Beauchamp
Clark

Missouri

64th

December 6, 1915

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

James Beauchamp
Clark

Missouri

65th

April 2, 1917

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

Frederick H. Gillett

Massachusetts

66th

May 19, 1919

Republican

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

Frederick H. Gillett

Massachusetts

67th

April 11, 1921

Republican

Warren G. Harding

Republican

Frederick H. Gillett

Massachusetts

68th

December 3, 1923

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

Nicholas Longworth

Ohio

69th

December 7, 1925

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

Nicholas Longworth

Ohio

70th

December 5, 1927

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

Nicholas Longworth

Ohio

71st

April 15, 1929

Republican

Herbert Hoover

Republican

John N. Garner

Texas

72nd

December 7, 1931

Democratic

Herbert Hoover

Republican

Henry T. Rainey

Illinois

73rd

March 9, 1933

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Joseph Wellington Byrns

Tennessee

74th

January 3, 1935

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

William B. Bankhead

Alabama

74th

June 4, 1936

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

William B. Bankhead

Alabama

75th

January 5, 1937

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

William B. Bankhead

Alabama

76th

January 3, 1939

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Sam Rayburn

Texas

76th

September 16, 1940

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Sam Rayburn

Texas

77th

January 3, 1941

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Sam Rayburn

Texas

78th

January 6, 1943

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Sam Rayburn

Texas

79th

January 3, 1945

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt/
Harry Truman

Democratic

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

Massachusetts

80th

January 3, 1947

Republican

Harry S. Truman

Democratic

Sam Rayburn

Texas

81st

January 3, 1949

Democratic

Harry S. Truman

Democratic

Sam Rayburn

Texas

82nd

January 3, 1951

Democratic

Harry S. Truman

Democratic

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

Massachusetts

83rd

January 3, 1953

Republican

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Sam Rayburn

Texas

84th

January 5, 1955

Democratic

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Sam Rayburn

Texas

85th

January 3, 1957

Democratic

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Sam Rayburn

Texas

86th

January 7, 1959

Democratic

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Sam Rayburn

Texas

87th

January 3, 1961

Democratic

John F. Kennedy

Democratic

John W. McCormack

Massachusetts

87th

January 10, 1962

Democratic

John F. Kennedy

Democratic

John W. McCormack

Massachusetts

88th

January 9, 1963

Democratic

John F. Kennedy/Lyndon
B. Johnson

Democratic

John W. McCormack

Massachusetts

89th

January 4, 1965

Democratic

Lyndon B. Johnson

Democratic

John W. McCormack

Massachusetts

90th

January 10, 1967

Democratic

Lyndon B. Johnson

Democratic

John W. McCormack

Massachusetts

91st

January 3, 1969

Democratic

Richard M. Nixon

Republican

Carl B. Albert

Oklahoma

92nd

January 21, 1971

Democratic

Richard M. Nixon

Republican

Carl B. Albert

Oklahoma

93rd

January 3, 1973

Democratic

Richard M. Nixon/Gerald Republican
Ford

Carl B. Albert

Oklahoma

94th

January 14, 1975

Democratic

Gerald Ford

Republican

Speaker

District

Congress

Date Elected

Party

President

Presidential Party

Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr.

Massachusetts

95th

January 4, 1977

Democratic

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr.

Massachusetts

96th

January 15, 1979

Democratic

Jimmy Carter

Democratic
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2. List of Speakers of the House of Representatives (continued)
Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr.

Massachusetts

97th

January 5, 1981

Democratic

Ronald Reagan

Republican

Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr.

Massachusetts

98th

January 3, 1983

Democratic

Ronald Reagan

Republican

Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr.

Massachusetts

99th

January 3, 1985

Democratic

Ronald Reagan

Republican

James C. Wright, Jr.

Texas

100th

January 6, 1987

Democratic

Ronald Reagan

Republican

James C. Wright, Jr.

Texas

101st

January 3, 1989

Democratic

George H.W. Bush

Republican

Thomas S. Foley

Washington

101st

June 6, 1989

Democratic

George H.W. Bush

Republican

Thomas S. Foley

Washington

102nd

January 3, 1991

Democratic

George H.W. Bush

Republican

Thomas S. Foley

Washington

103rd

January 5, 1993

Democratic

Bill Clinton

Democratic

Newt Gingrich

Georgia

104th

January 4, 1995

Republican

Bill Clinton

Democratic

Newt Gingrich

Georgia

105th

January 7, 1997

Republican

Bill Clinton

Democratic

J. Dennis Hastert

Illinois

106th

January 6, 1999

Republican

Bill Clinton

Democratic

J. Dennis Hastert

Illinois

107th

January 3, 2001

Republican

George W. Bush

Republican

J. Dennis Hastert

Illinois

108th

January 7, 2003

Republican

George W. Bush

Republican

J. Dennis Hastert

Illinois

109th

January 4, 2005

Republican

George W. Bush

Republican

Nancy Pelosi

California

110th

January 4, 2007

Democratic

George W. Bush

Republican

Nancy Pelosi

California

111th

January 6, 2009

Democratic

Barack Obama

Democratic

John Boehner

Ohio

112th

January 5, 2011

Republican

Barack Obama

Democratic

3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate
President Pro
Tempore*
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Congress

Tenure

Party**

President***

Presidential Party****
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John Langdon

New Hampshire

1st

Apr. 6, 1789 - Apr. 21,
1789;
Aug. 7, 1789 - Aug. 9, 1789

Democratic-Republican

George Washington

Federalist

Richard Henry Lee

Virginia

2nd

Apr. 18, 1792 - Oct. 8, 1792

Anti-Administration

George Washington

Federalist

John Langdon

New Hampshire

2nd

Nov. 5, 1792 – Dec. 4,
1792; Mar. 1, 1793 – Mar.
3, 1793

Democratic-Republican

George Washington

Federalist

John Langdon

New Hampshire

3rd

Mar. 4, 1793 - Dec. 2, 1793

Democratic-Republican

George Washington

Federalist

Ralph Izard

South Carolina

3rd

May 31, 1794 - Nov. 9,
1794

Pro-Administration

George Washington

Federalist

Henry Tazewell

Virginia

3rd

Feb. 20, 1795 - Jun. 7,
1795

Democratic-Republican

George Washington

Federalist

Henry Tazewell

Virginia

4th

Dec. 7, 1795 - Dec. 8, 1795

Democratic-Republican

George Washington

Federalist

Samuel Livermore

New Hampshire

4th

May 6, 1796 - Dec. 4, 1796

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

William Bingham

Pennsylvania

4th

Feb. 16, 1797 - Mar. 3,
1797

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

William Bradford

Rhode Island

5th

Jul. 6, 1797 - Oct. 1797

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

Jacob Read

South Carolina

5th

Nov. 22, 1797 - Dec. 12,
1797

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

Theodore Sedgwick

Massachusetts

5th

Jun. 27, 1798 - Dec. 5,
1798

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

John Laurence

New York

5th

Dec. 6, 1798 - Dec. 27,
1798

Federalist

George Washington

Federalist

James Ross

Pennsylvania

5th

Mar. 1, 1799 - Dec. 1, 1799

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

Samuel Livermore

New Hampshire

6th

Dec. 2, 1799 - Dec. 29,
1799

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

Uriah Tracy

Connecticut

6th

May 14, 1800 - Nov. 16,
1800

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

John E. Howard

Maryland

6th

Nov. 21, 1800 - Nov. 27,
1800

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

James Hillhouse

Connecticut

6th

Feb. 28, 1801 - Mar. 3,
1801

Federalist

John Adams

Federalist

Abraham Baldwin

Georgia

7th

Dec. 7, 1801 - Jan. 14,
1802;
Apr. 17, 1802 - Dec. 13,
1802

Democratic-Republican

John Adams

Federalist

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party

*	Information regarding the President’s name, home state, Congress and tenure was obtained from the United States Senate website. See President Pro Tempore, United States Senate, http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/President_Pro_Tempore.htm#5 (last visited Dec. 3, 2011).
**	Information from this column was obtained from Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774 – Present, http://bioguide.
congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
***	Information from this column was obtained from the Library of Congress archives. See Chronological List of Presidents, First Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, Library of
Congress, http://loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
****	Information from this column was obtained from the University of Virginia’s Miller Center. See American President: A Reference Resource, The Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/
president (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Stephen R. Bradley

Vermont

7th

Dec. 14, 1802 - Jan. 18,
1803;
Feb. 25, 1803 - Feb. 25,
1803;
Mar. 2, 1803 - Oct. 16,
1803

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

John Brown

Kentucky

8th

Oct. 17, 1803 - Dec. 6,
1803;
Jan. 23, 1804 - Feb. 26,
1804

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Jesse Franklin

North Carolina

8th

Mar. 10, 1804 - Nov. 4,
1804

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Joseph Anderson

Tennessee

8th

Jan. 15, 1805 - Feb. 3,
1805;
Feb. 28, 1805 - Mar. 2,
1805;
Mar. 2, 1805 - Dec. 1, 1805

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Samuel Smith

Maryland

9th

Dec. 2, 1805 - Dec. 15,
1805;
Mar. 18, 1806 - Nov. 30,
1806;
Mar. 2, 1807 - Oct. 25,
1807

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Samuel Smith

Maryland

10th

Apr. 16, 1808 - Nov. 6,
1808

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

Stephen R. Bradley

Vermont

10th

Dec. 28, 1808 - Jan. 8,
1809

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

John Milledge

Georgia

10th

Jan. 30, 1809 - Mar. 3,
1809

Democratic-Republican

Thomas Jefferson

Democratic-Republican

John Milledge

Georgia

11th

Mar. 4, 1809 - May 21,
1809

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Andrew Gregg

Pennsylvania

11th

Jun. 26, 1809 - Dec. 18,
1809

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

11th

Feb. 28, 1810 - Mar. 2,
1810;
Apr. 17, 1810 - Dec. 11,
1810

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

John Pope

Kentucky

11th

Feb. 23, 1811 - Nov. 3,
1811

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

William Crawford

Georgia

12th

Mar. 24, 1812 - Mar. 23,
1813

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

Joseph B. Varnum

Massachusetts

13th

Dec. 6, 1813 - Feb. 3, 1814

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

13th

Apr. 18, 1814 - Nov. 25,
1814;
Nov. 25, 1814 - Dec. 3,
1815

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

14th

Dec. 4, 1815 - Mar. 3, 1817

Democratic-Republican

James Madison

Democratic-Republican

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
John Gaillard

South Carolina

15th

Mar. 4, 1817 - Mar. 4,
1817;
Mar. 6, 1817 - Feb. 18,
1818;
Mar. 31, 1818 - Jan. 5,
1819

Democratic-Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

James Barbour

Virginia

15th

Feb. 15, 1819 - Dec. 5,
1819

Anti-Democratic

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

James Barbour

Virginia

16th

Dec. 6, 1819 - Dec. 26,
1819

Anti-Democratic

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

16th

Jan. 25, 1820 - Dec. 2,
1821

Democratic-Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

17th

Dec. 3, 1821 - Dec. 27,
1821;
Feb. 1, 1822 - Dec. 2, 1822;
Feb. 19, 1823 - Nov. 30,
1823

Democratic-Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

18th

Dec. 1, 1823 - Jan. 20,
1824;
May 21, 1824 - Mar. 3,
1825

Crawford Republican

James Monroe

Democratic-Republican

John Gaillard

South Carolina

19th

Mar. 9, 1825 - Dec. 4, 1825

Jacksonian

John Quincy Adams

Democratic-Republican

Nathaniel Macon

North Carolina

19th

May 20, 1826 - Dec. 3,
1826;
Jan. 2, 1827 - Feb. 13,
1827;
Mar. 2, 1827 - Dec. 2, 1827

Jacksonian

John Quincy Adams

Democratic-Republican

Samuel Smith

Maryland

20th

May 15, 1828 - Dec. 18,
1828

Jacksonian

John Quincy Adams

Democratic-Republican

Samuel Smith

Maryland

21st

Mar. 13, 1829 - Dec. 10,
1829;
May 29, 1830 - Dec. 31,
1830;
Mar. 1, 1831 - Dec. 4, 1831

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

Samuel Smith

Maryland

22nd

Dec. 5, 1831 - Dec. 11,
1831

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

Littleton Tazewell

Virginia

22nd

Jul. 9, 1832 - Jul. 16, 1832

Jackson Republican

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

Hugh L. White

Tennessee

22nd

Dec. 3, 1832 - Dec. 1, 1833

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

Hugh L. White

Tennessee

23rd

Dec. 2, 1833 - Dec. 15,
1833

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

George Poindexter

Mississippi

23rd

Jun. 28, 1834 - Nov. 30,
1834

Anti-Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

John Tyler

Virginia

23rd

Mar. 3, 1835 - Dec. 6, 1835

Anti-Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

William R. King

Alabama

24th

Jul. 1, 1836 - Dec. 4, 1836;
Jan. 28, 1837 - Mar. 3,
1837

Jacksonian

Andrew Jackson

Democratic

William R. King

Alabama

25th

Mar. 7, 1837 - Sep 3, 1837;
Oct. 13, 1837 - Dec. 3,
1837;
Jul. 2, 1838 - Dec. 18,
1838;
Feb. 25, 1839 - Dec. 1,
1839

Democratic

Martin Van Buren

Democratic

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
William R. King

Alabama

26th

Dec. 2, 1839 - Dec. 26,
1839;
Jul. 3, 1840 - Dec. 15,
1840;
Mar. 3, 1841 - Mar. 3, 1841

Democratic

Martin Van Buren

Democratic

William R. King

Alabama

27th

Mar. 4, 1841 - Mar. 4, 1841

Democratic

William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler

Whig

Samuel Southard

New Jersey

27th

Mar. 11, 1841 - May 31,
1842

Whig

William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler

Whig

Willie P. Mangum

North Carolina

27th

May 31, 1842 - Dec. 3,
1843

Whig

William Henry Harrison/
John Tyler

Whig

Willie P. Mangum

North Carolina

28th

Dec. 4, 1843 - Mar. 3, 1845

Whig

John Tyler

Democratic, Whig

Willie P. Mangum

North Carolina

29th

Mar. 4, 1845 - Mar. 4, 1845

Whig

James K. Polk

Democratic

Ambrose H. Sevier

Arkansas

29th

Dec. 27, 1845 - Dec. 27,
1845

Democratic

James K. Polk

Democratic

David R. Atchison

Missouri

29th

Aug. 8, 1846 - Dec. 6,
1846;
Jan. 11, 1847 - Jan. 13,
1847;
Mar. 3, 1847 - Dec. 5, 1847

Democratic

James K. Polk

Democratic

David R. Atchison

Missouri

30th

Feb. 2, 1848 - Feb. 8, 1848;
Jun. 1, 1848 - Jun. 14,
1848;
Jun. 26, 1848 - Jun. 29,
1848;
Jul. 29, 1848 - Dec. 4,
1848;
Dec. 26, 1848 - Jan. 1,
1849;
Mar. 2, 1840 - Mar. 4, 1849

Democratic

James K. Polk

Democratic

David R. Atchison

Missouri

31st

Mar. 5, 1849 - Mar. 5,
1849;
Mar. 16, 1849 - Dec. 2,
1849

Democratic

Zachary Taylor/Millard
Fillmore

Whig

William R. King

Alabama

31st

May 6, 1850 - May 19,
1850;
Jul. 11, 1850 - Mar. 3, 1851

Democratic

Zachary Taylor/Millard
Fillmore

Whig

William R. King

Alabama

32nd

Mar. 4, 1851 - Dec. 20,
1852

Democratic

Millard Fillmore

Whig

David R. Atchison

Missouri

32nd

Dec. 20, 1852 - Mar. 3,
1853

Democratic

Millard Fillmore

Whig

David R. Atchison

Missouri

33rd

Mar. 4, 1853 - Dec. 4, 1854

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

Lewis Cass

Michigan

33rd

Dec. 4, 1854 - Dec. 4, 1854

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

Jesse D. Bright

Indiana

33rd

Dec. 5, 1854 - Dec. 2, 1855

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

Jesse D. Bright

Indiana

34th

Dec. 3, 1855 - Jun. 9, 1856

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

Charles E. Stuart

Michigan

34th

Jun. 9, 1856 - Jun. 10,
1856

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

Jesse D. Bright

Indiana

34th

Jun. 11, 1856 - Jan. 6,
1857

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

James M. Mason

Virginia

34th

Jan. 6, 1857 - Mar. 3, 1857

Democratic

Franklin Pierce

Democratic

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party

James M. Mason

Virginia

35th

Mar. 4, 1857 - Mar. 4, 1857

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Thomas J. Rusk

Texas

35th

Mar. 14, 1857 - Jul. 29,
1857

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic

Benjamin Fitzpatrick

Alabama

35th

Dec. 7, 1857 - Dec. 20,
1857;
Mar. 29, 1858 - May 2,
1858;
Jun. 14, 1858 - Dec. 5,
1858;
Jan. 19, 1859 - Jan. 19,
1859;
Jan. 25, 1859 - Feb. 9,
1859

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic

Benjamin Fitzpatrick

Alabama

36th

Mar. 9, 1859 - Dec. 4,
1859;
Dec. 19, 1859 - Jan. 15,
1860;
Feb. 20, 1860 - Feb. 26,
1860

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic

Jesse D. Bright

Indiana

36th

Jun. 12, 1860 - Jun. 13,
1860

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic

Benjamin Fitzpatrick

Alabama

36th

Jun. 26, 1860 - Dec. 2,
1860

Democratic

James Buchanan

Democratic

Solomon Foot

Vermont

36th

Feb. 16, 1861 - Feb. 17,
1861

Republican

James Buchanan

Democratic

Solomon Foot

Vermont

37th

Mar. 23, 1861 - Jul. 3,
1861;
Jul. 18, 1861 - Dec. 1,
1861;
Jan. 15, 1862 - Jan. 15,
1862;
Mar. 31, 1862 - May 21,
1862;
Jun. 19, 1862 - Dec. 12,
1862;
Feb. 18, 1863 - Mar. 3,
1863

Republican

Abraham Lincoln

Republican

Solomon Foot

Vermont

38th

Mar. 4, 1863 - Dec. 6,
1863;
Dec. 18, 1863 - Dec. 20,
1863;
Feb. 23, 1864 - Feb. 23,
1864;
Mar. 11, 1864 - Mar. 13,
1864;
Apr. 11, 1864 - Apr. 13,
1864

Republican

Abraham Lincoln

Republican

Daniel Clark

New Hampshire

38th

Apr. 26, 1864 - Jan. 4,
1865;
Feb. 9, 1865 - Feb. 19,
1865

Republican

Abraham Lincoln

Republican

Lafayette S. Foster

Connecticut

39th

Mar. 7, 1865 - Mar. 2, 1867

Opposition

Andrew Johnson

Democratic

Benjamin F. Wade

Ohio

39th

Mar. 2, 1867 - Mar. 3, 1867

Republican

Andrew Johnson

Democratic

Benjamin F. Wade

Ohio

40th

Mar. 4, 1867 - Mar. 3, 1869

Republican

Andrew Johnson

Democratic

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Henry B. Anthony

Rhode Island

41st

Mar. 23, 1869 - Mar. 28,
1869;
Apr. 9, 1869 - Dec. 5, 1869;
May 28, 1870 - Jun. 2,
1870;
Jul. 1, 1870 - July 5, 1870;
Jul. 14, 1870 - Dec. 4, 1870

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Henry B. Anthony

Rhode Island

42nd

Mar. 10, 1871 - Mar. 12,
1871;
Apr. 17, 1871 - May 9,
1871;
May 23, 1871 - Dec. 3,
1871;
Dec. 21, 1871 - Jan. 7,
1872;
Feb. 23, 1872 - Feb. 25,
1872;
Jun. 8, 1872 - Dec. 1, 1872;
Dec. 4, 1872 - Dec. 8,
1872;
Dec. 13, 1872 - Dec. 15,
1872;
Dec. 20, 1872 - Jan. 5,
1873;
Jan. 24, 1873 - Jan. 24,
1873

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Matthew H. Carpenter

Wisconsin

43rd

Mar. 12, 1873 - Mar. 13,
1873;
Mar. 26, 1873 - Nov. 30,
1873;
Dec. 11, 1873 - Dec. 6,
1874;
Dec. 23, 1874 - Jan. 4,
1875

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Henry B. Anthony

Rhode Island

43rd

Jan. 25, 1875 - Jan. 31,
1875;
Feb. 15, 1875 - Feb. 17,
1875

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Thomas W. Ferry

Michigan

44th

Mar. 9, 1875 - Mar. 10,
1875;
Mar. 19, 1875 - Dec. 20,
1875;
Dec. 20, 1875 - Mar. 4,
1877

Republican

Ulysses S. Grant

Republican

Thomas W. Ferry

Michigan

45th

Mar. 5, 1877 - Mar. 5,
1877;
Feb. 26, 1878 - Mar. 3,
1878;
Apr. 17, 1878 - Dec. 1,
1878;
Mar. 3, 1879 - Mar. 17,
1879

Republican

Rutherford B. Hayes

Republican

Allen G. Thurman

Ohio

46th

Apr. 15, 1879 - Nov. 30,
1879;
Apr. 7, 1880 - Apr. 14,
1880;
May 6, 1880 - Dec. 5, 1880

Democratic

Rutherford B. Hayes

Republican

Thomas F. Bayard

Delaware

47th

Oct. 10, 1881 - Oct. 13,
1881

Democratic

James A. Garfield/Chester
A. Arthur

Republican

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
David Davis

Illinois

47th

Oct. 13, 1881 - Mar. 3,
1883

Independent

James A. Garfield/Chester
A. Arthur

Republican

George F. Edmunds

Vermont

47th

Mar. 3, 1883 - Dec. 2, 1883

Republican

James A. Garfield/Chester
A. Arthur

Republican

George F. Edmunds

Vermont

48th

Dec. 3, 1883 - Jan. 14,
1884;
Jan. 14, 1884 - Mar. 3,
1885

Republican

Chester A. Arthur

Republican

John Sherman

Ohio

49th

Dec. 7, 1885 - Feb. 26,
1887

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

John J. Ingalls

Kansas

49th

Feb. 26, 1887 - Dec. 4,
1887

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

John J. Ingalls

Kansas

50th

Dec. 5, 1887 - Mar. 3, 1889

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

John J. Ingalls

Kansas

51st

Mar. 7, 1889 - Mar. 17,
1889;
Apr. 2, 1889 - Dec. 1, 1889;
Dec. 5, 1889 - Dec. 10,
1889;
Feb. 28, 1890 - Mar. 18,
1890;
Apr. 3, 1890 - Mar. 2, 1891

Republican

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

Charles F. Manderson

Nebraska

51st

Mar. 2, 1891 - Dec. 6, 1891

Republican

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

Charles F. Manderson

Nebraska

52nd

Dec. 7, 1891 - Mar. 3, 1893

Republican

Benjamin Harrison

Republican

Charles F. Manderson

Nebraska

53rd

Mar. 4, 1893 - Mar. 22,
1893

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

Isham G. Harris

Tennessee

53rd

Mar. 22, 1893 - Jan. 7,
1895

Democratic

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

Matt W. Ransom

North Carolina

53rd

Jan. 7, 1895 - Jan. 10,
1895

Democratic

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

Isham G. Harris

Tennessee

53rd

Jan. 10, 1895 - Mar. 3,
1895

Democratic

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

William P. Frye

Maine

54th

Feb. 7, 1896 - Mar. 3, 1897

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

William P. Frye

Maine

55th

Mar. 4, 1897 - Dec. 3, 1899

Republican

William McKinley

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

56th

Dec. 4, 1899 - Mar. 3, 1901

Republican

William McKinley

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

57th

Mar. 7, 1901 - Mar. 4, 1903

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

58th

Mar. 5, 1903 - Mar. 3, 1905

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

59th

Mar. 4, 1905 - Mar. 3, 1907

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

60th

Dec. 5, 1907 - Mar. 3, 1909

Republican

Theodore Roosevelt

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

61st

Mar. 4, 1909 - Apr. 3, 1911

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

William P. Frye

Maine

62nd

Apr. 4, 1911 - Apr. 27, 1911

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Aug. 14, 1911 - Aug. 14,
1911

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Charles Curtis

Kansas

62nd

Dec. 4, 1911 - Dec. 12,
1911

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Jan. 15, 1912 - Jan. 17,
1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Feb. 12, 1912 - Feb. 14,
1912

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Mar. 11, 1912 - Mar. 12,
1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Frank B. Brandegee

Connecticut

62nd

Mar. 25, 1912 - Mar. 26,
1912

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Apr. 8, 1912 - Apr. 8, 1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Apr. 26, 1912 - Apr. 27,
1912;
May 7, 1912 - May 7, 1912

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

May 10, 1912 - May 10,
1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Henry Cabot Lodge

Massachusetts

62nd

May 25, 1912 - May 25,
1912

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

May 30, 1912 - Jun. 3,
1912;
Jun. 13, 1912 - Jul. 5, 1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Jul. 6, 1912 - Jul. 31, 1912

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Aug. 1, 1912 - Aug. 10,
1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Aug. 12, 1912 - Aug. 26,
1912

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Aug. 27, 1912 - Dec. 15,
1912

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Dec. 16, 1912 - Jan. 4,
1913

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Jan. 5, 1913 - Jan. 18,
1913

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Jan. 19, 1913 - Feb. 1,
1913

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

Augustus O. Bacon

Georgia

62nd

Feb. 2, 1913 - Feb. 15,
1913

Democratic

William H. Taft

Republican

Jacob H. Gallinger

New Hampshire

62nd

Feb. 16, 1913 - Mar. 3,
1913

Republican

William H. Taft

Republican

James P. Clarke

Arkansas

63rd

Mar. 13, 1913 - Mar. 3,
1915

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

James P. Clarke

Arkansas

64th

Dec. 6, 1915 - Oct. 1, 1916

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

Willard Saulsbury

Delaware

64th

Dec. 14, 1916 - Mar. 4,
1917

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

Willard Saulsbury

Delaware

65th

Mar. 5, 1917 - Mar. 3, 1919

Democratic

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

Albert B. Cummings

Iowa

66th

May 19, 1919 - Mar. 3,
1921

Republican

Woodrow Wilson

Democratic

Albert B. Cummings

Iowa

67th

Mar. 7, 1921 - Dec. 2, 1923

Republican

Warren G. Harding

Republican

Albert B. Cummings

Iowa

68th

Dec. 3, 1923 - Mar. 3, 1925

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

Albert B. Cummings

Iowa

69th

Mar. 4, 1925 - Mar. 6, 1925

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

George H. Moses

New Hampshire

69th

Mar. 6, 1925 - Mar. 4, 1927

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

George H. Moses

New Hampshire

70th

Dec. 15, 1927 - Mar. 3,
1929

Republican

Calvin Coolidge

Republican

George H. Moses

New Hampshire

71st

Mar. 4, 1929 - Dec. 6, 1931

Republican

Herbert Hoover

Republican

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party

George H. Moses

New Hampshire

72nd

Dec. 7, 1931 - Mar. 3, 1933

Republican

Herbert Hoover

Republican

Key Pittman

Nevada

73rd

Mar. 9, 1933 - Jan. 2, 1935

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Key Pittman

Nevada

74th

Jan. 7, 1935 - Jan. 4, 1937

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Key Pittman

Nevada

75th

Jan. 5, 1937 - Jan. 2, 1939

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Key Pittman

Nevada

76th

Jan. 3, 1939 - Nov. 10,
1940

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

William H. King

Utah

76th

Nov. 19, 1940 - Jan. 3,
1941

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Pat Harrison

Mississippi

77th

Jan. 5, 1937 - Jan. 2, 1939

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Carter Glass

Virginia

77th

Jul. 10, 1941 - Jan. 5, 1943

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Carter Glass

Virginia

78th

Jan. 14, 1943 - Jan. 2,
1945

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Democratic

Kenneth McKellar

Tennessee

79th

Democratic

Franklin D. Roosevelt/Harry
Truman

Democratic

Arthur H. Vandenberg

Michigan

80th

Jan. 4, 1947 - Jan. 2, 1949

Republican

Harry Truman

Democratic

Kenneth McKellar

Tennessee

81st

Jan. 3, 1949 - Jan. 2, 1951

Democratic

Harry Truman

Democratic

Kenneth McKellar

Tennessee

82nd

Jan. 3, 1951 - Jan. 2, 1953

Democratic

Harry Truman

Democratic

Styles Bridges

New Hampshire

83rd

Jan. 3, 1953 - Jan. 4, 1955

Republican

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Walter F. George

Georgia

84th

Jan. 5, 1955 - Jan. 2, 1957

Democratic

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Carl T. Hayden

Arizona

85th

Jan. 3, 1957 - Jan. 6, 1959

Democratic

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Carl T. Hayden

Arizona

86th

Jan. 7, 1959 - Jan. 2, 1961

Democratic

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Republican

Carl T. Hayden

Arizona

87th

Jan. 3, 1961 - Jan. 8, 1963

Democratic

John F. Kennedy

Democratic

Carl T. Hayden

Arizona

88th

Jan. 9, 1963 - Jan. 3, 1965

Democratic

John F. Kennedy/Lyndon B.
Johnson

Democratic

Carl T. Hayden

Arizona

89th

Jan. 4, 1965 - Jan. 9, 1967

Democratic

Lyndon B. Johnson

Democratic

Carl T. Hayden

Arizona

90th

Jan. 10, 1967 - Jan. 2,
1969

Democratic

Lyndon B. Johnson

Democratic

Richard B. Russell

Georgia

91st

Jan. 3, 1969 - Jan. 20,
1971

Democratic

Richard Nixon

Republican

Richard B. Russell

Georgia

92nd

Jan. 21, 1971 - Jan. 21,
1971

Democratic

Richard Nixon

Republican

Allen J. Ellender

Louisiana

92nd

Jan. 22, 1971 - Jul. 27,
1972

Democratic

Richard Nixon

Republican

James O. Eastland

Mississippi

92nd

Jul. 28, 1972 - Jan. 2, 1973

Democratic

Richard Nixon

Republican

James O. Eastland

Mississippi

93rd

Jan. 3, 1973 - Jan. 13,
1975

Democratic

Richard Nixon/Gerald Ford

Republican

James O. Eastland

Mississippi

94th

Jan. 14, 1975 - Jan. 3,
1977

Democratic

Gerald Ford

Republican

James O. Eastland

Mississippi

95th

Jan. 4, 1977 - Dec. 27,
1978

Democratic

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

Warren G. Magnuson

Washington

96th

Jan. 15, 1979 - Dec. 4,
1980

Democratic

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

Milton R. Young

North Dakota

96th

Dec. 5, 1980 - Dec. 5, 1980

Republican

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

Warren G. Magnuson

Washington

96th

Dec. 6, 1980 - Jan. 4, 1981

Democratic

Jimmy Carter

Democratic

President Pro
Tempore

State

Congress

Tenure

Party

President

Presidential Party

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

97th

Jan. 5, 1981 - Jan. 2, 1983

Republican

Ronald Reagan

Republican

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

98th

Jan. 3, 1983 - Jan. 2, 1985

Republican

Ronald Reagan

Republican

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

99th

Jan. 3, 1985 - Jan. 5, 1987

Republican

Ronald Reagan

Republican

John C. Stennis

Mississippi

100th

Jan. 6, 1987 - Jan. 2, 1989

Democratic

Ronald Reagan

Republican
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3. List of Presidents Pro Tempore of the Senate (continued)
Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

101st

Jan. 3, 1989 - Jan. 2, 1991

Democratic

George H.W. Bush

Republican

Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

102nd

Jan. 3, 1991 - Jan. 4, 1993

Democratic

George H.W. Bush

Republican

Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

103rd

Jan. 5, 1993 - Jan. 3, 1995

Democratic

Bill Clinton

Democratic

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

104th

Jan. 4, 1995 - Jan. 6, 1997

Republican

Bill Clinton

Democratic

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

105th

Jan. 7, 1997 - Jan. 6, 1999

Republican

Bill Clinton

Democratic

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

106th

Jan. 7, 1999 - Jan. 3, 2001

Republican

Bill Clinton

Democratic

Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

107th

Jan. 3, 2001 - Jan. 20,
2001

Democratic

George W. Bush

Republican

Strom Thurmond

South Carolina

107th

Jan. 20, 2001 - Jun. 6,
2001

Republican

George W. Bush

Republican

Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

107th

Jun. 6, 2001 - Jan. 3, 2003

Democratic

George W. Bush

Republican

Theodore (Ted) Stevens

Alaska

108th

Jan. 3, 2003 - Jan. 3, 2005

Republican

George W. Bush

Republican

Theodore (Ted) Stevens

Alaska

109th

Jan. 4, 2005 - Jan. 4, 2007

Republican

George W. Bush

Republican

Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

110th

Jan. 4, 2007 - Jan. 3, 2009

Democratic

George W. Bush

Republican

Robert C. Byrd

West Virginia

111th

Jan. 3, 2009-Jun. 28, 2010

Democratic

Barack Obama

Democratic

Daniel K. Inouye

Hawaii

111th

Jun. 28, 2010-Jan. 5, 2011

Democratic

Barack Obama

Democratic

Daniel K. Inouye

Hawaii

112th

Jan. 5, 2011-

Democratic

Barack Obama

Democratic
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4. Pre-Inauguration Day Contingencies
Time Period

Contingency

Constitutional/Statutory/Party Rule
Governing Contingency

Primary Season through
National Party Conventions

Death of a Presidential Candidate

H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932): “A constitutional amendment is not necessary
to provide for the case of the death of a party nominee before the November
elections. Presidential electors, and not the President, are chosen at the
November election. The electors, under the present Constitution, would be free to
choose a President, notwithstanding the death of a party nominee.”

National Party Conventions through
November General Election

Death of a Presidential Candidate

Republican Party

Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate

Republican Nat’l Comm., The Rules of the Republican Party (2008), Rule
No. 9: “(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby authorized and
empowered to fill any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of death,
declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate for President of the United
States or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United States, as
nominated by the national convention, or the Republican National Committee
may reconvene the national convention for the purpose of filling any such
vacancies. (b) In voting under this rule, the Republican National Committee
members representing any state shall be entitled to cast the same number of
votes as said state was entitled to cast at the national convention. (c) In the
event that the members of the Republican National Committee from any state
shall not be in agreement in the casting of votes hereunder, the votes of such
state shall be divided equally, including fractional votes, among the members of
the Republican National Committee present or voting by proxy. (d) No candidate
shall be chosen to fill any such vacancy except upon receiving a majority of the
votes entitled to be cast in the election.”

Death of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates

National Party Conventions through
November General Election

Death of a Presidential Candidate

Democratic Party

Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate

Democratic Nat’l Comm., The Charter & Bylaws of the Democratic Party of
the United States (2010) Article Three, Section 1: “The Democratic National
Committee shall have general responsibility for the affairs of the Democratic
Party between National Conventions, subject to the provisions of this Charter
and to the resolutions or other actions of the National Convention. This
responsibility shall include: . . . (c) filling vacancies in the nominations for the
office of President and Vice President;”

Death of both Presidential and
Vice-Presidential Candidates

Democratic Nat’l Comm., Call for the 2012 Democratic National Convention
(2011) Section VIII(G): “Filling a Vacancy on the National Ticket: In the event
of the death, resignation or disability of a nominee of the Party for President
or Vice President after the adjournment of the National Convention, the
National Chairperson of the Democratic National Committee shall confer with
the Democratic leadership of the United States Congress and the Democratic
Governors Association and shall report to the Democratic National Committee,
which is authorized to fill the vacancy or vacancies.”
Post-November General Election through the
Meeting of the Electoral College on the First
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December

Death of a Presidential Candidate

Post-November General Election through the
Meeting of the Electoral College on the First
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December

Death of a Presidential Candidate

Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate
Death of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates

Death of a Vice-Presidential Candidate
Death of both Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates

H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932): “Inasmuch as the electors would be free to choose
a President, a constitutional amendment is not necessary to provide for the
case of the death of a party nominee after the November elections and before
the electors vote. The problem in such a case would be a political one, for if
the political party did not in some manner designate a person, the electors
representing that political party would probably so scatter their votes that the
election would be thrown into the House.”
On Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Death, Disability, or
Resignation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Prof. Lawrence
D. Longley): “Theoretically, the electors would be free to vote for anyone they
pleased. But the national party rules for the filling of vacancies by the national
committees would still be in effect, and the electors would probably respect the
decision of their national committee on a new nominee. Again, the elevation of
the vice presidential candidate to the presidential slot would be likely but not
certain.”
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4. Pre-Inauguration Day Contingencies (continued)
Time Period

Contingency

Constitutional/Statutory/Party Rule
Governing Contingency

Post-Meeting of the Electoral College on the First
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December
through the January 6th Counting of Electoral
College Votes in Congress

Death of the President-elect

On Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Death, Disability, or
Resignation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Prof. Lawrence D.
Longley): “There would likely be a debate about whether the votes cast for a
dead man could be counted, but most constitutional experts believe that the
language of the 12th Amendment gives Congress no choice but to count all
the electoral votes cast, providing the ‘person’ voted for was alive when the
ballots were cast. (The 1873 precedent, in which Congress refused to count the
Greeley votes, would not be binding, because Greeley was already dead when the
electors cast their votes.)”

Post-Meeting of the Electoral College on the First
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December
through the January 6th Counting of Electoral
College Votes in Congress

Death of both the President-elect and the Vice
President-elect and Resulting Failure to Qualify
(Presidential Candidate and Vice-Presidential
Candidate that Garnered Majority of Electoral
Votes)

(Presidential Candidate that Garnered Majority
of Electoral Votes )1

According to the House Committee report for the 20th Amendment, Congress
would have “no discretion” in the matter and “would declare that the deceased
candidate had received a majority of the votes.”2
“The operative law would then be section 3 of the 20th Amendment, which
states: ‘If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President,
the President-elect shall have died, the Vice President-elect shall become
President.’ And when the Vice President-elect took office as President, he would
be authorized under the 25th Amendment to nominate a new Vice President.
Similarly, if the Vice President-elect should die before the count in Congress,
he would still be declared the winner, and the new President would be able to
nominate a replacement.”
H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932): “There is no immediate emergency presented if
a candidate for Vice President, or if the Vice President elect, should die, if the
President elect qualifies upon the day fixed for the beginning of his term.”
H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932): “Section 3 of the [20th A]mendment . . . gives to
Congress the power to provide for the case.” Section 3 of the 20th Amendment
states in relevant part: “the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein
neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified,
declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to
act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or
Vice President shall have qualified.”3

1	H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932) (“It will be noted that the committee uses the term ‘President elect’ in its generally accepted sense, as meaning the person who has received the majority of
the electoral votes, or the person who has been chosen by the House of Representatives in the event that the election is thrown into the House. It is immaterial whether or not the votes
have been counted, for the person becomes the President elect as soon as the votes are cast.”).
2 H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932).
3 U.S. Const. Amend. XX, § 3.
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4. Pre-Inauguration Day Contingencies (continued)
Time Period

Contingency

Constitutional/Statutory/Party Rule
Governing Contingency

Post-Meeting of the Electoral College on the First
Monday After the Second Wednesday in December
through the January 6th Counting of Electoral
College Votes in Congress

Death of one or more of the three highest vote
getters where the election for President is thrown
into the House

H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932): “If the election of the President is thrown into the
House, the House, under the twelfth amendment, must proceed immediately
to choose a President ‘from the persons having the highest numbers not
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President.’ If one of these
persons had died, the political party which he represents would be practically
disenfranchised. It seems certain that votes cast for a [man who was dead
prior to the casting of the Electoral College votes] could not legally be counted
. . . . Section 4 of the [20th A]mendment . . . specifically gives Congress the
power to provide for this case. . . . Under some circumstances, for example, it
might be advisable to provide for a substitution of a name for the name of the
deceased candidate and to permit the election by the House to proceed as it
otherwise would; under other circumstances it might be advisable to provide for
a reconvening of the Electoral College; again it might be necessary to provide
that a designated officer shall act temporarily as President until a President can
be chosen in the manner prescribed by the law; and other methods might be
selected by the Congress.”

Death of one or more of the two highest vote
getters where the election for Vice President is
thrown into the Senate

H.R. REP. NO. 72-345 (1932): “If the election of the Vice President is thrown into
the Senate, the Senate, under the twelfth amendment, must proceed to choose
the Vice President ‘from the two highest numbers on the list.’ If one of these
persons has died, a situation is presented similar to that discussed . . . in the
case of the death of one of the three highest where the election is thrown into
the House. Section 4 of the [20th A]mendment . . . also gives Congress power to
provide for this case.”
Post-January 6th Counting of Electoral College
Votes in Congress through January 20th
Inauguration Day

Death of the President-elect
Death of the Vice President-elect
Death of both the President-elect and Vice
President-elect

On Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Death, Disability, or
Resignation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Prof. Lawrence D.
Longley): A contingency “may be caused by the death of either the Presidentor Vice President-elect between the day the votes are counted in Congress
and Inauguration Day. If the President-elect died, . . . [Section 3] of the 20th
Amendment would elevate the Vice President-elect to the presidency. In the
event of the death of the Vice President-elect, the 25th Amendment would
similarly authorize the new President to nominate a Vice President, subject
to the approval of Congress . . . . In the event that neither a President nor a
Vice President qualified on Inauguration Day, January 20, then the Automatic
Succession Act of 1947 would go into effect, placing the Speaker of the House,
the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, and then the various Cabinet officials
in line for the presidency.”
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5. State Statutes Binding Electors1		
State

Statute

Relevant Provision

Alabama

Ala. Code 1975 § 17-14-31(c) (LexisNexis
2011)

“Each certificate of nomination and nominating petition must be accompanied by a list of the names and addresses of
persons, who shall be qualified voters of this state, equal in number to the number of presidential electors to be chosen.
Each person so listed shall execute the following statement which shall be attached to the certificate or petition when
the same is filed with the Secretary of State: “I do hereby consent and do hereby agree to serve as elector for President
and Vice President of the United States, if elected to that position, and do hereby agree that, if so elected, I shall cast my
ballot as such elector for _______ for President and _______ for Vice President of the United States” (inserting in the
blank spaces the respective names of the persons named as nominees for the respective offices in the certificate to which
this statement is attached).”

Alaska

Alaska Stat. § 15.30.040 (LexisNexis
2012)

“The party shall require from each candidate for elector a pledge that as an elector the person will vote for the candidates
nominated by the party of which the person is a candidate.”

California

Cal. Elec. Code § 6906 (LexisNexis 2012)

“ The electors, when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall vote by ballot for that person for President and that
person for Vice President of the United States, who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party which they
represent, one of whom, at least, is not an inhabitant of this state.”

Colorado

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-4-304(5)
(LexisNexis 2011)

“Each presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate
who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this state.”

Connecticut

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-176 (LexisNexis
2012)

“Each such elector shall cast his ballots for the candidates under whose names he ran on the official election ballot . . . .”

District of
Columbia

D.C. Code Ann. § 1-1001.08(g)(2)
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Each person elected as elector of President and Vice President shall, in the presence of the Board, take an oath or
solemnly affirm that he or she will vote for the candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to represent, and it
shall be his or her duty to vote in such manner in the electoral college.”

Florida

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 103.021(1) (LexisNexis
2012)

“Each such elector shall be a qualified elector of the party he or she represents who has taken an oath that he or she will
vote for the candidates of the party that he or she is nominated to represent.”

Hawaii

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 14-28 (LexisNexis 2011)

“ The electors, when convened, if both candidates are alive, shall vote by ballot for that person for president and that
person for vice president of the United States, who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party or group which
they represent, one of whom, at least, is not an inhabitant of this State.”

Maine

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 805(2)
(LexisNexis 2011)

“The presidential electors at large shall cast their ballots for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who
received the largest number of votes in the State. The presidential electors of each congressional district shall cast their
ballots for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who received the largest number of votes in each respective
congressional district.”

Maryland

Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8-505(c)
(LexisNexis 2012)

“After taking the oath prescribed by Article I, § 9 of the Maryland Constitution before the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or,
in the Clerk’s absence, before one of the Clerk’s deputies, the presidential electors shall cast their votes for the candidates
for President and Vice President who received a plurality of the votes cast in the State of Maryland.”

Massachusetts

Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 53, § 8
(LexisNexis 2011)

“Such surnames and a list of the persons nominated for presidential electors, together with an acceptance in writing
signed by each candidate for presidential elector on a form to be provided by the state secretary, shall be filed by the state
chairmen of the respective political parties not later than the second Tuesday of September. Said acceptance form shall
include a pledge by the presidential elector to vote for the candidate named in the filing.”

Michigan

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.47 (LexisNexis
2012)

“At any time before receipt of the certificate of the governor or within 48 hours thereafter, an elector may resign by
submitting his written and verified resignation to the governor. Failure to so resign signifies consent to serve and to cast
his vote for the candidates for president and vice-president appearing on the Michigan ballot of the political party which
nominated him. Refusal or failure to vote for the candidates for president and vice-president appearing on the Michigan
ballot of the political party which nominated the elector constitutes a resignation from the office of elector, his vote shall
not be recorded and the remaining electors shall forthwith fill the vacancy.”

Mississippi

Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-785(3)
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Each person so listed shall execute the following statement which shall be attached to the certificate or petition when it
is filed with the State Board of Election Commissioners: ‘I do hereby consent and do hereby agree to serve as elector
for
President and
Vice President of the United States, if elected to
that position, and do hereby agree that, if so elected, I shall cast my ballot as such for President and for Vice President
of the United States’ (inserting in said blank spaces the respective names of the persons named as nominees for said
respective offices in the certificate to which this statement is attached).”

1	Statutes in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia bind presidential electors to cast Electoral College Votes for the nominees of the political party which nominated them or the
winner of the statewide popular vote. “Party pledge” statutes, so called because eight jurisdictions proscribe a pledge to be recited by the elector, bind the elector to cast his electoral
vote for his respective party’s presidential and vice- presidential nominees. Nineteen jurisdictions have adopted statutes instructing electors to cast their electoral votes for candidates
who garnered the most votes in the state’s popular election. Of the combined twenty-seven jurisdictions that regulate the vote of presidential electors, a mere six states provide penalties
for violating the statute. Only one jurisdiction, Wisconsin, releases electors from their statutory obligation in the event the candidate to whom they are bound is deceased at the time of
the meeting of the Electoral College.
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5. State Statutes Binding Electors1 (continued)
State

Statute

Relevant Provision

Montana

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-25-304
(LexisNexis 2011)

“Each elector nominated by a political party under 13-25-101 or by an unaffiliated presidential candidate shall execute
the following pledge: “If selected for the position of elector, I agree to serve and to mark my ballots for president and vice
president for the nominees of the political party that nominated me.”

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-25-307(3)
(LexisNexis 2011)

“Except as otherwise provided by law, the secretary of state may not accept and may not count either an elector’s
presidential or vice presidential ballot if the elector has not marked both ballots or has marked a ballot in violation of the
elector’s pledge.”

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-714
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Each at-large presidential elector shall cast his or her ballot for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates
who received the highest number of votes in the state. Each congressional district presidential elector shall cast his or
her ballot for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who received the highest number of votes in his or her
congressional district.”

Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 298.050 (LexisNexis
2011)

“The presidential electors shall vote only for the nominees for President and Vice President of the party or the independent
candidates that prevailed in this State in the preceding general election.

New Mexico

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-15-9(A)-(B)
(LexisNexis 2012)

“A. All presidential electors shall cast their ballots in the electoral college for the candidates of the political party which
nominated them as presidential electors. B. Any presidential elector who casts his ballot in violation of the provisions
contained in Subsection A of this section is guilty of a fourth degree felony.”

North Carolina

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163-212
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Any presidential elector having previously signified his consent to serve as such, who fails to attend and vote for the
candidate of the political party which nominated such elector, for President and Vice-President of the United States at the
time and place directed in G.S. 163-210 (except in case of sickness or other unavoidable accident) shall forfeit and pay to
the State five hundred dollars ($500.00), to be recovered by the Attorney General in the Superior Court of Wake County. In
addition to such forfeiture, refusal or failure to vote for the candidates of the political party which nominated such elector
shall constitute a resignation from the office of elector, his vote shall not be recorded, and the remaining electors shall
forthwith fill such vacancy as hereinbefore provided.”

Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.40
(LexisNexis 2012)

“A presidential elector elected at a general election or appointed pursuant to section 3505.39 of the Revised Code shall,
when discharging the duties enjoined upon him by the constitution or laws of the United States, cast his electoral vote
for the nominees for president and vice-president of the political party which certified him to the secretary of state as a
presidential elector pursuant to law.”

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 10-102
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Every party nominee for Presidential Elector shall subscribe to an oath, stating that said nominee, if elected, will cast
his ballot for the persons nominated for the offices of President and Vice President by the national convention of his party.
. . . Failure of any party nominee to take and file said oath by said date shall automatically vacate his nomination and a
substitute nominee shall be selected by the state central committee of the appropriate political party.”

Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 10-109
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Any Presidential Elector who violates his oath as a Presidential Elector shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).”

Oregon

Or. Rev. Stat. § 248.355(2)
(LexisNexis 2009)

“A candidate for elector when selected shall sign a pledge that, if elected, the candidate will vote in the electoral college
for the candidates of the party for President and Vice President. The Secretary of State shall prescribe the form of the
pledge.”

South Carolina

S.C. Code Ann. § 7-19-80
(LexisNexis 2011)

“Each candidate for presidential and vice-presidential elector shall declare which candidate for president and vicepresident he will vote for if elected. Those elected shall vote for the president and vice-president candidates for whom
they declared. Any person selected to fill a vacancy in the electoral college shall vote for the candidates the elector whose
place he is taking had declared for. The declaration shall be made to the Secretary of State on such form as he may
require not later than sixty days prior to the general election for electors. No candidate for president and vice-president
elector shall have his name placed on the ballot who fails to make such declaration by the prescribed time. Any elector
who votes contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of violating the election laws of this State and
upon conviction shall be punished according to law. Any registered elector shall have the right to institute proper action to
require compliance with the provisions of this section. The Attorney General shall institute criminal action for any violation
of the provision of this section. Provided, the executive committee of the party from which an elector of the electoral
college was elected may relieve the elector from the obligation to vote for a specific candidate when, in its judgment,
circumstances shall have arisen which, in the opinion of the committee, it would not be in the best interest of the State for
the elector to cast his ballot for such a candidate.”

Vermont

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2732
(LexisNexis 2012)

“The electors must vote for the candidates for president and vice-president who received the greatest number of votes at
the general election.”

Virginia

Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-203
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Electors selected by the state convention of any political party as defined in § 24.2-101 shall be required to vote for
the nominees of the national convention to which the state convention elects delegates. Electors named in any petition
of qualified voters as provided in § 24.2-543 shall be required to vote for the persons named for President and for Vice
President in the petition.”

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29A.56.320
(LexisNexis 2012)

“Each presidential elector shall execute and file with the secretary of state a pledge that, as an elector, he or she will vote
for the candidates nominated by that party.”

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29A.56.340
(LexisNexis 2012)

“ Any elector who votes for a person or persons not nominated by the party of which he or she is an elector is subject to a
civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars.”
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5. State Statutes Binding Electors1 (continued)
State

Statute

Relevant Provision

Wisconsin

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 7.75(2) (LexisNexis 2011)

“The presidential electors, when convened, shall vote by ballot for that person for president and that person for vice
president who are, respectively, the candidates of the political party which nominated them under s. 8.18, the candidates
whose names appeared on the nomination papers filed under s. 8.20, or the candidate or candidates who filed their
names under s. 8.185(2), except that at least one of the persons for whom the electors vote may not be an inhabitant of
this state. A presidential elector is not required to vote for a candidate who is deceased at the time of the meeting.”

Wyoming

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-19-108 (LexisNexis
2012)

“All Wyoming electors shall vote for the candidates for the office of president and vice-president receiving the highest
number of votes in the Wyoming general election.”
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G. Student Profiles
Carina Bergal
Carina Bergal graduated from Fordham University School
of Law in 2011 and has a bachelor of arts in philosophy and
legal studies from Brandeis University. During her time as an
undergraduate, she worked in the Civil Rights Division of the
Massachusetts Attorney General’s office. Upon graduation, she
worked as a litigation legal assistant for Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP. During law school, Carina served as a legal intern in the
Office of General Counsel of the Office of Administration
in the Executive Office of the President of the United States,
where she worked closely with White House Counsel and OA
General Counsels on diverse government legal issues. Carina
served as the Managing Editor of the Fordham Environmental
Law Review and published a Note on the proper classification
of the Mexican drug war as a non-international armed conflict.
(See Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The Case
for a Non-International Armed Conflict Classification, 34
Fordham Int’l L.J. 1042 (2011).) Most recently, an abridged
essay of Carina’s Note was featured in the National Security
Law Report, a publication of the American Bar Association’s
Standing Committee on Law and National Security. (See
Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a NonInternational Armed Conflict Classification, 32(3) ABA Nat’l
Security Law Rep. 15 (2012)).
Rosana Escobar Brown
Rosana Escobar Brown graduated from Fordham University
School of Law in 2012 and visited The George Washington
University School of Law for the 2011-2012 academic year.
She entered law school after obtaining a bachelor of arts magna
cum laude in political science from American University, where
she concentrated her studies in lobbying and constitutional
law. Rosana’s experience includes a long career in management
where, as a licensed optician she operated several high-volume
optical retail locations before deciding to pursue a college
degree and later, a second career in the law. While at American
University, Rosana was an executive board member for the prelaw chapter of Phi Alpha Delta, Law Fraternity International,
and she studied abroad in Dublin, Ireland, working with Fine
Gael, the former minority political party in Irish Parliament
which gained a majority in the 2011 elections. After her first
year in law school, Rosana interned in prosecution with the
Special Victims Unit at the Albany County District Attorney’s

Office. Later Rosana gained exposure to national security law
and information privacy as an intern with National Security
Counselors, a non-profit group based in Arlington, Virginia.
She also worked as a law clerk for solo practitioner Mirriam
Seddiq in Maryland criminal defense and immigration law, and
for the last year has been employed with Price Benowitz, LLP,
a Washington, D.C. based criminal defense and personal injury
law firm who maintains attorneys throughout the tri-state area.

Christopher Fell
Christopher Fell graduated from Fordham University School
of Law in 2012. Christopher grew up in Brooklyn, New
York. While studying history at Boston College, he worked
for several political campaigns and interned at the 2004
Republican National Convention. After college, he joined
Teach for America and taught in the South Bronx. In the
summer of 2011 Chris interned at the Manhattan District
Attorney’s office.
Francisco Pardo
Francisco A. Pardo graduated from Fordham University
School of Law in 2012. Francisco has a bachelor of arts
summa cum laude in political science with a minor in applied
ethics from George Washington University. He was a GW
scholar at the University of Oxford in the fields of politics,
law, and history. Francisco’s experience includes a New York
County Lawyer’s Association summer fellowship with the
Honorable Robert Patterson, Jr., Senior Judge of the Southern
District of New York and a half-year legal internship with
the ACLU Racial Justice Project. Additionally, as a former
Executive Board member of the Miami-Dade Election
Reform Coalition, a non-partisan elections watchdog
and voting rights organization, his knowledge of election
administration and best practices enabled him to offer indepth analysis and practical solutions to the contingencies
surrounding presidential succession during the pre-inaugural
period. Francisco is also a member of the Board of Directors
of Equal Justice Works, a national organization dedicated to
mobilizing the next generation of public interest lawyers. He
will begin a career in public service with the New York City
Campaign Finance Board as a Special Compliance Analyst,
working to safeguard public matching funds and to ensure the
compliance of outside corporate and organizational political
expenditures in campaigns for city office.
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Erin Sullivan
Erin M. Sullivan graduated from Fordham University School
of Law in 2011 and received a bachelor of science in industrial
and labor relations from Cornell University in 2007. Her
past work experience includes an internship at Fox News,
where she worked closely with Judge Andrew Napolitano in
researching and drafting the substantive content for his book
It Is Dangerous to Be Right When the Government Is Wrong:
The Case for Personal Freedom, which analyzes the evolution
of select U.S. constitutional rights. Additionally, as a secondyear law student she wrote an independent study paper on the
constitutionality of the Patriot Act, as seen through the eyes
of the authors of the Federalist Papers, and took a class on the
language of the Constitution. Erin joined Cahill Gordon &
Reindel llp as an associate in the fall of 2011.
Patrick Sweeney
Patrick Sweeney graduated from Fordham University School
of Law in 2012 and graduated cum laude from Villanova
University in 2007 with a bachelor of science in mechanical
engineering and a business minor. After graduation, Patrick
worked for the Department of Defense as an artillery
engineer at the Armament Research and Development
Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal. While there he
primarily worked on the M119, M198, and M102 weapon
systems. Patrick currently works at a financial firm in New
York City. During the summer of 2011 he interned at Fox
News working for Judge Andrew Napolitano in researching
and drafting the substantive content of an upcoming book.
Patrick will be joining the Army as part of the Army JAG
Corps.
Jennie R. Tricomi
Jennie R. Tricomi graduated from Fordham University
School of Law in 2011. She graduated from the University
of Virginia with a bachelor of arts in history in 2006. During
her last year at UVA, Jennie wrote her thesis on the efforts of
Virginian women in support of ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment. During her second year at Fordham, Jennie
studied the Constitution, its framers, and origins in a course
taught by Professor John D. Feerick. Jennie joined Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy as an associate in the fall of 2011.
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Daniel Tyrrell
Daniel J. Tyrrell graduated from Fordham University School
of Law in 2011. After graduating from the University of
Pennsylvania in 2005 with a bachelor of arts degree in
philosophy, politics & economics, Daniel served as Deputy
Director of Absentee Ballot and Early Voting for the Republican
National Committee during the 2006 election cycle. From 2007
to 2008, he served as Deputy Regional Political Director for the
Rudy Giuliani Presidential Committee, where he was responsible
for developing and implementing campaign strategy in fifteen
states and five U.S. territories. His past work experience includes
judicial internships with the Honorable John W. Bissell, thenChief Judge of the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, then-Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Justice James R. Zazzali, then-Justice of the Supreme Court of
the State of New Jersey, and the Honorable Susan D. Wigenton,
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. Daniel served as a Notes & Article Editor for the
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, President of the
Fordham Law Republicans, and Vice President of the Fordham
University School of Law Chapter of the Federalist Society. He
currently works in Washington, D.C. for the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
Elnaz Zarrini
Elnaz Zarrini graduated from Fordham University School of
Law in 2011 and has a bachelor of arts from Brandeis University
in both political science and international globalization
studies. As a second-year law student she wrote a Note on
the Commercial Activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act for Nazi art expropriation claims for the Fordham
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, on which she served as
Associate Editor. Her past work experience includes internships
at the United States Court of International Trade with the
Honorable Donald Pogue, where she drafted opinions for
district court cases heard by designation, including tobacco
litigation and constitutional law issues, the New York City Bar
Ethics Clearinghouse Subcommittee, and the Prisoners’ Rights
Project, where she drafted letters to New York State prisoners on
constitutional law issues. She took a course on the Language of
the Constitution taught by Professor John D. Feerick and joined
Brown Rudnick LLP as a litigation and restructuring associate
in the fall of 2011.
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